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Abstract 
The law on sovereign debt defaults and restructurings is heavily fragmented. The norms 
applying to sovereign debt are scattered across several legal regimes and interpreted by a 
broad array of jurisdictions, leading to a highly contradictory case-law. At the scholarly level, 
sovereign debt is seldom treated holistically. Commentators tend to focus on either the 
domestic law aspects of the debt relationship, or its international law aspects. In addition, 
sovereign debt as a of legal studies topic is heavily under-theorised.  
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a global framework to systematise the law on 
sovereign defaults and restructurings, both at the domestic and at the international level. This 
framework makes sense of the contradictions plaguing the legal study of sovereign debt. It 
also contextualises the changes which recently occurred within the law, and allows mapping 
the whole impact of legal norms on sovereigns and their creditors. The result is a better 
understanding of how the law on sovereign debt incentivise stakeholders within the debt 
relationship. 
This thesis understands the evolution of the law on sovereign debt since the 1970 as a 
succession of two paradigmatic regulatory models: the creditor protection model and the 
anti-holdout model.  Under the first model, norms on sovereign debt sought to incentivise 
the extension of credit to sovereigns by providing creditors with access to independent courts 
and efficient judicial remedies. From the 1990s onwards, these remedies enabled vulture 
funds and retail investors to heavily disturb restructuring processes, often at the cost of the 
debtor’s population. In response to these inefficiencies the anti-holdout model was 
developed. Its purpose it to disincentivise litigation on sovereign debt to facilitate the 
restructuring of unsustainable debts. This new model relies on majority-based restructuring 
decisions, a limitation of remedies available to holdout creditors, and the provision to the 
sovereign of liquidities to facilitate its return to debt sustainability.  
Understanding that these changes are united by a paradigmatic vision of how sovereign debt 
should be regulated creates a clearer picture of the blind spots in the current regulation of 
sovereign debt. Notably, this thesis will show that the recent legal changes lead to an increase 
in the risk of fragmentation of the regime, creates a system that heavily disfavours retail 
holders of sovereign debt, and does little to incentivise sovereigns to restructure 
unsustainable debts.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Ubiquitous indebtedness and a changing regulatory environment 
Sovereign debt, in the 21st century, is quasi-universal. Most States regularly access capital 
markets in order to borrow the amounts necessary to the pursuit of their public mission1. 
Sovereign bonds2, the financial instrument underlying most of the world’s sovereign debt, 
heavily feature in many a financial portfolio, from those of retail investors, to the holdings 
of pension or other investment funds, as well as on the books of most of the world’s banks3. 
Sovereign defaults and restructurings4 have also been a near constant feature of the recent 
years. The early 2000s and 2010s were marked by two high profile sovereign debt crises, 
Argentina’s and Greece’s, leading to the two largest recorded sovereign debt reductions in 
history5.  
 
1 A recent IMF study finds data on sovereign borrowing since the 1950s in at least 190 States. Samba Mbaye, 
Marialuz Moreno Badia and Kyungla Chae, ‘Global Debt Database: Methodology and Sources’ (2018) 18 IMF 
Working Paper. 
2 Bonds, traditionally, are defined as ‘negotiable debt securities’. Philip R Wood, International Loans, Bonds 
and Securities Regulation (Sweet & Maxwell 1995) 9., quoted in Michael Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before 
International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge University Press 2011) 13 
<http://ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511974922> accessed 12 
November 2015. A sovereign bond is a negotiable debt security issued by a sovereign, or on behalf of a 
sovereign, by a bank. Bonds ‘evidence the obligation of the borrower to pay to their holder, an agreed interest 
on the loan, the principal at maturity, and to amortize the issue in a specified manner.’ Edwin Borchard and 
Justus S Hotchkiss, State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders: General Principles (Beard Books 1951) 23. 
Quoted in Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals 13. 
3 For an overview of sovereign debt holdings see Serkan Arsanalp and Takahiro Tsuda, ‘Tracking Global 
Demand for Emerging Market Sovereign Debt’ (2014) 14 IMF Working Paper; ‘Sovereign Bond Holdings | 
Bruegel’ <https://bruegel.org/publications/datasets/sovereign-bond-holdings/> accessed 23 January 2020; 
IMF, ‘Sovereign Investor Base Dataset for Emerging Markets’ 
<https://www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/IMF/imported-
datasets/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/Data/wp1439.ashx>. 
4 A sovereign debt restructuring, is understood as the process via which an overindebted sovereign reduces the 
amount, maturity, or conditions of its current debt, usually in cooperation with its creditors, with the aim of 
returning to debt sustainability. They usually rely on a voluntary exchange of “outstanding sovereign debt 
instruments” against “new debt instruments or cash, through a legal process”. Udaibir Das, Michael 
Papaioannou and Christoph Trebesch, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950–2010: Literature Survey, Data, 
and Stylized Facts (WP/12/203)’ 7. 
5 While these two restructuring processes have occupied the centre of the discussion regarding sovereign debt, 
both in the press and academia, they are far from the only recent occurrences of defaults and restructuring. 
Notably, at the time of writing, Venezuela is in the midst of a sovereign default. Similarly, in 2016, Ukraine 
defaulted on its external debt, Cote d’Ivoire underwent a restructuring in 2011, Nigeria in 2004, etc. See e.g. 
Lee C Buchheit and G Mitu Gulati, ‘How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt (¿Cómo Restructurar La Deuda 
Venezolana?)’ (Social Science Research Network 2017) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3006680 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3006680> accessed 6 December 2018; ‘Venezuela in “Selective Default”’ 
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The impact of sovereign debt crises goes beyond the often-mentioned astronomic sums 
involved in restructurings. Debt crises force sovereigns to juggle between debt repayment, 
guaranteeing future in-flows of capital, and the very pressing current needs of their 
population. This fiscal pressure usually results in austerity, often leaving the most destitute 
at risk6. At the time of writing, with the world’s greatest recession looming as a result of the 
coronavirus pandemic, the question of sovereign debt and debt repayment is undeniably 
pressing7. The world’s poorest and middle economies may very well, in the coming months, 
be forced to choose between defaulting today to suffer market sanctions tomorrow, or 
repaying and sacrifice lives. 
Beyond the undeniable impact of restructurings on the debtors’ population, the losses 
restructurings cause to actors within the global financial system can threaten to trigger 
worldwide crises, as was the case both during the 1980s Latin American crisis8 and the 
recent Greek crisis9. Losses to banks and other vital financial institutions go beyond loss of 
share value. Banking crises lead to lending droughts, causing unemployment, recessions and 
other financial hardships for many10. When bonds of a defaulting sovereign are held by retail 
 
(14 November 2017) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-41982069> accessed 7 May 2019. See 
also, the annexes in Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Sweet & 
Maxwell 2009). 
6 Cephas Lumina, ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other Related 
International Financial Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, Particularly 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Mission to Argentina)’ (UNHRC 2014) A/HRC/25/50/Add.3; Cephas 
Lumina, ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other Related International 
Financial Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Mission to Greece )’ (UNHRC 2014) A/HRC/25/50/Add.1; Cephas Lumina, Sovereign Debt 
and Human Rights: Making the Connection (Oxford University Press 2018) 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198810445.001.0001/oso-9780198810445-
chapter-10> accessed 7 February 2020; Michael Riegner, ‘Legal Frameworks and General Principles for 
Indicators in Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ (2016) 41 Yale Journal of International Law 141, 168; Juan Pablo 
Bohoslavsky, ‘Economic Inequality, Debt Crises and Human Rights’ (2016) 41 Yale Journal of International 
Law 177. 
7 At the time of submission, an embryo of solution has been put forward by the G-20, the IMF and the World 
Bank. See ‘G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting 15 April 2020 [Virtual]’ 
<https://g20.org/en/media/Documents/G20_FMCBG_Communiqu%C3%A9_EN%20(2).pdf> accessed 21 
April 2020; ‘IIF Statement Following the Conclusion of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors Virtual Meeting’ <https://www.iif.com/Press/View/ID/3856/IIF-Statement-Following-the-
Conclusion-of-the-G20-Finance-Ministers-and-Central-Bank-Governors-Virtual-Meeting> accessed 21 April 
2020. For early criticisms of the scheme laid down in these declarations see Patrick Bolton and others, ‘Born 
Out of Necessity: A Debt Standstill for COVID-19’ (Economics for Inclusive Prosperity) 
<https://econfip.org/policy-brief/born-out-of-necessity-a-debt-standstill-for-covid-19/> accessed 23 April 
2020. 
8 Manuel Monteagudo, ‘The Debt Problem: The Baker Plan and the Brady Initiative: A Latin American 
Perspective’ (1994) 28 The international lawyer 59. 
9 Lamont Black and others, ‘The Systemic Risk of European Banks during the Financial and Sovereign Debt 
Crises’ (2016) 63 Journal of Banking & Finance 107. 
10 Bohoslavsky (n 6) 186. 
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investors, restructurings can mean the erasure of hard-earned savings, usually for middle- 
and lower-class individuals who lacked access to more sophisticated investment vehicles.  
On top of this undeniable relevance, the law on sovereign debt has recently been the object 
of several developments, leading to constant attention by legal commentators over the last 
ten to twenty years. First, sovereign bonds have been heavily amended to include collective 
action clauses11. The pari passu clause, topic of much contention, has been the object of 
recent re-drafting by the International Capital Market Association12, following calls for 
change by the IMF 13  and much of the scholarship on sovereign debt 14 . The domestic 
legislation on sovereign debt has also faced changes, with Belgium and France enacting 
special ‘anti-vulture funds’ legislation15, and with the UK and Belgium enacting dispositions 
designed to reinforce the immunities of sovereigns facings debt crises16. 
At the international level, norms on sovereign debt faced a quasi-revolution with sovereign 
bonds being, for the first time, the object of litigation before ICSID Tribunals17. At the same 
time, sovereign debt was the object of high-profile cases before the European Court of 
Human Rights 18  and the European court of Justice 19 , and even litigation before the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea20. This surge in international litigation on 
 
11 On CACs see e.g. Antonia E Stolper and Sean Dougherty, ‘Collective Action Clauses: How the Argentina 
Litigation Changed the Sovereign Debt Markets’ (2017) 12 Capital Markets Law Journal 239; Anna Gelpern, 
Ben Heller and Brat Setser, ‘Count the Limbs. Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses in Sovereign Bonds’, 
Too Little Too Late: The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises (Columbia University Press 2016); Mark 
Weidemaier and Mitu Gulati, ‘A People’s History of Collective Action Clauses’ [2014] Virginia Journal of 
international law 1. 
12 International Capital Markets Association, ‘Standard Pari Passu Provision for the Terms and Conditions of 
Sovereign Notes.’ <https://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Resources/ICMA-Standard-Pari-Passu-
Provision-August-2014.pdf.> accessed 2 November 2019. 
13 International Monetary Fund, ‘Third Progress Report on Inclusion of Enhanced Contractual Provisions in 
International Sovereign Bond Contracts’ <https://www.imf.org/en/publications/search?series=Policy+Papers> 
accessed 2 November 2019. 
14 See notably Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, ‘Rank Pari Passu or Not to Rank Pari Passu: That Is the Question in 
Sovereign Bonds after the Latest Episode of the Argentine Saga’ (2009) 15 Law and Business Review of the 
Americas 745; Lee C Buchheit and Jeremiah S Pam, ‘Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, The’ 
(2004) 53 Emory Law Journal 869; Mark LJ Wright, ‘Interpreting the Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Bond 
Contracts: It Is All Hebrew (and Aramaic) to Me’ (2014) 9 Capital Markets Law Journal 259. 
15 Loi du 12 juillet 2015 relative à la lutte contre les activités des fonds vautours 2015 (Moniteur Belge 
16/09/2015) 58113; LOI n° 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la 
corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économique 2016 (2016-1691). 
16 Debt Relief (Developping Countries) Act 2010; Loi visant à empêcher la saisie ou la cession des fonds 
publics destinés à la coopération internationale, notamment par la technique des fonds vautours 2008. 
17 Abaclat and Others v Argentine Republic [2011] ICSID ARB/07/5; Giovanni Alemanni and Others v The 
Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [2014] ICSID ARB/07/8; Ambiente Ufficio 
S.pA and others v Argentine Republic [2013] ICSID ARB/08/9; Poštová banka, a.s and Istrokapital SE v 
Hellenic Republic (Award) [2015] ICSID ARB/13/8. 
18 Mamatas et autres v Greece [2016] European Court of Human Rights 63066/14; 64297/14 and 66106/14. 
19 Alessandro Accorinti and others v European Central Bank [2015] European Court of Justice T-79/13. 
20 The ‘ARA Libertad’ case (Argentine v Ghana) (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea). 
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sovereign debt was accompanied by the publicatio, of two sets of principles by UNCTAD21 
and the UN General Assembly22.  
These developments have been accompanied by a particularly contradictory case-law23. 
Some jurisdictions have characterised sovereign debt restructuring as acta de iure 
gestionnis24, others as acta de iure imperii25. Sovereign bonds have both been characterised 
as investments for the purpose of the ICSID convention by some arbitral tribunals26, and not 
by another27. A least four different interpretation of the infamous pari passu clause have 
been put forward by domestic courts28. There are stark contradictions within the international 
law on economic necessity29, and heavy doubts regarding how it would apply to sovereign 
debt30. Finally, there are debates surrounding the normativity and content of the UNCTAD 
principles and the UNGA resolution on sovereign debt31. 
 
21 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign 
Lending and Borrowing’ <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2012misc1_en.pdf>. 
22 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Resolution 69/319: Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Processes’ <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/319>. 
23 On the general state of the law on debt and debt restructurings, Klabbers notes: ‘The innocent Martian 
landing on earth may be forgiven the somewhat bewildered look in her eyes when surveying the situation 
regarding regulation of international financial matters’ Jan Klabbers, ‘On Functions and Finance: Sovereign 
Debt Workouts and Equality in International Organizations Law’ (2016) 41 Yale Journal of International Law 
241, 241. 
24 Republic of Argentina v Weltover, Inc (1992) 504 US 607 (Supreme Court). 
25 Ordinanza (2005) 2005 RDI 856 (Corte di Cassazione). 
26 Giovanni Alemanni and Others v. The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (n 
17); Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic (n 17); Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic 
(n 17). 
27 Poštová banka, a.s. and Istrokapital SE v. Hellenic Republic (Award) (n 17). 
28 See e.g.: Elliott Assocs, LP v Banco de la Nacion [2000] New-York Southern District Court 194 F.R.D. 116; 
NML Capital, LTD, et al v The Republic of Argentina [2012] United State Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit 12-105(L); Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China v Grenada [2014] United States Court of 
Appeals, second Circuit 12–2619–CV. 
29Michael Waibel, ‘Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration: CMS and LG&E’ (Social Science Research 
Network 2007) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1566488 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1566488> accessed 21 
March 2016; August Reinisch, ‘Necessity in International Investment Arbitration— An Unnecessary Split of 
Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases?: Comments on CMS v. Argentina and LG&amp;E v. Argentina’ (2007) 8 
The Journal of World Investment &amp; Trade vii. 
30 August Reinisch and Christina Binder, ‘Debts and State of Necessity’, Making Sovereign Financing and 
Human Rights Work; Bohoslavsky J. P. and Cernic J. L (eds) (1st edn, Hart Publishing 2018). 
31Michael Waibel, ‘Out of Thin Air?’ in Carlos Espósito, Yuefen Li and Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky (eds), 
Sovereign Financing and international law (Oxford University Press 2013) 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674374.001.0001/acprof-
9780199674374-chapter-5> accessed 3 October 2016; Robert Howse, ‘Concluding Remarks in the Light of 
international law’ in Carlos Espósito, Yuefen Li and Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky (eds), Sovereign Financing and 
international law (Oxford University Press 2013) 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674374.001.0001/acprof-
9780199674374-chapter-17> accessed 6 October 2016. 
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1.1.2 The ‘non-system’32 on sovereign debt 
Sovereign debt, as a social phenomenon, inherently crosses the traditional boundary between 
domestic and international law. On the one hand, the legal instrument underlying the debt is 
contractual, subject to domestic law33, and the main forum for dispute settlement is often 
domestic34. Thus, failure to pay by the sovereign will be first and foremost treated as a breach 
of contract. Similarly, debt restructurings are either regulated in contractual instruments or 
subject to general principles of domestic contract law.  
On the other hand, the sovereign nature of the debtor roots sovereign debt within public 
international law. Questions relative to State debt have been addressed in specific bilateral 
or multilateral instruments35 . There is also one multilateral treaty dealing with matters 
relative to sovereign debt: the 1983 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in respect 
to State Property, Archives and Debt36. 
Despite its perpetual relevance, neither custom, nor the general principles of international 
law seem to have developed ad hoc norms applicable to sovereign debt37. Indeed, sovereign 
debt restructurings, despite constituting an important source of State practice, do not seem 
to have led to the creation of international custom. State practice, to lead to the creation of 
normative custom needs to be accompanied by a subjective element, the opinio iuris cive 
necessitatis38. As sovereign debt restructurings are usually agreed upon on an ad hoc basis, 
it follows that no opinio iuris can emerge from sovereign’s negotiations during debt 
workouts39, thus preventing the development of ad hoc custom. 
 
32 Anna Gelpern, ‘Sovereign Debt: Now What?’ (2016) 41 The Yale Journal of international law Online 45, 
48. citing José Ocampo, ‘A Brief History of Sovereign Debt Resolution and a Proposal for a Multilateral 
Instrument: The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises’ (2016) 189–195. 
33 Either the debtor’s law or a foreign law elected via choice of law clauses. 
34 Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals (n 2) 63; citing Case concerning the 
Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France (France v Brazil) (n 133). The competent 
jurisdiction being either the debtor’s courts and tribunals or those elected in forum selection clauses. 
35 See e.g. the provisions related to debt in Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed in Versailles 1919; Treaty 
of Peace (Spain-USA), Paris 1898. On this question see Howse (n 36). 
36 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts 1983. This 
instrument is however of little relevance on debt defaults and restructurings. 
37  Odette Lienau, ‘The Challenge of Legitimacy in Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ (2016) 57 Harvard 
International Law Journal 151, 152–153. In general on the applicability of international law to sovereign debt 
see the discussions in Waibel, ‘Out of Thin Air?’ (n 31).  
38 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark, Federal Repulbic of Germany 
v Netherlands [1969] ICJ Rep (International Court of Justice). 
39 Waibel, ‘Out of Thin Air?’ (n 29); Bradley N Lewis, ‘Restructuring the Odious Debt Exception’ (2007) 25 
Boston University international law Journal 297. 
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That is not to say that general customary international law and the general principles of 
international law do not apply to sovereign debt. While defaults and restructurings are not 
by themselves prohibited in international law, they can lead to international responsibility 
under other norms. For example, a State’s decision not to fulfil its contractual obligations 
can be tantamount to expropriation, either under the customary standard 40 , a Bilateral 
Investment Treaty provision41, or a Human Rights Treaty provision42. Similarly, a State’s 
conduct surrounding default or restructuring could give rise to international responsibility 
under a number of other BIT clauses (such as non-discrimination, national treatment or more 
likely a fair and equitable treatment clause) 43  or a non-discrimination or due process 
obligation under a human rights treaty44. 
Beyond issues of international regulation, sovereign debt, as an object of study is of 
particular relevance to international lawyers. The sets of interest at stake when sovereigns 
default and restructure, are closely linked to those traditionally examined within the field. 
Sovereign debt restructurings, as opposed to corporate bankruptcies, are not mere exercises 
in accounting. Restructurings inherently touch upon the ability of States to regulate their 
own economic matters. Enforcing debt obligations against sovereigns, whether on the basis 
of contracts or of international law, prevents those sovereigns from deciding for themselves 
how their external indebtedness should be managed45. Moreover, the domestic measures 
accompanying restructurings, in particular budget cuts and other austerity programs, are 
usually demands from creditors which tend to run against the desires of the sovereign’s 
population46. Thus, as was recently obvious in the Greek and Argentinean cases47, matters 
 
40 On the customary nature of expropriation see: Case concerning the Factory at Chorzow (claim for indemnity) 
(merits) (Permanent Court of International Justice); Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, International Investment 
Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2013) 195; August Reinisch, 
‘Expropriation’ [2008] The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law 
<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199231386.001.0001/
oxfordhb-9780199231386-e-11> accessed 27 August 2018. 
41 Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic (n 17). 
42 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18). 
43 Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic (n 17); Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic 
(n 17); Giovanni Alemanni and Others v. The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility) 
(n 17). 
44 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18). 
45 This right to restructure line of thinking is notably echoed in the recent UNGA resolution. United Nations 
General Assembly, ‘Resolution 69/319: Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes’ (n 22). 
See Vassilis Paliouras, ‘The Right to Restructure Sovereign Debt’ (2017) 20 Journal of International Economic 
Law 115. 
46 See e.g. Cristina Flesher Fominaya, ‘European Anti-Austerity and pro-Democracy Protests in the Wake of 
the Global Financial Crisis’ (2017) 16 Social Movement Studies 1; Luís de Sousa, Pedro C Magalhães and 
Luciano Amaral, ‘Sovereign Debt and Governance Failures: Portuguese Democracy and the Financial Crisis’ 
(2014) 58 American Behavioral Scientist 1517; Stephen B Kaplan and Kaj Thomsson, ‘The Political Economy 
of Sovereign Debt: Global Finance and Electoral Cycles’ (2017) 79 The Journal of Politics 605. 
47  See notably Anna-Lena Högenauer and David Howarth, ‘Unconventional Monetary Policies and the 
European Central Bank’s Problematic Democratic Legitimacy’ (2016) 71 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 
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of sovereign debt are closely tied to ideas of self-determination and to questions about the 
very nature of sovereignty and democracy48. Those questions are not easily understood 
through a contract law only framework, but rather require the concepts which come more 
naturally with an international law lens49. 
Understanding sovereign debt, therefore, requires grappling with the contractual norms 
surrounding repayment, the principles of international law limiting sovereign behaviour 
during restructuring, and touches upon the core international law notions of sovereignty, 
self-determination and democracy. Understanding sovereign debt, at today’s date, also 
requires a model which reflects how the legal norms attached to this unique social 
phenomenon have recently changed, and a way to make sense of the stark contradictions 
within the case-law on debt and debt restructurings. So far, however, it appears that such a 
framework is lacking.  
This thesis suggests a systematisation of the law on sovereign debt. Its purpose is to present 
theoretical framework making sense of the sweeping legal changes that sovereign debt has 
undergone, as well as systematising the contradictory case-law mentioned above. In order to 
fully map how legal norms impact States and their creditors, the framework suggested by 
this thesis applies both to the domestic and international aspects of the law on sovereign debt. 
 
<http://orbilu.uni.lu/handle/10993/28059> accessed 11 May 2020; Matthias Goldmann and Silvia Steininger, 
‘A Discourse Theoretical Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Towards a Democratic Financial Order’ 
(2016) 17 German Law Journal 709. 
48 See Odette Lienau, ‘Who Is the Sovereign in Sovereign Debt? Reinterpreting a Rule-of-Law Framework 
from the Early Twentieth Century’ (Social Science Research Network 2008) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 
1143063 63–64 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1143063> accessed 12 January 2016; Odette Lienau, 
Rethinking Sovereign Debt: Politics, Reputation, and Legitimacy in Modern Finance (Harvard University Press 
2014); Odette Lienau, ‘Extending the European Debt Discussion to Broader International Governance’ [2011] 
Cornell Law Faculty Publications <https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/593>. These issues echo the 
concerns regarding economic self-determination which have been encapsulated under the label of the ‘New 
International Economic Order’. See United Nations General Assembly, ‘Resolution 3281 (XXIX). Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States’ <http://www.un-documents.net/a29r3281.htm>; United Nations 
General Assembly, ‘Resolution  3202 (S-VI). Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order’ <http://www.un-documents.net/s6r3202.htm>; Antony Anghie, ‘Legal Aspects 
of the New International Economic Order’ (2015) 6 Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, 
Humanitarianism, and Development 145; Lorenz Eitner, Foreign Debts In The Present And A New 
International Economic Order (Routledge 2019). 
49 Goldmann and von Bongdandy argue notably that one should understand sovereign debt restructurings as 
exercises of public authority and not as private transactions. See Armin von Bogdandy and Matthias Goldmann, 
‘Sovereign Debt Restructurings as Exercises of International Public Authority’ in Carlos Espósito, Yuefen Li 
and Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky (eds), Sovereign Financing and international law (Oxford University Press 2013) 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674374.001.0001/acprof-
9780199674374-chapter-3> accessed 3 October 2016; Matthias Goldmann, ‘Public and Private Authority in a 
Global Setting: The Example of Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ (2018) 25 Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 331. 
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This framework understands the law on sovereign debt as a succession between two distinct 
coherent regulatory models: the creditor protection model and the anti-holdout model. The 
creditor protection models aims to provide creditors with efficient legal remedies as an 
incentive to lend to sovereigns. These benefits both parties in the sovereign debt relationship 
as it enables States to borrow under better conditions, while protecting creditors against 
repudiation. The anti-holdout model is a reaction to the collective action issues which arose 
in the 1990s and early 2000s and rendered restructurings increasingly difficult. It aims at 
encouraging creditor participation in sovereign debt restructurings by disincentivising 
creditors from holding out of reasonable restructuring offers.  
Before delving in the methodology behind this project, two clarifications need to be made.  
First, this thesis needs to define what it means by sovereign debt and which aspects of the 
law on sovereign debt it focuses on. Then, it needs to review the current state of the 
scholarship on sovereign debt, as the gaps within the way lawyers have approached this topic, 
provide a direct background behind the necessity of developing the framework advanced 
here. 
1.2 Defining and studying sovereign debt 
1.2.1 Defining sovereign debt 
Traditionally, the scholarship on State’s debts has divided sovereign debt into several 
categories.  
Bilateral debt is usually understood as debt lent by one sovereign to another50. Multilateral 
debt, a contrario, is usually defined as debt owed by a sovereign to an international 
organisation, typically the IMF or the World Bank51.  
Sovereign debt has also been traditionally divided between internal and external debt. 
External debt being “expressed in foreign currency, typically payable abroad, governed by 
external law and subject to the jurisdiction of external courts.”52 Internal debt, a contrario, 
is payable domestically, in the local currency and adjudicated by the sovereign’s domestic 
 
50 Mauro Megliani, Sovereign Debt: Genesis, Restructuring, Litigation (Springer 2015) 97. 
51 ibid 123. 
52 Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals (n 2) 13. 
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laws and courts. Some authors characterise internal debt as the debt repayable on the territory 
of the sovereign and external debt as the debt repayable abroad53. However, the place of 
repayment has little impact on the norms applicable to the bonds54. At today’s date, the 
distinction between internal and external debt is somewhat artificial55. While historically, 
internal debt was usually borrowed by the sovereign’s own population, the rise of modern 
finance has globalised exposure to ‘internal’ debt instruments 56 . Furthermore, the 
development of the Eurozone calls into question the workability of the distinction between 
internal and external debt. Indeed, member States of the Eurozone typically issue bonds 
under domestic law but denominated in Euro, a currency over which they have little control.  
This thesis, when it mentions sovereign debt focuses only on either internal or external debt, 
and generally not on multilateral and bilateral debt. The reason for this limit is triple. First, 
the legal regime on multilateral debt is fundamentally different from the one governing 
domestic and external debt, as the first is governed by ad hoc international legal instruments. 
Moreover, the creditor-debtor dynamic arising from bilateral and multilateral debt is 
materially different from the one governing the relationship between sovereigns and their 
private creditors57. Finally, at today’s date, the bulk of sovereign indebtedness is emitted 
either internally or externally to private entities58, warranting an in-depth analysis of the 
legal regime governing it. 
 
53 Hayk Kupelyants, Sovereign Defaults Before Domestic Courts (Oxford University Press 2018) 7. 
54 François Gianviti, ‘The International Monetary Fund and External Debt’, Academy of international law, 
Recueil des cours 234. 
55 Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals (n 2) 13; Megliani, Sovereign Debt 
(n 56) 4, citing François Gianviti, ‘The International Monetary Fund and External Debt’ (1989) III Academy 
of international law, Recueil des cours 205, 235.   
56 Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals (n 2) 13. 
57 Bilateral debt is typically restructured through ad hoc negotiations at the Paris club and litigation over 
bilateral loan is rare. Similarly, multilateral debt has not been the object of litigation and is entirely governed 
by Treaty. On the Paris Club’s functioning see Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch (n 4) 9–14; Megliani, Sovereign 
Debt (n 50) 278–307; Ann Vourc’h, ‘L’allégement de la dette au Club de Paris’ (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 1992) OECD Development Centre Working Papers <http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/content/workingpaper/380566408014> accessed 23 February 2016; Alexis Rieffel, ‘The Paris 
Club, 1978-1983’ (1984) 28 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 83; Alexis Rieffel, ‘The Role of the Paris 
Club in Managing Debt Problems’ [1985] Essays in International Finance 2. 
58 Matthias Schlegl, Christoph Trebesch and Mark LJ Wright, ‘The Seniority Structure of Sovereign Debt’ 
(National Bureau of Economic Research 2019) Working Paper 25793 6 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w25793> 
accessed 23 January 2020. 
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For similar reasons, this thesis will not focus on debts arising from war reparations or on 
odious ‘debts’59. These two regimes, again, are governed by ad hoc norms and their analysis 
sheds little light on the relationship between private creditors and sovereigns60. 
Finally, it should be noted, that this thesis cannot analyse the entire regulation of internal or 
external sovereign indebtedness, but rather focuses on the law surrounding default and debt 
restructurings61. The main reason for such a narrow focus is that the changes this thesis focus 
on have essentially occurred within the norms concerning debt repayment stricto sensu. In 
addition, the private-creditor/sovereign-debtor dynamic which is at the centre of much of the 
scholarly discussion on sovereign debt is essentially centred on those specific norms. 
To summarise, when this thesis uses the term ‘sovereign debt law’ it does so as a short-hand 
for: the ensemble of domestic and international law norms governing sovereign, internal or 
external, debt defaults and restructurings. 
1.2.2 Ontological fragmentation 
As mentioned above sovereign debt, as a social phenomenon, is entangled in both domestic 
and international legal sources. Understanding it, therefore, requires a theoretical framework 
explaining both of those legal aspects of the debt relationship. However, the scholarship on 
sovereign debt has been ‘ontologically fragmented’. With the notable exceptions of 
Megliani’s “Sovereign debt: Genesis – Restructuring – Litigation”, Lastra and Buchheit 
“Sovereign debt Management”62, and Olivares-Caminal’s “Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt 
Restructurings”63 few scholarly works have attempted to analyse sovereign debt in a holistic 
fashion.  
 
59 Odious debts traditionally refer to debts inherit from non-democratic regimes, debts of occupation and debts 
of “subjugation”. See Howse (n 35). This characterisation was first advanced in Aleksandr N Sack, Les Effets 
Des Transformations Des États Sur Leurs Dettes Publiques et Autres Obligations Financières. (Recueil Sirey 
1927). 
60 For an overview of the law governing war reparations see e.g. Pierre d’Argent, Les Réparations de Guerre 
En Droit International Public. La Responsabilité Internationale Des Etats à l’épreuve de La Guerre. (2002) 
<https://dial.uclouvain.be/pr/boreal/object/boreal:91715> accessed 1 April 2019. It is undeniable that some 
‘odious debts’ are held by private creditors. See e.g. Tinoco Claims Arbitration (Great Britain v Costa Rica) 
(1923) 1 U N Rep Arbitr Awards 369. However, the questions surrounding odious debt as a topic of legal 
scholarship focus more of matters of State succession and/or government succession and therefore are 
materially different from those arising when sovereigns default or restructure for economic reasons. For an 
overview of the law on odious debt see Lienau, Rethinking Sovereign Debt (n 47); Jeff King, The Doctrine of 
Odious Debt in international law: A Restatement (Cambridge University Press 2016); Howse (n 34). 
61 Instead of e.g., the norms regulating the issuance of bonds, or those regulating their holdings.  
62 Rosa Maria Lastra and Lee C Buchheit (eds), Sovereign Debt Management (First edition, Oxford University 
Press 2014). 
63 Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (n 5). 
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Most commentators on sovereign debt law have rather provided in-depth examinations of 
specific aspects of the debt relationship. Notably, Waibel’s “Sovereign Debt before 
International Courts and Tribunals”64 provides an overview of the international litigation on 
sovereign debt and highlights the trends present in said litigation65. Hayk Kupelyants’ 2018 
“Sovereign Defaults before Domestic Courts”66 provides an analysis of the domestic British 
litigation on sovereign debt. Lienau’s “Rethinking Sovereign Debt” 67  and King’s “The 
Doctrine of Odious Debt in International law – a restatement”68 provide the most recent 
studies of the odious debt doctrine69.  Recent collective works have focused on the impact 
of sovereign debt restructurings on human rights 70 , on the UNCTAD’s principles on 
sovereign lending and borrowing71, and on the lack of adequate regulatory structure to 
manage sovereign debt restructurings72. 
A large swath of the scholarship on sovereign debt has also focused on the ‘vulture fund 
phenomenon’, either to analyse its rise and impact, to critique decisions favouring vulture 
funds, to find solutions to the vulture fund phenomenon, or in rare cases to argue that the 
actions of vulture funds participate in the good functioning of the sovereign debt market73. 
In the same vein, the pari passu clause and its multiple interpretations has, led to many a 
 
64 Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals (n 2). 
65 There has been earlier attempts to analyse the international law on sovereign debt see e.g. Nicolas Politis, 
Les emprunts d’état en droit international (A Durand et Pedone-Lauriel 1894). 
66 Kupelyants (n 53). 
67 Lienau, Rethinking Sovereign Debt (n 48). 
68 King (n 60). 
69 Dee also Howse (n 35); Lee C Buchheit, G Mitu Gulati and Robert B Thompson, ‘The Dilemma of Odious 
Debts’ (Social Science Research Network 2006) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 932916 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=932916> accessed 13 January 2016; Anna Gelpern, ‘Odious, Not Debt’ [2007] 
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works 
<https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1868>; ibid. 
70 Sovereign Debt and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2019). 
71 Carlos Espósito, Yuefen Li and Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky (eds), Sovereign Financing and international law: 
The UNCTAD Principles on Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing (Oxford University Press 2013) 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674374.001.0001/acprof-
9780199674374> accessed 16 November 2015. 
72  Too Little, Too Late: The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises (Columbia University Press 2016) 
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/guzm17926> accessed 25 April 2019. 
73 See Elisa Beneze, ‘Stopping the Circling Vultures: Restructuring a Solution to Sovereign Debt Profiteering 
Note’ (2016) 49 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 245; Jonathan Blackman and Rahul Mukhi, ‘The 
Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna’ (2010) 73 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 47; Jill Fisch and Caroline Gentile, ‘Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of 
Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ (2004) 53 Emory Law Journal 1043; Mauro Megliani, ‘Vultures 
in Courts: Why the UNCTAD Principles on Responsible Financing Cannot Stop Litigation’ (2015) 28 Leiden 
Journal of international law 849; Marcus Miller and Dania Thomas, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Judge, 
the Vultures and Creditor Rights’ (2007) 30 World Economy 1491; Marcus Miller and Dania Thomas, 
‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Judge, the Vultures and Creditor Rights’ (2007) 30 World Economy 1491; 
Tim R Samples, ‘Rogue Trends in Sovereign Debt: Argentina, Vulture Funds, and Pari Passu Under New York 
Law’ (Social Science Research Network 2014) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2403342 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2403342> accessed 19 August 2016; Patrick R Wautelet, ‘Vulture Funds, 
Creditors and Sovereign Debtors: How to Find a Balance?’ (Social Science Research Network 2011) SSRN 
Scholarly Paper ID 1994425 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1994425> accessed 11 February 2019. 
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take in legal journals. Most of these takes have focused on critiques of the judicial 
interpretation of the clause74, on the reason for the clause’s presence in sovereign bonds, or 
on the lack of market reactions to its interpretation75. 
Similarly, suggestions for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM), and 
analysis of SDRM proposals have occupied a large space within the recent scholarly debate 
on sovereign debt 76 . Studies have also focused on specific restructurings and on key 
moments within the development of the current sovereign debt market. In particular, the 
scholarship on sovereign debt has heavily focused on the Latin American debt crisis77 and 
the Argentinean78 and Greek79 restructuring processes. 
 
74 Sergio Chodos, ‘Fromt the Pari Passu Discussion to the “Illegality” of Making Payments’, Too Little, Too 
Late: The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises; M. Guzman, J.A. Ocampo, J.E. Stiglitz (eds) (Columbia 
University Press 2016); Robert A Cohen, ‘Sometimes a Cigar Is Just a Cigar: The Simple Story of Pari Passu’ 
(2011) 40 Hofstra Law Review 11; Romain Zamour, ‘NML Argentina and the Ratable Payment Interpretation 
of the Pari Passu Clause’ (2013) 38 The Yale Journal of international law Online 
<http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-38-zamour-nml-v-argentina.pdf>; Taylor Klavan, ‘Rock the Boat: How the 
Conflict between NML Capital and the Republic of Argentina Will Affect International Investment’ (2013) 5 
Creighton International and Comparative Law Journal 47; William W Bratton, ‘Pari Passu and a Distressed 
Sovereign’s Rational Choices’ (Social Science Research Network 2010) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 505942 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=505942> accessed 26 September 2016; Olivares-Caminal, ‘Rank Pari Passu 
or Not to Rank Pari Passu’ (n 13); ‘Analysis of the Role, Use and Meaning of Pari Passu Clauses in Sovereign 
Debt Obligations as a Matter of English Law’ <http://www.fmlc.org/uploads/2/6/5/8/26584807/79.pdf>. 
75 Mitu Gulati and Robert E Scott, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate Andthe Limits of 
Contract Design (University of Chicago Press 2013); Lee C Buchheit, ‘The Pari Passu Clause Sub Specie 
Aeternitatis’ (1991) 10 International Financial Law Review 11; Buchheit and Pam (n 14); Lee C Buchheit and 
Jeremiah S Pam, ‘The Hunt for Pari Passu Cover Story’ (2004) 23 International Financial Law Review 20; 
Mark Weidemaier, Robert Scott and Mitu Gulati, ‘Origin Myths, Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu’ (2013) 
38 Law & Social Inquiry 72. 
76 See e.g. Anne Krueger, ‘A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ [2002] IMF Working Paper 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf>; Patrick Bolton and David AJr Skeel, ‘Inside 
the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured Conference on Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring: The View from the Legal Academy’ (2004) 53 Emory Law Journal 763; Jochen R Andritzky 
and others, ‘A Mechanism to Regulate Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the Euro Area’ (Social Science 
Research Network 2016) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2845278 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2845278> 
accessed 2 April 2019; Charles Mooney, ‘A Framework for a Formal Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism: 
The KISS Principle (Keep It Simple, Stupid) and Other Guiding Principles’ [2015] Faculty Scholarship at Penn 
Law <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1547>; Richard Euliss, ‘The Feasibility of the 
IMF’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism: An Alternative Statutory Approach to Mollify American 
Reservations’ (2003) 19 American University international law Review 
<https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol19/iss1/5>; Sean Hagan, ‘Designing a Legal Framework 
to Restructure Sovereign Debt’ (2004) 36 Georgetown Journal of international law 299. 
77 Monteagudo (n 8); Philip Power, ‘Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and Its Implications 
for Futures Restructurings’ (1995) 64 Fordham Law Review 2701; Theodore Allegaert, ‘Recalcitrant Creditors 
against Debtor Nations, or How to Play Darts’ (1997) 6 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 429. 
78 Anna Gelpern, ‘What Bond Markets Can Learn from Argentina’ (2005) 24 International Financial Law 
Review 19; Rainer Kulms, ‘Private Creditors and Sovereign Default: From Argentina to Greece’ (2012) 2012 
Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade - International Edition 65; Samples (n 73); Klavan (n 74). 
79 Kulms (n 78); Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch and Mitu Gulati, ‘The Greek Debt Restructuring: 
An Autopsy’ (2013) 28 Economic Policy 513; Lee C Buchheit, ‘Restructuring a Nation’s Debt Capital Markets: 
Greek Sovereign Debt’ (2010) 29 International Financial Law Review 46; Sebastian Grund, ‘Restructuring 
Government Debt under Local Law: The Greek Case and Implications for Investor Protection in Europe’ (2017) 
12 Capital Markets Law Journal 253; Alexander Metalinos, ‘The Greek Sovereign Debt Restructuring’, 
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If one focuses on international law80, the competence of arbitral tribunals on sovereign debt 
cases has led to several usually critical studies81. International lawyers have also focused on 
sovereign immunities and sovereign debt 82 , and the recent UNGA and UNCTAD 
developments regarding sovereign debt have led to a flurry of literature83 . From these 
developments has also sprouted a line of articles focusing on the impact of good faith 
obligations on sovereign debt restructurings84. 
Fundamentally, studies of sovereign debt either focus on its public international law aspects, 
or on its private, domestic law aspects. The problem with studying sovereign debt by 
dividing its public/private and its domestic/international aspects, is that the reality of what 
sovereign debt is transcends these traditional legal boundaries. Thus, focusing on one aspect 
of sovereign debt regulation paints an incomplete picture of the way in which law affects the 
behaviour of States and their creditors in general.  
That is not to say that such approaches are flawed, the in-depth analyses they provide are 
necessary to understand the details of how certain aspects of the debt relationship are 
 
Sovereign debt and debt restructuring : legal, financial and regulatory aspects (Globe Law And Business 
2013). 
80 Regarding good faith and international law, Bohoslavsky and Goldmann have also recently proposed an 
‘incremental approach’ to sovereign debt restructuring, and analysed sovereign debt restructurings as exercises 
of public authority. Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky and Matthias Goldmann, ‘An Incremental Approach to Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring: Sovereign Debt Sustainability as a Principle of Public international law’ (2016) 41 Yale 
Journal of international law 13; Bogdandy and Goldmann (n 48). It has also been argued that the recent 
developments in the law on sovereign debt have led to a right to restructure for sovereign debtors. Paliouras (n 
45). 
81 See e.g. Michael Waibel, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration’ (2007) 
101 American Journal of international law 711; Pietro Ortolani, ‘Are Bondholders Investors? Sovereign Debt 
and Investment Arbitration after Poštová’ (2017) 30 Leiden Journal of international law 383; Kei Nakajima, 
‘Beyond Abaclat: Mass Claims in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Regulatory Governance for Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring’ (2018) 19 The Journal of World Investment &amp; Trade 208. 
82 W Mark C Weidemaier, ‘Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt’ (2014) 2014 University of Illinois Law 
Review 67; Beatrice Bonafè, ‘State Immunity and the Protection of Private Investors: The Argentine Bonds 
before Italian Courts’ (2007) XVI Italian Yearbook of international law 165; Georges R Delaume, ‘Sovereign 
Immunity and Public Debt’ (1989) 23 international lawyer (ABA) 811; Adriana T Ingenito and Christina G 
Hioureas, ‘Carving out New Exceptions to Sovereign Immunity: Why the NML Capital Cases May Harm U.S. 
Interests Abroad Symposium: Investor-State Disputes’ (2015) 30 Maryland Journal of international law 118. 
83 Stephanie Blankenburg and Richard Kozul-Wright, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructurings in the Contemporary 
Global Economy: The UNCTAD Approach’ 42 Yale Journal of international law 1; Lee C Buchheit and G 
Mitu Gulati, ‘Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing’ (2010) 198 UNCTAD Discussion Papers 
<http://unctad.org/en/Docs/osgdp20102_en.pdf>; Mauro Megliani, ‘Vultures in Courts: Why the UNCTAD 
Principles on Responsible Financing Cannot Stop Litigation’ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of international law 
849; Espósito, Li and Bohoslavsky (n 70). 
84 Matthias Goldmann, ‘Good Faith and Transparency in Sovereign Debt Workouts (Paper Prepared for the 
Second Session of the UNCTAD Working Group on a Debt Workout Mechanism)’ 
<https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2014misc3_en.pdf>; Bohoslavsky and Goldmann (n 80); 
Dania Thomas and Javier Garcia Fronti, ‘Good Faith in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Evolution of an 
Open Norm in “localised” Contexts?’ [2007] CSGR Working Paper Series. 
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regulated. However, if lawyers are to fully understand how sovereign defaults and 
restructurings work, a uniting framework such as the one suggested here is needed. 
1.2.2 Methodological fragmentation 
A similar disconnect appears in the methodological approaches used by legal scholars when 
focusing on sovereign debt. From a methodological standpoint, a large number of studies on 
sovereign debt have been rooted in legal positivism85 sensu lato. These have, on average, 
attempted to either highlight trends in specific aspects of the case-law on sovereign debt86 
or to provide an explanatory overview of the international and contractual regimes governing 
sovereign debt87. The legal positivist scholarship has focused heavily on the interpretation 
of legal norms applicable to State debts, either by virtue of contract or in international law88. 
These positivist approaches to sovereign debt have produced a large body of studies which 
have made sense of an often obscure and contradictory case-law. Reliance on said 
scholarship is necessary if one wants to try and determine what the content of sovereign debt 
law has been or currently is.  
However, on average, those studies have ignored the economic impacts of regulation on the 
stakeholders in the sovereign debt relationship. Similarly, they have not engaged with the 
reasons behind the existence of legal norms. Moreover, these positivist approaches have 
mostly been de lege lata. 
Besides black-letter approaches, sovereign debt law has seen a number of ‘law and 
economics’ studies on specific issues plaguing the sovereign debt market89, and offering 
technical solutions to said issues90. These have ranged from studies of an SDRM mechanism, 
 
85 And therefore focused on the ‘proper’ interpretation of the legal norms affecting sovereign debt. 
86 See e.g. Kupelyants (n 53); Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals (n 2). 
87 See e.g. Edwin Borchard, Justus S Hotchkiss and William Harris Wynne, State Insolvency and Foreign 
Bondholders (Beard Books 1951); Megliani, Sovereign Debt (n 50); Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring (n 5); Dominique Carreau and Malcolm N Shaw, ‘La Dette Extérieure | The 
External Debt’ <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/law-books-of-the-academy/la-dette-exterieure-
the-external-debt-ej.9789041100832.3_774> accessed 12 October 2016. 
88 See e.g. Zamour (n 74); Buchheit, ‘The Pari Passu Clause Sub Specie Aeternitatis’ (n 75); Buchheit and Pam 
(n 75); Waibel, ‘Out of Thin Air?’ (n 31); Reinisch and Binder (n 30); Waibel, ‘Two Worlds of Necessity in 
ICSID Arbitration’ (n 29); Ortolani (n 81). 
89A number of studies have notably focused on the collective action issues encountered during contemporary 
debt restructurings. See notably: Lee C Buchheit and G Mitu Gulati, ‘Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will’ 
(2002) 51 Emory Law Journal 1317; Anna Gelpern, ‘How Collective Action Is Changing Sovereign Debt 
Cover Story’ (2003) 22 International Financial Law Review 19; Jesse Kaplan, ‘Collective Action and the 
Competence of Courts: The Lessons of NML v. Argentina’ (2014) 20 Stanford Journal of Law, Business & 
Finance 1. 
90 Yan Liu and others, ‘Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ [2014] IMF Policy Paper 
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to studies of the collective action issues arising in the sovereign bond market, as well as 
several analyses of the impact of legal changes on bond prices91. These law and economics 
studies of sovereign debt provide some of the background assumptions on which this thesis 
is based. However, it does not appear that any of those studies has produced an overview of 
the incentives produced by the regulation of sovereign debt defaults and restructurings, as a 
whole. These studies have often centred on the production of technical solutions to the 
inefficiencies created by the sovereign debt market and have thus not sought to analyse the 
reasons behind the legal system creating these inefficiencies, as this thesis seeks to do.  
Finally, a lot of the law and economic studies of sovereign debt tend to heavily focus on the 
reputational aspects of sovereign debt, and on the need of sovereigns to repay. This has led 
them to treat the State as a ‘black box’, to quote Lienau, and therefore to ignore the 
redistributive aspects of the debt relationship, notably the impact of defaults and 
restructurings on the sovereign’s population92. 
When writers have strayed away from positivists or law and economics their approach has, , 
focused strongly on the political and deontological issues raised by sovereign defaults and 
restructurings. Notably, several studies have focused on the impact of sovereign debt on the 
debtor’s population’s human rights93. The scholarship on odious debt, in particular, has 
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91 See notably Stephen J Choi, G Mitu Gulati and Eric A Posner, ‘Pricing Terms in Sovereign Debt Contracts: 
A Greek Case Study with Implications for the European Crisis Resolution Mechanism’ (Social Science 
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Odious Debts and State Corruption’ (2007) 70 Law and Contemporary Problems 33; Gelpern, ‘How Collective 
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Debt’ (n 82); Kris James Mitchener and Marc D Weidenmier, ‘Supersanctions and Sovereign Debt Repayment’ 
(National Bureau of Economic Research 2005) Working Paper 11472 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w11472> 
accessed 18 January 2016. 
92 On this question see Lienau, Rethinking Sovereign Debt (n 48); Lienau, ‘Who Is the Sovereign in Sovereign 
Debt?’ (n 48). 
93 See inter allia, Daniel Bradlow, ‘Can Parallel Lines Ever Meet? The Strange Case of the International 
Standards on Sovereign Debt and Business and Human Rights’ (2016) 41 Yale Journal of international law; 
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framed much of its approach on the morality of imposing debt obligations of dictatorial 
regimes on successor governments94. Finally, a last strand of the scholarship has focused on 
sovereign debt through a “colonialism” lens95, or has centred on the redistributive effects, or 
the legitimacy of the policies put in place during restructurings96. In general, these studies 
have highlighted the ‘human cost’ of sovereign debt but have failed to grapple with its 
economics.  
The net result of this kaleidoscope of approaches is that, the technical issues that plagued 
sovereign debtors and their creditors from the 1980s onwards are well understood. Writers 
on sovereign debt should know that the ‘sovereign’ in sovereign debt is not a mere abstract, 
corporate entity but a legal person  designed to act as an agent of its population97, and that 
said population heavily suffers during restructurings and defaults. A plethora of solutions to 
these issues has been suggested, and some have led to actual modifications in the law on 
sovereign debt.  
 
94 See Larry Cata Backer, ‘Odious Debt Wears Two Faces: Systemic Illegitimacy, Problems, and Opportunities 
in Traditional Odious Debt Conceptions in Globalized Economic Regimes Odious Debts and State Corruption’ 
(2007) 70 Law and Contemporary Problems 1; Tom Ginsburg and Thomas S Ulen, ‘Odious Debt, Odious 
Credit, Economic Development, and Democratization  Odious Debts and State Corruption’ (2007) 70 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 115; Matthew B Masaro, ‘Incorporating the Fresh Start into Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring through Odious Debt Note’ (2018) 104 Cornell Law Review 1643; Paul B Stephan, ‘The 
Institutionalist Implications of an Odious Debt Doctrine Odious Debts and State Corruption’ (2007) 70 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 213; Howse (n 35). 
95 See Maria Giannacopoulos, ‘Sovereign Debts: Global Colonialism, Austerity and Neo-Liberal Assimilation 
Troubling Waters: Speaking (of) Forbidden (Legal) Subjects: Special Issue to Commemorate Penny Pether’ 
(2015) 19 Law Text Culture 166; Maria Giannacopoulos, ‘Sovereign Debt Crises, Referendums and the 
Changing Face of Colonial Power’ (2017) 31 Continuum 33; Ranabir Samaddar, A Post-Colonial Enquiry into 
Europe’s Debt and Migration Crisis (Springer Singapore 2016) 
<https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811022111> accessed 1 May 2020; Faisal Ahmed, Laura Alfaro and 
Noel Maurer, ‘Lawsuits and Empire: On the Enforcement of Sovereign Debt in Latin America’ (2010) 73 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 39; Dan Beeton, ‘“Give Me Liberty or Give Me Debt!”’ (2013) 34 Third World 
Quarterly 1499. 
96 See Catherine Bonser-Neal, ‘Why Fiscal Austerity - A Review of Recent Evidence on the Economic Effects 
of Sovereign Debt Symposium’ (2015) 22 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 543; Howard Karger, ‘The 
Bitter Pill: Austerity, Debt, and the Attack on Europe’s Welfare States Special Issue: Austerity versus Stimulus: 
International Challenges for Social Welfare’ (2014) 41 Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 33; Bonser-
Neal; Jo Marie Griesgraber and Oscar Ugarteche, ‘The IMF Today and Tomorrow: Some Civil Society 
Perspectives Understanding Pathways through Financial Crises and the Impact of the IMF - Global Insights’ 
(2006) 12 Global Governance 351; Larry Cata Backer, ‘Ideologies of Globalization and Sovereign Debt: Cuba 
and the IMF’ (2005) 24 Penn State international law Review 497; Richard Joyce, ‘Sovereignty and IMF 
Intervention in Cambodia’ (2003) 12 Griffith Law Review 166; Daniel Kalderimis, ‘IMF Conditionality as 
Investment Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis’ (2004) 13 Social & Legal Studies 103; Devran Unlu, ‘Is 
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Policies’ (2013) 6 Ankara Bar Review 187; Hector R Torres, ‘Reforming the International Monetary Fund – 
Why Its Legitimacy Is at Stake’ (2007) 10 Journal of International Economic Law 443; Yanis Varoufakis, 
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What is missing from this picture is an understanding of ‘why’ the law on sovereign debt led 
to incomprehensible outcomes, and an understanding of the logic behind the measures 
currently put in place to prevent such outcomes from re-occurring again.  
The bird’s eye view of sovereign debt advanced by this thesis, centred on paradigmatic 
regulatory models allows for an answer to these questions. As will be exposed infra, the 
models advanced here are rooted in law and economics. They are based on law as a tool of 
social engineering, designed to influence the behaviour of sovereigns and their creditors. 
The models, however, go beyond law and economics stricto sensu. Thus, the systematisation 
of the law they enable aims at providing an intellectual model of how the law on sovereign 
debt can be construed through a diachronic lens. Moreover, the de lege ferenda 
developments, and the critique of the regulatory models this thesis suggests rely heavily on 
the fact that the impact of restructurings goes beyond issues reaches the very livelihood of 
indebted sovereign’s populations.  
1.3 Theoretical and Normative Background 
The purpose of this thesis is to systematise the law on sovereign defaults and restructurings 
into distinct regulatory models, based on the type of behaviour they aim to incentivise in 
market actors. Then, it aims at analysing what behaviour these regulatory models lead to, in 
practice, in order to suggest de lege ferenda legal reforms. Methodologically therefore, this 
thesis needs a theory of law’s impact on the behaviour of sovereigns and their creditors, 
which includes a theory of how these market actors behave. Moreover, it also requires a 
defined set of values against which the effectiveness of norms should be assessed.  
The descriptive framework espoused by this thesis is rooted in law and economics. There 
are several advantages such a methodology.  
First, law and economics, is inherently centred on studying how legal norms impact the 
behaviour of market actors98. Moreover, it is not only of use to describe how actors currently 
react to legal norms, but is also prospective, it enables predicting how actors will react to a 
set of norms99. This aspect of economics makes it particularly suited to the objectives of this 
 
98 Joel P Trachtman, The Economic Structure of international law (Harvard University Press 2009) 1–3; Robert 
B Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics: Pearson New International Edition (6 edition, Pearson 2013) 
3. 
99 Cooter and Ulen (n 98) 3. 
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thesis as the measures analysed in the anti-holdout model are recent and the body of market 
practice in response to these norms limited.  
In addition, the economic analysis of law as a descriptive tool, is politically and 
philosophically agnostic as it is centred on the actual preferences on the actors involved100. 
A contrario, neither legal positivism nor other approaches to law provide the tools necessary 
for this project. Legal positivism’s insistence of treating the law in ‘splendid isolation’ does 
not allow for an understanding of where legal norms come from, or what their impact on the 
‘real world’ is101. Similarly, when other schools of thought seek to describe where law comes 
from, they often do so by reference to a pre-agreed deontological, philosophical or political 
framework.  
Second, law and economics, lends itself to the creation of coherent models of human 
behaviour102.  Law and economics postulates that the actions of legal actors can be explained 
and modelled. Such a starting point is necessary for the endeavour pursued by this thesis. If 
one wants to make sense of the incentives provided by legal norms, one first needs to believe 
that human behaviour can be understood and predicted. 
Finally, the study of sovereign debt is, by nature, the study of a phenomenon rooted in 
international finance and macroeconomics. Law and economics, as a discipline, particularly 
befits such topics of legal scholarship as it integrates well with the abundant economic 
scholarship on sovereign debt, providing this thesis with some elements of interdisciplinarity. 
This should not be taken to mean that this thesis ignores the contributions of other 
methodological approaches. As the next paragraphs will show, the understanding of human 
and sovereign behaviour on which it relies departs, in part, from homo economicus as a 
 
100 Trachtman (n 98) 2. See also Richard A Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (1979) 8 
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that efficiency or self-maximisation as a criterion for ‘good law’ is far from being depoliticised but rather 
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Hofstra Law Review <https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol8/iss4/2>; Ronald Dworkin, Law’s 
Empire (Belknap Press 1986) ch 2; Ronald M Dworkin, ‘Is Wealth a Value?’ (1980) 9 The Journal of Legal 
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101 Guido Calabresi, Of Law and Economics and Economic Analysis of Law: The Role of the Lawyer (Yale 
University Press) 8 
<http://www.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.12987/yale/9780300195897.001.0001/upso-
9780300195897-chapter-1> accessed 6 May 2020. 
102 Trachtman (n 98) 1–3. 
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heuristic and takes into account both the behavioural critique of rational choice theory and 
its liberal critique. As such, it fits perhaps better under the label of a ‘new law and economics 
approach’103. At the normative level, this thesis also departs from the traditional law and 
economics approach in that it measures the efficiency of norms, not against individual 
preferences, but against a distinct set of values, as will be shown in the last paragraphs of 
this section. 
Before delving more deeply into the methodological underpinnings of this thesis, a number 
of caveats on the models on which it relies are necessary. The two models presented here 
should not be understood as empirical representations of the decision-making behaviour of 
those enacting the legal norms themselves. For example, when this thesis argues that a 
certain interpretation of the pari passu clause fits within the creditor protection model, it 
does not claim that the judge interpreting the clause intends to favour creditors in order to 
incentivise lending104. Rather, it only focuses on the potential impact of the clause on the 
behaviour of actors within the sovereign debt market. 
What the models do, is providing an intellectual framework via which the norms on 
sovereign debt and the changes they have undergone can be intellectually systematised. To 
use an analogy, one could understand the two models which underpin this thesis as similar 
to what structuralists would refer to as a ‘structure’105. In this analogy, creditor protection 
and anti-holdout models are the dichotomic structure explaining instances of parole in 
sovereign debt law. Parole being, for example, the decision to insert a collective action 
clause in a sovereign bond. That is not to say that the exercise pursued in this thesis is 
structuralist. As opposed to Koskiennemi’s work in From Apology to Utopia or to Kennedy’s 
Semiotics of the legal argument  ¸the purpose of this thesis is not to deconstruct106 the current 
 
103  See Michael G Faure and Roy A Partain, Environmental Law and Economics: Theory and Practice 
(Cambridge University Press 2019) 11 <https://abdn.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/environmental-law-
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105 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge 
University Press 2006) 11 <http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9780511493713> accessed 3 November 
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‘Structuralist Legal Histories’ (Social Science Research Network 2015) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2591956 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2591956> accessed 23 November 2015; Duncan Kennedy, ‘The Structure of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries’ (1970) 28 Buffalo Law Review 209; Duncan Kennedy, ‘A Semiotics of the Legal 
Argument’ (1991) 42 Syracuse Law Review 75. On parole and langue in anthropological literature see 
Ferdinand de Saussure and others, Course in General Linguistics (Open Court 1986); Claude Levi-Strauss, La 
Pensee Sauvage (Revised edition, Pocket 1990); Corinne François-Denève, Mythologies: Roland Barthes 
(Bréal 2002). 
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discourse on sovereign debt and reduce it to a set of “conditions of what can acceptably be 
said within it”107. Rather, like a structuralist’s structure, the models are intellectual creations 
which can be used to explain a variety of social and cultural phenomena, and not an empirical 
description of the ‘real world’108. 
Moreover, when applied to court decisions the models are not predictive of the result of 
litigation, but rather focus on the interpretation of the norms applied in the case. For example, 
in the section on necessity, the French Company of Venezuelan Railroad case 109  is 
considered as fitting into the creditor protection model despite the verdict being in favour of 
the debtor. In that specific case, for example, the interpretation of the necessity defence fits 
with creditor protection while the facts of the case led to a situation where the debtor’s 
responsibility was absolved. 
1.3.1 The impact of law on the behaviour of States and their creditors 
Understanding how legal norms impact the behaviour of sovereigns and their creditors 
requires three elements: the set of preferences they seek to maximise, their mode of 
behaviour, and a model of the influence legal norms on this behaviour.  
1.3.1.1 The preferences of sovereigns and their creditors 
The traditional understanding of market actor’s behaviour has been fairly narrow. Market 
actors, according to the classic economic model of human behaviour espoused by Posner 
and its followers, are rational self-maximisers. They act on the basis of a cost-benefit 
analysis in order to increase their own utility, expressed in dollars or dollar equivalents110. 
Applied to the sovereign debt market this would mean that States, seek to borrow at the best 
possible rate, and repay as little as they can while maintaining said rate. Creditors, on the 
 
107 ibid 11. 
108 It should also be noted that the central policy tenets underpinning the two models are akin to what Lienau 
refers to as the ‘laws of the market’, or ‘law in hiding’ within the market. They are economic ideas which shape 
the legal norms on sovereign debt. See Odette Lienau, ‘Law in Hiding: Market Principles in the Global Legal 
Order’ (Social Science Research Network 2018) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3096060 
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110 See e.g. Richard A Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (1979) 8 The Journal of Legal 
Studies 103, 119.For an overview of rational choice theory as a behavioural heuristic in the legal scholarship 
see in general Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2d ed, Little, Brown 1977); Andrew T Guzman, 
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other hand, seek to maximise their revenues, usually by obtaining the best possible interest 
payment111. 
There are several issues with applying this narrow definition of human behaviour to the 
sovereign debt market. First, its reading of utility as applied to States appears too limited. 
While it is true that, in general, sovereigns seek to borrow at the best possible price112, their 
preferences are not purely monetarily motivated. Rather, it appears that, in practice, 
sovereigns within the sovereign debt market pursue two sets of sometimes contradictory 
interests: the pursuit of financial gain, and the maximisation of their ‘jurisdiction’ or 
‘sovereignty’113. Sovereigns, thus, seek to strike a balance between the maximisation of 
revenues that good borrowing conditions allow, and the loss of jurisdiction over their debts 
that better borrowing conditions generally entails114.  
A potential difficulty with assessing States’ preferences arises from the fact that sovereigns, 
lack agency, and therefore need to act through the intermediary of individuals115. Public 
choice theory116 and liberal theories readings of sovereign’s preferences assume that the 
individuals acting on behalf of governments seek to further their own preferences rather than 
those of the public they theoretically represent117. Thus, following those theories one cannot 
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model sovereigns as having preferences of their own. However, following Trachtmann118, 
quoting March and Olsen119, this thesis opts for a generally institutionalist vision of the 
sovereign. It considers that, as States are institutionally designed to achieve certain set goals, 
they benefit from a sufficient internal coherence to allow construing them, as having 
determinable preferences120.  
That is not to say that this thesis considers the liberal critique121 of institutionalism to be 
unfounded. An actual empirical determination of how sovereigns behave would probably 
require the granularity that public choice theories or liberal theories of sovereign behaviour 
provide122. However, the paradigm-mapping exercise pursued here does not require a perfect 
empirical representation of sovereign behaviour, but rather benefits from a clearer heuristic 
of how sovereigns behave123. Such an understanding is better achieved by opting for an 
institutional lens rather than a liberal or public-choice theory approach.  
Nevertheless, there are instances where the preferences of certain government organs or their 
agents are easily identifiable and can thus fit with the broader model of State behaviour used 
here. In such cases, this thesis takes them into account so as to produce as reliable a model 
of sovereign behaviour as possible124.   
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It has also been argued that using set and endogenous preferences, as done here, is unrealistic, 
as actors’ preferences change through time125. This argument, while founded in other areas 
of foreign relations, does not seem particularly relevant to the present study.  
For sovereigns it seems that maximising jurisdiction and minimising costs remains a 
relatively constant set of interests. While the relationship between both sets of preferences 
may change over time, the nature of the preference sought should remain fairly stable126. 
For creditors one can expect that maximising profits remain a stable goal through time. One 
can reasonably assume that when they acquire debt titles or during a restructuring, private 
entities are mostly interested in the obtention of an interest rate payment proportional to the 
risk they take 127 . As noted by Lienau, this does not mean creditor’s preferences are 
systematically homogeneous128. Creditor’s specific choices may vary while the nature of 
their preferences remains the same. For example, during restructurings, some creditors might 
prefer cooperation with sovereigns, while other may desire full payments. As will be shown 
in chapter 2 and 3, however in those cases all sets of creditors still seek to further their profits, 
but given their structural differences obtain profits in different fashion.  
1.3.1.2 The behaviour of sovereigns and their creditors 
Having established, for the purpose of this thesis the set of preferences sovereigns and their 
creditors seek to further when accessing capital markets, this thesis now needs to turn to the 
way via which sovereigns and their creditors seek to further said set of interests. 
Traditional law and economics reads market actors behaviour as furthering their interest 
through rational means, as argued in classical economics129. A more modern framing of this 
 
125 See notably George Stigler and Gary Becker, ‘De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum’ (1977) 67 American 
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theory concedes that individual action may vary, but argues that the aggregate of market 
actors’ behaviour matches the result produced by rational choices and that, therefore, one 
can construe individual behaviour as if it were rational130. 
There are several issues with this conception of behaviour, as applied to the sovereign debt 
market. First, as opposed to classical conceptions of rational choice theory, market actors’ 
opportunities are, in real life, limited by external circumstances 131 . Transaction costs, 
information asymmetry, and the opportunity cost of time prevent sovereigns and their 
creditors from behaving optimally. They bound their rationality132. 
Moreover, as behavioural economists have shown, individual action is marred by 
unconscious biases which prevent them from reaching optimal outcomes, even in the 
absence of the aforementioned external constraints133. Those same inefficiencies apply, to 
actions within the sovereign debt market. Risk aversion might prevent law firms from 
altering the drafting of bond clauses, even when they lead to sub-optimal results 134 . 
Endowment effects or sunk-cost fallacies may prevent bondholders from liquidating their 
positions when restructurings seem unavoidable135. Similarly, some research has found that 
economic actors are biased towards solutions which appear fair or equitable136 but diverge 
from the maximisation of their preferences. 
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If one particularly considers the application of rational choice theory to sovereigns, a rich 
literature has argued that the collective nature of States prevents the application of rational 
choice theory to model their behaviour, as said theory is better suited to individuals137. Here 
again it is argued that, because sovereigns lack agency, one should deconstruct the black box 
that is the modern State and focus on the behaviour of individuals acting as its agents. 
Understood as such, the actions of sovereigns are less rational, more bounded, than those of 
the individuals who compose them138.This thesis, to a certain extent, takes into account these 
preferences of government organs. Notably, in its chapter 4, it argues that short-term 
electoral interests may prevent sovereigns from behaving optimally by delaying necessary 
restructurings. 
However, following Sunstein139, this thesis does not embrace a complete rejection of rational 
choice theory in favour of fully empirical and detailed models of human behaviour, neither 
does it treat actors as fully ‘rational’ in the traditional sense of the term. Rather, it 
understands that behaviour, while generally rational, is limited by external constraints and 
takes into account market actor biases when they are directly relevant. 
1.3.1.3 The impact of legal norms on the behaviour of sovereigns and their creditors 
If one assumes that sovereigns and their creditors have set preferences, and that they behave 
in a predictable way, there are several ways via which norms can impact their behaviour. 
Here again, the specificity of sovereign debt, as a legal relationship, must be kept in mind. 
Theories of international law’s impact on sovereigns’ behaviour abound140. However, most 
 
‘morals’ sensu lato, with the essentially self-interested set of preferences that economists tend to adopt is a 
complex question, impossible to fully explore within these pages. To put it simply, one can frame the desire 
for morality as part of market actors’ utility function, as Smith does or as a bias in market actor’s action, as a 
behaviourist would. This thesis opts for the latter, as it makes for a simpler modelling of market actor’s 
relationships. 
137 Copp (n 115) 195; Thompson (n 115) 291. 
138 On collective entities as more prone to biases see notably David G Myers and Helmut Lamm, ‘The Group 
Polarization Phenomenon’ (1976) 83 Psychological Bulletin 602; Paul Hart, ‘Irving L. Janis’ Victims of 
Groupthink’ (1991) 12 Political Psychology 247; Prof Paul t’Hart, Groupthink in Government: A Study of 
Small Groups and Policy Failure (Johns Hopkins Paperbacks Ed edition, The Johns Hopkins University Press 
1994). 
139 As such, this thesis understands that the contribution of behavioural economics has not been to undermine 
the idea that people act in a somewhat rational manner, but rather to note that when behaviour predictably 
deviates from what is expected, it should be modelled. See Cass Sunstein, ‘Behavioral Analysis of Law’ [1997] 
Law & Economics Working Papers 1–2 <https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics/79> 
noting, “it it does not follow that people’s behavior is unpredictable, systematically irrational, random, rule-
free, or elusive to social scientists. On the contrary, the qualifications can be described, used, and sometimes 
even modelled.” 
140 A classic argument would be that breaching international norms leads to reputations costs. See e.g. Abram 
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements (Harvard University Press 1995). For an application to sovereign debt see, infra, and Tomz (n 112). 
Another well-known theory states that international law works by enabling State to cooperate, via institutions, 
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of these theories focus on the behaviour of sovereigns towards other sovereigns and have 
very little to say about how the law can impact the actions of sovereigns in at arms’ length 
transactions with private entities. 
This thesis operates from the postulate that legal norms can affect the behaviour of market 
actors in three main ways. First, norms shape the market itself. Second, norms tax certain 
behaviours in order to alter the preferences of market actors. Finally, norms provide 
legitimacy to certain behaviours. 
On the first point, laws provide the structure of the legal relationship between sovereigns 
and their creditors. Financial markets, like any other market, are essentially created by legal 
norms enabling market actors to interact with each other141. For example, the transferability 
of bonds has enabled both retail investors and vulture funds to participate within the 
sovereign debt market by providing them with a legal title over the bonds emitted by 
sovereigns.  
Beyond their roles as gatekeepers, legal norms also structure the behaviour of market players 
by creating strategic opportunities142 . They determine the range of possible behaviours 
within the sovereign debt market. For example, the insertion of collective action clauses in 
sovereign bonds creates a new strategic opportunity for sovereigns and their creditors, it 
enables them to restructure entire bond series through a majority vote by bondholders143. 
Second, through enforcement, legal norms incentivise certain behaviours by acting as a 
pricing mechanism. To put it simply, legal norms render certain types of behaviour more 
 
in order to reduce transaction costs, and thus functions by being mutually beneficial. See e.g. Robert O Keohane, 
‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’ (1988) 32 International Studies Quarterly 379, 386–387; Terry 
M Moe, ‘Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory: The Politics of the NLRB’ (1987) 2 Studies in American 
Political Development 236; Duncan Snidal, ‘Political Economy and International Institutions’ (1996) 16 
International Review of Law and Economics 121; Douglass C North, ‘Government and the Cost of Exchange 
in History’ (1984) 44 The Journal of Economic History 255. Other arguments base themselves on the fact that 
sovereigns have to justify their behaviour. See e.g. Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave (2nd edn, Columbia 
University Press 1979).  
141 See notably Justin Desautels-Stein, ‘The Market as a Legal Concept: Classic Liberalism, Modern Liberalism, 
Pragmatic Liberalism’ [2015] Research Handbook on Political Economy and Law 394 
<https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781781005347/9781781005347.00011.xml> accessed 13 May 
2019. Citing David Kennedy, International Legal Structures (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1987). See also  
142 Or, to put it otherwise, legal norms de not merely affect preferences, they can create preferences. See Oren 
Bar-Gill and Chaim Fershtman, ‘Law and Preferences’ (2004) 20 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 
331, 331–332; Sunstein (n 139) 2–3. See also Jules L Coleman and Jody Kraus, ‘Rethinking the Theory of 
Legal Rights’ (1985) 95 Yale Law Journal 1335. Citing RH Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 
Journal of Law & Economics 1. 
143 See infra chapter 4. 
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expensive via sanctions. This indirectly incentivises other types of behaviour144. In order to 
function as incentives, legal norms must provide those injured by the behaviour they seek to 
disincentivise with legal rights. These legal rights need to be attached to legal remedies, 
actionable by the injured party145. Lastly, remedies need to be of such a nature that, when 
employed, their impact is sufficient to dissuade the actor against which they are levelled 
from breaching the norm146.  
Moreover, the content of the obligations contained in the legal norms on sovereign debt, and 
the remedies attached to their breach, need to be relatively predictable 147 , and their 
enforcement beneficial to the right-holder148. In the absence of predictability, actors cannot, 
ex ante, adapt their behaviour to match legal requirements and therefore norms lose their 
incentivising effect. In addition, in the absence of legal certainty, enforcement by right-
holders features an additional risk cost and is thus costlier for the victim. 
The impact of the norms which apply to sovereign debt on the behaviour of market actors 
can also derive from said norms’ perceived legitimacy149. The legitimacy of legal norms can 
form part of their pricing effect in that breaching a norm that appears legitimate may lead to 
additional political or social costs, and vice versa150. Legitimacy, however, acts beyond 
 
144 Oliver Wendell Jr Holmes, The Path of the Law (Martino Fine Books 2012); Cooter and Ulen (n 98) 3; 
Trachtman (n 98) 5–6; Guzman (n 110) 33.; Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, ‘Rethinking Cost-Benefit 
Analysis’ (1999) 109 Yale Law Journal 165; Matthew D Adler, Eric A Posner and University of Chicago (eds), 
Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives (The University of Chicago Press 
2001); Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard University Press 2009) 575–592. 
For an overview in tort law of how the law can play such a role see e.g. Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: 
A Legal and Economic Analysis (Yale University Press 2008); Clifton R Musser Professor Emeritus of Law 
and Economics and Senior Lecturer William M Landes and others, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 
(Harvard University Press 1987).  
145 For a theory of entitlements see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied 
in Judicial Reasoning’ (1916) 26 Yale Law Journal 710. 
146 If they fail to do so, it creates a possibility of efficient breach. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (n 110) 
107; Gregory Klass, ‘Efficient Breach’, Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law, G. Klass, G. Letsas, P. 
Saprai (eds.) (2014); Daniel Friedmann, ‘The Efficient Breach Fallacy’ (1989) 18 The Journal of Legal Studies 
1. 
147 For an illustration of the links between norm’s efficiency and predictability see Mario J Rizzo, ‘Law amid 
Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort’ (1980) 9 The Journal of Legal Studies 291; 
Paul H Rubin, ‘Predictability and the Economic Approach to Law: A Comment on Rizzo’ (1980) 9 The Journal 
of Legal Studies 319. See also Michael Alstine, ‘The Costs of Legal Change’ (2002) 49 All Faculty 
Publications 813; Anthony D’Amato, ‘Legal Uncertainty’ (1983) 71 California Law Review 1; Jonathan 
Macey, ‘The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis’ (1989) 65 Chicago-Kent Law Review 
93; Aurelien Portuese, Orla Gough and Joseph Tanega, ‘The Principle of Legal Certainty as a Principle of 
Economic Efficiency’ (2017) 44 European Journal of Law and Economics 131. 
148 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law (1999) 46, 53. Citing Ronald Braeutigam, 
Bruce Owen and John Panzar, ‘An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems’ (1984) 47 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 173; Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (n 110). 
149  The literature on law’s impact and legitimacy is abundant, and a complete overview of the topic is 
impossible here. As such, this brief section focuses on the impact of legitimacy directly relevant to the current 
project. 
150 Chayes and Chayes (n 140). See also Bar-Gill and Fershtman (n 142) 332. Citing Louis Kaplow and Steven 
Shavell, ‘Fairness Versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice’ 
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pricing to influence the behaviour of States and their creditors151. As mentioned supra, 
market actors are influenced by moral concerns152. As such, norms aligning with these 
concerns are more likely to be followed153. As market actors are biased towards acting fairly, 
norms which are perceived as legitimate logically incentivise certain types of behaviour. For 
example, if one believes that requiring sovereigns to repay their debts is legitimate since as 
it aligns with the broadly shared moral principle that promises should be honoured, then, 
enforcement of sovereign debt contracts against defaulting States is legitimised, and thus 
incentivised.  
Finally, given that sovereign debt is rooted in both contract and international law, it should 
be noted that the self-serving character of the norms on sovereign debt may play in their 
favour. As both legal systems are rooted in consent, and as actors within the sovereign debt 
market are self-interested, it is logical that most of the norms applying to the lawmakers in 
the sovereign debt relationship will be self-serving. The result of here is that most actors will 
perceive said consensual norms as legitimate and will thus be likely to follow them154. 
1.3.2 What should the law on sovereign debt do? 
After having established how the law on sovereign debt can impact the behaviour of actors 
within the sovereign debt market, this thesis now needs to determine what type of behaviour 
a legal system on sovereign debt should encourage, i.e. what sets of interests should be 
protected.  
 
(National Bureau of Economic Research 2003) Working Paper 9622 4 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w9622> 
accessed 11 May 2020; See also Sunstein (n 139). 
151 Robert Alan Dahl and Charles Edward Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare (Transaction Publishers 
1992) 102. Cited in Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’ (1999) 53 International 
Organization 379, 388. See also Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology 
(University of California Press 1978) 548; Alexander Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the 
International State’ (1994) 88 The American Political Science Review 384. See also Thomas M Franck, The 
Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press 1990). 
152 Sunstein (n 136) 217; Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (n 132) 1492; Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (n 136).  
153 Multiple empirical studies in criminal law and criminology have found that alignment between norms and 
shared social values increased compliance. See Tom Tyler and Jonathan Jackson, ‘Future Challenges in the 
Study of Legitimacy and Criminal Justice’ (Social Science Research Network 2013) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 
2141322 11 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2141322> accessed 14 May 2020; Jonathan Jackson and others, 
‘Why Do People Comply with the Law?Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions’ (2012) 52 The 
British Journal of Criminology 1051. Lienau also notes ‘Perhaps the unique feature of institutions or rules that 
are considered legitimate is their ability to encourage voluntary compliance—to command a higher degree of 
support or acquiescence than might otherwise exist in the absence of coercion or selfinterest’ Lienau, ‘The 
Challenge of Legitimacy in Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ (n 37) 154. 
154 Hurd (n 151) 385. See also Robert Axelrod, ‘Effective Choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma’ (1980) 24 Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 3; Jack Citrin and others, ‘Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of 
Economic Motivations’ (1997) 59 The Journal of Politics 858; Debra Satz and John Ferejohn, ‘Rational Choice 
and Social Theory’ (1994) 91 Journal of Philosophy 71. 
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Essentially, sovereign debt, as a social phenomenon, aims at providing States with liquidities 
necessary for the pursuit of their public mission. As such, two clear sets of interests matter 
within the sovereign debt relationship155. 
First, the interest of creditors ought to be protected by sovereign debt law. Ensuring that 
sovereign debts protects the legitimate expectations of creditors and strengthens the rule of 
law. More importantly, protecting creditor’s expectations is also necessary to guarantee that 
creditors will accept to lend to sovereigns156.  
However, when sovereign debts become unsustainable, i.e. when a State becomes so 
indebted that it cannot satisfy its creditors without requiring an alteration of borrowing 
conditions157, the law on sovereign debt should provide stakeholders with incentives to 
reduce said indebtedness. Doing so is economically productive, as it ensures that sovereigns 
do not default on their debts, thus limiting the damages caused by over-indebtedness on 
creditors158. Moreover, reducing debt burdens limits the negative effects of sovereign debt 
crises on the debtor’s population. Given the well-documented negative impact of said crises 
on the ability of sovereigns to fulfil the human rights of their population, ensuring that, when 
necessary, sovereigns can restructure their debt is primordial159.  
Essentially, an ‘ideal’ legal system on sovereign debt should incentivise States against 
repudiating their debts, while enabling them to restructure when their debt burdens becomes 
unsustainable by incentivising creditors to accept reasonable debt proposals160. 
 
155 Choi, Gulati and Posner (n 91). 
156 North (n 124).  
157 On debt sustainability see Charles Wyplosz, ‘Debt Sustainability Assessment: The IMF Approach and 
Alternatives’ <https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/11765/files/HEIWP03-2007.pdf>. 
158 See e.g. Buchheit and Gulati, ‘Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will’ (n 89); Sayantan Ghosal and 
Marcus Miller, ‘Writing-down Debt with Heterogeneous Creditors: Lock Laws and Late Swaps’ (2016) 6 
Journal of Globalization and Development 239. 
159  See Lumina, ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other Related 
International Financial Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, Particularly 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Mission to Argentina)’ (n 6); Lumina, ‘Report of the Independent 
Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other Related International Financial Obligations of States on the 
Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Mission to Greece )’ 
(n 6); Sovereign Debt and Human Rights (n 70). 
160 Riegner notes: ‘Sovereign debt restructurings are firstly governed by the principles of economy and of 
sustainability. In general, economy requires public finances to be managed in a way that is purposeful, results-
oriented, and cost efficient. With regard to sovereign debt, economy finds expression in the principle of 
sustainability: Debt must be managed in a way that uses public resources in a manner that is efficient in the 
longer term and that prevents avoidable financial burdens. This entails a duty to restructure debt if a 
restructuring is evidently the only way to avoid excessive burdens on public finances.’ Riegner (n 6) 160. 
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1.4 Structure of this thesis  
This thesis, beyond its introduction, is divided in three main chapters. Chapter 2 aims at 
providing some background on how sovereign debt works. It is divided in two main sections. 
Its Section 1 provides a brief overview of the main economic theories explaining the 
creditor/sovereign relationship. Section 2 provides an overview of how this relationship has 
evolved historically. The purpose of this first chapter is to frame the creditor protection and 
the anti-holdout model within the economic scholarship on sovereign debt and to explain the 
development of both models in a historical perspective.  
The third chapter of this thesis provides an overview of the creditor protection model. Its 
first section provides a general theory of the creditor protection model’s functioning. It 
argues that, in order to incentivise lending, the law on sovereign debt needs a combination 
of three elements: access by creditors to competent courts independent from the sovereign, 
the recognition by said courts of the sovereign’s responsibility 161 ; and efficient legal 
remedies granted by courts to coerce the sovereign.  
The second section of chapter 3 analyses how these three components have been 
implemented in international law. It analyses each components of the creditor protection 
model in international law separately. The last section highlights the strengths and 
weaknesses of the creditor protection model. To summarise, it argues that while creditor 
protection incentivises lending, enhances the debtor’s accountability and is predictable, it 
also incentivises holding out in the contemporary bond market, thus ultimately leading to a 
situation where unsustainable debts cannot easily be restructured.  
The fourth chapter of this thesis turns to an analysis of the anti-holdout model. As with the 
second chapter, it begins by highlighting the necessary component for the model to function, 
namely, majority decision-making during restructurings, a limitation of the remedies 
available to creditors and the provision of additional liquidities to the sovereign debtor. 
Section 2 then analyses how these components have been implemented in international law. 
Section 3, highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the second model, i.e. the fact that 
while the anti-holdout model facilitates restructuring, its implementation is detrimental to 
 
161 Which this thesis has dubbed, following Gathii, the sanctity of creditor’s rights. See James Thuo Gathii, 
‘The Sanctity of Sovereign Loan Contracts and Its Origins in Enforcement Litigation’ (2006) 38 George 
Washington international law Review 251. 
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retail investors, risks leading to a fragmentation of the law on sovereign debt and does little 
to encourage early restructurings by the debtor.  
This thesis concludes by providing de lege ferenda ideas to improve upon the current 
weaknesses of the anti-holdout model. 
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2 Understanding Sovereign debt 
2.1 Introduction 
As underlined by Graeber, in Debt: the first 5000 years, a debt relationship presupposes 
some form of equality between creditors and debtors162. Said equality enables creditors to 
ensure that debtors will eventually repay their debts, usually by providing lenders with 
remedies designed to protect their rights against borrowers163. 
Starting from these premises, sovereign debt is an oxymoron. Sovereign debtors, historically, 
have been endowed with regulatory powers164 and immunity from litigation165, meaning 
lending to foreign sovereigns was an endeavour mired with uncertainty166. A contrario, 
creditors of a private entity have always been guaranteed that their debtor cannot unilaterally 
modify the conditions of the debt contract. Similarly, were a private debtor to default or 
renege upon its debt, creditors can rely on courts and tribunals to obtain payment, either 
through the attachment of the debtor’s assets, or through its liquidation in a bankruptcy 
process167.  
This puts the creditor of a sovereign in a peculiar position. On the one hand, sovereign 
lending has been a particularly lucrative activity. A recent study highlights that since 1815 
 
162 David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years (Melville House 2011) 190–191. 
163 ibid. 
164 Such an ability, as will be exposed in the next section has at today’s been greatly diminished. However, 
regulatory interventions to facilitate sovereign debt restructurings are not unheard of contemporarily. For 
example, in the early 2000s, Argentina legislated to prevent itself from repaying holdout creditors. More 
recently, Greece retroactively introduced a Collective Action Clause in its sovereign bonds to facilitate its 
restructuring process. See on Argentina: Arturo C Porzecanski, ‘From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: 
Implications of Argentina’s Default Symposium: Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ (2005) 6 Chicago Journal of 
international law 311. On Greece, Mamatas et autres v Greece [2016] European Court of Human Rights 
63066/14; 64297/14 and 66106/14; Astrid Iversen, ‘The Future of Involuntary Sovereign Debt Restructurings: 
Mamatas and Others v Greece and the Protection of Holdings of Sovereign Debt Instruments under the ECHR’ 
(2019) 14 Capital Markets Law Journal 34. Historically such legislative debt repudiations or restructurings 
were more common. Waibel, notably mentions Peru’s 1886 and 1889 legislative restructuring of its debt. See 
Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals (n 2) 73–74. Commenting on Canevaro 
Claim (Italy v Peru), Award (1912) 6 AJIL 746 (Permanent Court of Arbitration). On the same case see also 
‘The Canevaro Case at the Hague’ (1912) 6 The American Journal of international law 709.  
165 See Delaume (n 82); Weidemaier, ‘Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt’ (n 82). 
166 As underlined by Feis, “A loan to a foreign government is an act of faith” Herbert Feis, Europe The World’S 
Banker 1870 - 1914 (Yale University Press 1931) 102. Cited in Megliani, Sovereign Debt (n 50) 239. Megliani 
similarly cites Terré noting that: “L’Etat étranger est bien souvent le plus mauvais des payeurs”. François Terré, 
‘Note a Cour d’appel de Paris, Société Bauer-Marchal c. Ministère Des Finances de Turquie’ (1957) 84 Journal 
de Droit International 394; Megliani, Sovereign Debt 239. 
167 Ugo Panizza, Federico Sturzenegger and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, ‘The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt 
and Default’ (2009) 47 Journal of Economic Literature 651. For a comparison between sovereign and corporate 
bankruptcies see also Patrick Bolton, ‘Towards a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons 
from Corporate Bankruptcy Practice Around the World’ [2003] IMF Working Paper. 
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the returns on sovereign bonds have on average outperformed the yield granted by their 
corporate counterparts 168 . The same study shows that, overall, the risk of default of 
sovereigns has been quite low169.  
On the other hand, in practice, sovereigns have been able to repudiate their debts, or to force 
creditors into unwanted restructurings170. If one thinks, of the 1917 repudiation of the Tsarist 
debt by Soviet Russia, or of the refusal by Argentina171 to repay its creditors it is undeniable 
that States can go rogue172. 
This peculiar position of creditors to a ‘puzzle’173 for both the legal and the economic 
scholarship on sovereign debt: why would a rational creditor extend credit to a sovereign 
whilst knowing that the latter can renege on its contractual obligations without facing 
efficient judicial remedies?174 Correlatively, why would a rational State ever repay its debts, 
knowing that the legal consequences of refusing to do so are limited? 
This sovereign debt puzzle is not purely theoretical. The creditor protection model can be 
understood as a direct response to the challenges produced by the specificities of sovereign 
lending. In order to better understand the context in which the creditor protection model has 
developed, the first part of this thesis needs to analyse the two main scholarly answers to the 
sovereign debt puzzle: the reputational theory of sovereign lending and the credible 
commitment theory. These two theories will be analysed in section 2 of this first chapter.  
While creditor protection, as a framework for regulating sovereign debt is easily explained 
by the economic specificities of sovereign lending, explaining the move away from creditor 
protection and towards easing debt restructurings necessitates a deeper historical 
 
168 Josefin Meyer, Carmen M Reinhart and Christoph Trebesch, ‘Sovereign Bonds since Waterloo’ (National 
Bureau of Economic Research 2019) Working Paper 25543 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w25543> accessed 
12 February 2019. The profitability of sovereign lending, on aggregate, has also been underlined by Peter 
Lindert and Peter Morton, ‘How Sovereign Debt Has Worked’, Developing Country Debt and the World 
Economy (University of Chicago Press 1989) <http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7529.pdf>. 
169 Meyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (n 168). 
170 Gulati and Buchheit quote, as foreword to Olivares-Carminal’s “Legal Aspects” an 1876 English decision 
stating that “these so-called [sovereign] bonds amount to nothing more than engagement of honour, binding, 
so far as engagements of honour bind (…)”. Twycross v Dreyfus [1876] Tokyo Ika Shika Daigaku Iyo Kizai 
Kenkyusho Hokoku 177 (Court of Appeal); Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
(n 5) vi.  
171 For an overview of Argentina’s debt restructuring see Amrita Dhillon and others, ‘Debt Restructuring and 
Economic Recovery: Analysing the Argentine Swap’ (2006) 29 World Economy 377; Samples (n 73). 
172 Porzecanski (n 164); Samples (n 73). 
173 The ‘sovereign debt puzzle’ term was coined by Marc Flandreau and Juan H Flores, ‘Bonds and Brands: 
Foundations of Sovereign Debt Markets, 1820–1830’ (2009) 69 The Journal of Economic History 646. 
174 Mark C Weidemaier and G Mitu Gulati, ‘Sovereign Debt and the “Contracts Matter” Hypothesis’ (Social 
Science Research Network 2014) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2511251 2 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2511251> accessed 27 November 2019. 
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understanding of how the sovereign debt market has evolved. This historical overview of 
sovereign lending will be the subject of the third section. 
2.2  Competing Theories of Sovereign Lending 
In order to understand the importance of the legal remedies granted to creditors, one has first 
to understand how sovereign lending, as an economic relationship, can be understood. So 
far, two main theories have been pushed forward in the literature on sovereign debt. The first 
focuses on reputation, the second on credible commitment devices175. 
This thesis does not argue that either theory is exclusive. Rather, it understands both 
reputation and credible commitment devices as tools available to States and their creditors 
to facilitate relationships within the sovereign debt market. Therefore, this thesis understands 
the relationship between creditors and sovereign debtors as a hybrid between these two 
models. This hybrid model will be briefly explained in the third section. 
2.2.1 Reputation and Sovereign Debt 
The current understanding of the reputational model of sovereign lending has mostly been 
developed by Tomz176. It posits that cooperation between lenders and borrowers can be 
 
175 Some alternative explanations of how sovereign debt ‘works’ have been put forward in the scholarly 
literature on debt. Flandreau and Flores, notably has analysed the role of issuing banks as seal of approval for 
debtors in the early XXth century, see Flandreau and Flores (n 173).. Similarly, much has been written on the 
role of colonial institutions, to explain why debtors, especially South American debtors, repaid their debts to 
creditors in imperial powers. See, inter allia, Marc Weidenmier, ‘Gunboats, Reputation, and Sovereign 
Repayment: Lessons from the Southern Confederacy’ (National Bureau of Economic Research 2004) Working 
Paper 10960 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w10960> accessed 18 January 2016; Waibel, Sovereign Defaults 
before International Courts and Tribunals (n 2) 29–35. However, as opposed to the theories analysed in this 
section, these explanations do not provide an explanation of how sovereign debt works across time. They will 
therefore not be analysed in more details.  Other theories of why sovereign repay have been advanced, notably, 
the role of international sanctions in repayment has been advanced. See e.g. Jeremy I Bulow and Kenneth 
Rogoff, ‘Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?’ (National Bureau of Economic Research 1988) Working 
Paper 2623 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w2623> accessed 18 January 2016; Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth 
Rogoff, ‘A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt’ (1989) 97 The Journal of Political Economy 
155; Mark C Weidemaier and G Mitu Gulati, ‘Sovereign Debt and the “Contracts Matter” Hypothesis’, 2 
(Social Science Research Network 2014) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2511251 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2511251> accessed 27 November 2019. However, this thesis understands 
sanctions as a credible commitment devices. Finally, a third school argues that States do not repudiate their 
debt because of the domestic economic consequences of doing so, both economically and politically. Panizza, 
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (n 167). While the consequences of defaults and the harmful effects of sovereign 
debt crises on the domestic population of the debtor are well documented, it seems that arguing that States do 
not opportunistically default because doing so would be too costly fails to explain the cases in which States 
have actually gone rogue. 
176 Tomz (n 112). Reputational analysis of the sovereign debt relationship seems to have been first developed 
by Jonathan Eaton and Mark Gersovitz, ‘Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’ 
(1981) 48 The Review of Economic Studies 289. 
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achieved because both sovereigns and their creditors are repeat players within the sovereign 
debt market. In Tomz’ model, ‘good States’ 177 , those who repay the sums they have 
borrowed, do so in order to build a good reputation, and thus benefit from better borrowing 
conditions178. A contrario, ‘bad States’, or ‘lemons’179, do not benefit from such a reputation. 
Therefore, potential lenders may be weary of extending them credit under favourable 
conditions. This increased perceived risk by foreign lenders does not mean that lending will 
not occur, but rather that it will be priced-in by investors, resulting in ‘lemons’ having to 
borrow with a higher interest rate than their more reliable counter-part180.  
This creates an incentive for States to repay their debts as, ultimately, doing so will enable 
them to increase their reputation with lenders, and obtain cheaper debt181. On the lenders’ 
side, reputation not only enables creditors to perform a more accurate risk assessment182, but 
also incentivises lending since creditors know that rational States have no interest in 
defaulting without good reason183.  
The reputational theory of sovereign debt can provide a key insight in understanding the 
move between the two models of sovereign debt regulation exposed in this thesis. It shows 
that judicial enforcement is not the only tool to incentivise States to repay their debts. 
Therefore, an absence of legal remedies does not automatically lead to risks of moral hazard.  
The problem with the reputational theory, from a creditor’s point of view, is that it does not 
provide actual ex ante assurances against debt repudiation. This is especially true when the 
reputational costs of said repudiation are outweighed by the short-term benefits of default184. 
The knowledge that the debtor will be, ex post, punished by higher interest rates is of little 
 
177 Tomz’s typology divides States in three separate categories, depending on their tendency towards repayment: 
stalwart, fair-weathers and lemons. While this divide into three types is useful in understanding creditors 
preferences, it is not necessary for a brief overview of the literature on debt and reputation. Tomz (n11) 16-17. 
178 Tomz (n 112) 16. For a critique of these assumptions see notably Lienau, ‘Law in Hiding’ (n 108) 562–569. 
179 Tomz (n 112) 17. 
180 ibid 23; Laura Alfaro and Fabio Kanczuk, ‘Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: A Quantitative Approach’ 
(2005) 65 Journal of International Economics 297; Ugo Panizza and eduardo Borzenstein, ‘The Costs of 
Sovereign Defaults’ (2008) 238 IMF Working Paper. The impact of future borrowing costs and market 
exclusion is heavily debated in the economic scholarship on sovereign debt. For an overview of the arguments 
see Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (n 167). 
181 Tomz (n 112) 23. Irani Arraiz, ‘Default, Settlement, and Repayment History: A Unified Model of Sovereign 
Debt’ (Social Science Research Network 2006) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1455163 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1455163> accessed 15 January 2020. 
182 As the risk of repudiation is compounded in the bonds interest rate 
183 Tomz (n 112) 23–25; Juan Cruces and Christoph Trebesch, ‘Sovereign Defaults: The Prics of Haircuts’ 
[2011] CESinfo Working Papers Series; Lienau, ‘Law in Hiding’ (n 108). 
184 See North and Weingast (n 124). 
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comfort to the bondholder who has just seen his investment disappear following an 
opportunistic default185.  
Thus, the reputational theory can explain why, on average, States are able to borrow, but a 
sovereign debt market driven purely by reputation does little to protect the creditors of 
defaulting States or reassure them ex ante. Such mechanism are, rather, the domain of the 
credible commitment model of sovereign lending.  
2.2.2 Credible Commitment and Sovereign Debt 
The credible commitment theory of sovereign lending was first put forward by North and 
Weingast in relation to Britain’s increased capacity to borrow following the Glorious 
Revolution186.  
The two authors base their arguments on the constitutional changes which followed the 
deposition of James II and the coronation of William III of Orange. The Revolution lead to 
a shift in power away from the Crown and in favour of Parliament.  Under the constitutional 
regime introduced by the Glorious Revolution, Parliament which at the time was appointed 
by and constituted of wealth holders, gained the ability to regulate the Crown’s finance187. 
According to North and Weingast, this created, an environment in which Britain could 
borrow at much more favourable rates than its European counterparts188. Indeed, Parliament, 
following the Revolution, was not only committed to the protection of property rights, but 
also had a vested interest in seeing that the government would repay what it had borrowed 
from private entities. This synergy was further enabled by the fact that, as members of the 
financial and aristocratic elite of Britain, parliamentarians themselves would often be 
creditors of the Crown, and part of a growing British rentier class 189 . As such the 
prerogatives granted to parliament rendered the Crowns’ creditors themselves responsible 
for deciding whether it could repudiate on its debts. This meant, in practice, that the British 
 
185 Bulow and Rogoff, ‘Sovereign Debt’ (n 175).In order to solve this conundrum, Eaton suggests a model 
where creditors agree ex ante to deny future lending in case of default. Jonathan Eaton, ‘Sovereign Debt, 
Reputation and Credit Terms’ (1996) 1 International Journal of Finance & Economics 25. 
186 See: North and Weingast (n 124); North (n 124). 
187 North and Weingast (n 124) 815–817. 
188 North and Weingast (n 124); North (n 124); John Beckett, ‘The Glorious Revolution, Parliament, and the 
Making of the First Industrial Nation’ (2014) 33 Parliamentary History 36. 
189 Kenneth Dyson, States, Debt, and Power: ‘Saints’ and ‘Sinners’ in European History and Integration 
(Oxford University Press 2014) 112. 
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government could constrain its future behaviour in such a way as to render debt repudiation 
unlikely, if not impossible190. 
These factors explain why, compared to its European neighbours, 17th and 18th century 
Britain was able to borrow at extremely advantageous interest rates191. Interestingly, further 
studies have confirmed North and Weingast’s findings by applying them to other historical 
democratic transitions in Europe192.  
Studies on the role played by the Gold Standard in sovereign lending seems to similarly 
confirm the idea that the ability of governments to effectively constrain themselves is key in 
their ability to borrow193. According to Bordo194, the Gold Standard, via which States pegged 
the value of their currencies to that of gold, acted as a ‘good housekeeping seal of approval’ 
as it effectively prevented States from devaluing their currencies. This guaranteed that sums 
 
190 North (n 124); David Stasavage, ‘Why Did Public Debt Originate in Europe?’, Fiscal Regimes and the 
Political Economy of Premodern States (Cambridge University Press 2015); Gary W Cox, ‘Was the Glorious 
Revolution a Constitutional Watershed?’ (2012) 72 The Journal of Economic History 567. It should be noted 
that there has been push-back against North and Weingast theory. Some authors have emitted doubts as to 
whether the Glorious Revolution actually lead to a measurable increased in Britain’s capacity to borrow. See 
Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh, ‘Institutional Reforms, Financial Development and Sovereign Debt: 
Britain 1690–1790’ (2006) 66 The Journal of Economic History 906. Other have argued that the reforms 
pointed to by North and Weingast had not been the instantaneous result of the Revolution but rather the result 
of an evolving trend. See Patrick Karl O'Brien, ‘Fiscal and Financial Preconditions for the Formation of 
Developmental States in the West and the East from the Conquest of Ceuta (1415) to the Opium War (1839)’ 
(2012) 23 Journal of World History 513. Despite these criticism, it seems that North and Weingast theory has 
entered the real of mainstream political economics and is broadly accepted at today’s date. For a rebuttal of 
these critiques see Cox. For a broader analysis of the context and the constitutional changes heralded by the 
Revolution see John Miller, The Glorious Revolution (2nd edn, Routledge 1997). 
191 North and Weingast (n 124) 820–824. That is not to say that other factors have not played a role in the surge 
in Britain’s capacity to borrow after the Revolution. The creation of the Bank of England, acting as the guardian 
of British monetary policy, is often mentioned as having bolstered the reliability of British bonds. See Der-
Yuan Yang, ‘The Origin of the Bank of England: A Credible Commitment to Sovereign Debt’ 
<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/11s61814> accessed 18 November 2019; Stephen Quinn, ‘Securitization of 
Sovereign Debt: Corporations as a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism in Britain, 1694-1750’ (Social 
Science Research Network 2008) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 991941 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=991941> 
accessed 18 November 2019. However, it is undeniable that one of the key differences between Britain at the 
time and other European Nations, i.e. France, Austria or Spain, is the fact that the British monarchs following 
the Revolution ceased to wield the absolute power that had previously enabled them to ignore contractual 
obligations. For a comparison between 18th century French and British debt see David Stasavage, Public Debt 
and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain, 1688-1789 (Cambridge University Press 
2003). On debt and the Spanish monarchy see James Conklin, ‘The Theory of Sovering Debt and Spain under 
Philip II’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 483; Anne Dubet, ‘Les Rois d’Espagne et Leurs Créanciers’, 
La dette publique dans l’histoire : « Les Journées du Centre de Recherches Historiques» des 26, 27 et 28 
novembre 2001 (Comité pour l’Histoire économique et financière 2006). 
192 Kim Oosterlinck, Loredana Ureche-Rangau and Jacques-Marie Vaslin, ‘Waterloo: A Godsend for French 
Public Finances?’ (European Historical Economics Society (EHES) 2013) Working Paper 0041 
<https://ideas.repec.org/p/hes/wpaper/0041.html> accessed 27 July 2016. 
193 Michael D Bordo, ‘The Gold Standard as a `Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval’’ (National Bureau of 
Economic Research 1995) Working Paper 5340 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w5340> accessed 26 February 
2016. 
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they had promised to their creditors would retain their value195, even in times of crisis. Bordo, 
logically, finds a strong correlation between adoption of the Gold Standard and increased 
borrowing capacity 196 . Similar conclusions are drawn by Mitchener and Weidenmier 
regarding ‘supersanctions’ during the late 19th century197. Supersanctions, here refer to the 
ability of Western powers between 1870 and 1913 to rely on the use of force or to mandate 
fiscal change for defaulting foreign sovereigns198, thus constraining those debtors’ future 
behaviour.  
The creditor protection model, as understood in this thesis, could be summarised as a judicial 
application of the credible commitment theory. As will be shown, under the creditor 
protection model, courts, whether domestic or international, are tasked with effectively 
binding States to their contractual obligations. As demonstrated by the aforementioned 
studies, this not only benefits the creditors of sovereigns, but is also beneficial for the 
sovereign itself.  
The strength of the credible commitment theory of sovereign debt, is that, as opposed to the 
reputational theory, it can explain how sovereign debt works in specific instances. Creditors 
agree to lend to specific States because they know ex ante that these States cannot repudiate 
their debts. However, credible commitment fails to explain how sovereign debt functions 
when such devices are lacking199.  
2.2.3 A Hybrid Model of Sovereign Lending 
This thesis does not consider credible commitment and reputation to be exclusive ways of 
understanding how sovereign debt works. Rather, both credible commitment devices and 
reputation building can be used by States and their creditors to improve the conditions of 
their access to capital markets.  
 
195 A series of judicial cases were brought, most of them by France, on behalf of creditors having extended to 
states sums repayable in gold denominated currencies. See Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International 
Courts and Tribunals (n 2) 58–73. Examining Case Concerning the payment of various serbian loans issued 
in France (France v Serbia) (1929) Series A n°20/01 Publ Cour Int Justice 1 (Permanent Court of International 
Justice); Case concerning the Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France (France v 
Brazil) (n 34). The Norwegian loan case brought before the ICJ proceeded from a similar factual nexus but 
was dismissed on the basis of a lack of jurisdiction. Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (France v Norway) 
(1957) 1957 ICJ Rep 9 (International Court of Justice). See also Borchard and Hotchkiss (n 2) 26–42. 
196 Bordo (n 193). 
197 Mitchener and Weidenmier (n 91). 
198 ibid. The use of force, forced monetary policy and the ‘quasi-receivership’ of foreign sovereign is also 
analysed in Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals (n 2) 22–88. 
199 Which is for most of sovereign debt’s history. 
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Fundamentally, this thesis understands that favourable access to capital markets is, in the 
modern world, essentially governed by financial considerations200. The interest rate on a 
sovereign bond is mostly determined by the borrower’s current perceived solvency and 
liquidity, the bond’s maturity, the borrower’s reputation and the broader market conditions 
at the time of lending. 
This does not mean that the law plays no role in sovereign lending. At the margin, States 
which are perceived as less reliable can use credible commitment devices to improve their 
access to capital markets. Recent studies on Greece for example have shown that when the 
Hellenic Republic’s solvability was doubted, Greek bonds issued under foreign laws were 
treated more favourably than Greek-law bonds with similar maturities201. Similarly, the 
‘original sin’ hypothesis analysed in chapter 3 shows that when the solvency of sovereign 
borrowers is questioned, they can improve their access to capital markets by borrowing in 
foreign currencies202. However, these devices should be understood as tools available to 
debtors to improve their borrowing conditions, rather than as mandatory conditions for 
accessing capital markets. 
2.3  Sovereign Lending in a Historical Context 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Another way to understand the rise of the creditor protection model and the subsequent move 
towards the anti-holdout model, is to place both models in their respective historical contexts. 
To that end, this section will look at four distinct ‘eras’ of sovereign lending. First, it will 
provide a quick overview of how sovereign debt has worked in a more distant past, between 
the 4th century B.C. and the 19th century. Generally, the purpose of this section is not to 
aspire to exhaustivity203, but rather to highlight that mechanisms designed to protect creditors 
 
200 Several studies on the pari passu clause and CACs have notably shown that the insertion of clauses designed 
to impede enforcement has little effect on borrowing costs of financially stable States. See Ashoka Mody and 
Barry Eichengreen, ‘Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? An Update and Additional 
Results’ (Social Science Research Network 1999) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 630737 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=630737.> accessed 15 January 2020; Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati, ‘Public 
Symbol In Private Contract: A Case Study’ (2006) 84 Washington University Law Review 1627; Michael 
Bradley, James Cox and Mitu Gulati, ‘The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their Antidotes: Lessons 
from the Sovereign Debt Market’ (2010) 39 Journal of Legal Studies 289. Similar conclusions have been drawn 
by Weidemaier regarding changes in the law of immunities. See Weidemaier, ‘Sovereign Immunity and 
Sovereign Debt’ (n 82). 
201 Choi, Gulati and Posner (n 91). 
202 Eichengreen, Haussman and Panizza (n 114). 
203 This historical section, in general, does not focus on the League of Nations Loans, the role of issuing banks 
in signalling debtors’ credibility in the early XXth century or on borrowings by Northern European Cities via 
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are not a historical anomaly. As will be shown, creditors have historically benefitted from 
institutional arrangements, either with the debtor or with their own States, designed to 
maximise the likelihood of seeing sovereign debts repaid. This hardly comes as a surprise 
given the role credible commitment plays in sovereign lending. However, and as will be 
underlined in the first section, while these remedies existed and provided a measure of 
creditor protection, their nature204 and effectivity205 renders them materially different from 
those analysed under the creditor protection model.  
The second section focuses on sovereign debt between the late 19th century and the 1950s. 
This specific era of sovereign lending deserves specific attention as it provides a direct 
backdrop for the rise of the creditor protection model in the 1970s. It argues, that the 
illegality of gunboat diplomacy, and the political risks tied to the exercise of diplomatic 
protection, combined with a wave of defaults in the 1920s explain why private creditors 
refrained from lending to developing States during the interwar period, and up to the 1970s. 
The third section then focuses on sovereign debt during the 1970s and 1980s, this period not 
only marks the return of developing States to capital markets, but also marks the rise of the 
conditions in which the creditor protection model could function, i.e. the syndicated loan 
market. 
Finally, the last section analyses the rise of the modern bond market following the Latin 
American debt crisis, which marks the beginning of the inefficiencies of the creditor 
protection model and the rise of the restructuring protection model analysed in chapter 4.  
 
rentes. These questions, while deserving a place in a historical study of sovereign debt are not as useful g to 
set the background of the creditor protection model. See Margaret G Myers, ‘The League Loans’ (1945) 60 
Political Science Quarterly 492; Manon van der Heijden, ‘Renteniers and the Public Debt of Dordrecht (1555-
1572)’, Urban public debts, urban government and the market for annuities in Western Europe (14th-18th 
centuries), vol 3 (Brepols Publishers 2003) <http://www.brepolsonline.net/doi/abs/10.1484/M.SEUH-
EB.3.1948> accessed 27 July 2016; John H Munro, ‘The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution: Usury, 
Rentes, and Negotiability’ (2003) 25 The International History Review 505; Flandreau and Flores (n 173). See 
also for an historical overview of sovereign debt Dyson (n 189); Graeber (n 162); Jean Andreau and others, La 
dette publique dans l’histoire : ‘Les Journées du Centre de Recherches Historiques’ des 26, 27 et 28 novembre 
2001 (Comité pour l’Histoire économique et financière 2006). 
204 The fact that they are mostly extra-judicial.  
205  The fact that, often, they failed to provide creditors with an actual shield against foreign sovereigns 
unwilling to repay their debts. 
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2.3.2 Early Instances of Sovereign Lending 
Sovereign debt has a significant history. The first recorded mention of public entities 
borrowing from private citizens dates from Ancient Greece, in the 4th century B.C.206. Debt, 
at the time, was mostly used by City-States to quickly raise the liquidities required to hire 
mercenary armies207. Greek city-States only sheltered a small population compared to their 
larger neighbours, meaning they could hardly spare the men needed to maintain a standing 
army and had to rely on mercenaries to wage war208. 
The debt of these Greek cities bears witness to the fact that mechanism designed to ensure 
that sovereigns209 could not renege upon their debts have historical precedence. Loans to the 
cities, for example, were secured against the assets of the polis210 itself or by personal 
guarantees pledged by its wealthy citizens211 . Enforcement of these secured loans was 
possible either by seizing the assets pledged as security, by suing individuals within the city 
themselves, or by recourse to arbitration before a third city212.  
With the first borrowings by public entities came the first defaults. The first recorded 
mention of sovereign debt focuses on a dispute between Dionysus, tyrant of Syracuse and 
his foreign creditors213. Said creditors accused the tyrant of having willingly debased his 
own currency to facilitate the repayment of large sums he had borrowed abroad214. 
 
206 Léopold Migeotte, ‘L’endettement Des Cités Grecques Dans l’Antiquité’, La dette publique dans l’histoire : 
« Les Journées du Centre de Recherches Historiques» des 26, 27 et 28 novembre 2001 (Comité pour l’Histoire 
économique et financière 2006). 
207 Graeber (n 162) 226; Emily Mackil, ‘The Greek Polis and Koinon’, Fiscal Regimes and the Political 
Economy of Premodern States (Cambridge University Press 2015); Migeotte (n 206). 
208 Migeotte (n 206); Mackil (n 207). 
209 ‘Sovereign’, in this section is used in the loosest of sense and not in its modern, post-Westphalian meaning. 
It simply refers to the fact that the debtor has regulatory capacities, which therefore increase the political and 
legal risks faced by its creditors. Some authors refer to ‘public debt’ rather than ‘sovereign debt’ when 
discussing the borrowings of pre-modern ‘sovereigns’. However, for the sake of clarity, this thesis uses the 
term sovereign debt throughout its entirety. 
210 Often the public buildings themselves or future tax revenues. See the multiple examples mentioned in 
Léopold Migeotte, L’emprunt Public Dans Les Cités Grecques: Recueil Des Documents et Analyse Critique 
(Les Éditions du Sphinx 1984). 
211 For an overview of the contracts of the Greek polis, see the documents gathered by ibid. 
212 Joseph J Walsh, ‘The Disorders of the 170s b.c. and Roman Intervention in the Class Struggle in Greece’ 
(2000) 50 The Classical Quarterly (New Series) 300; Migeotte (n 210) 44; RJ Buck and RM Nielsen, ‘Is 
Nikareta an Exception?’ (1989) 21 Prudentia 14; Sheila L Ager, Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World, 
337-90 B.C (University of California Press 1996). Later on cities would sometimes submit their arbitral 
disputes to well regarded foreign intellectuals, Cicero notably served as sole arbitrator of one such dispute. See 
ibid; Walsh. 
213 Charles J Bullock, ‘Dionysius of Syracuse. Financier’ (1930) 25 The Classical Journal 260. 
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The debt of 4th century B.C. Greek city-States clearly highlights the importance of some 
measure of creditor protection to enable public entities to obtain lending. Those remedies, 
designed to protect creditors, were quasi-boilerplate clauses present in most of them215, 
highlighting their importance.  
Due to the lack of surviving written sources, assessing the efficiency of these remedies for 
creditors is difficult. However, the historical record shows instances of arbitral litigation 
between foreign creditors and foreign city-States, resulting in repayment of debts to the 
latter 216 . Similarly, anecdotal evidence suggests that attachment of assess of assets of 
defaulting debtors occurred217.  
These early instances of sovereign debt would cease after the assimilation of the Hellenic 
peninsula by the Roman republic. Rome itself seldom borrowed, and never from foreign 
creditors218, and whether other antique nations did so is uncertain in the absence of written 
sources. 
Medieval sovereigns, a contrario, often relied on credit, either from their subjects or more 
often from Italian or Jewish bankers. The relationship between those bankers and the crowns 
of Europe would be fraught with defaults by the latter. Notably, Edward III’s debt 
repudiation, which arguably caused the downfall of the Florentine Bardi bank219. 
As opposed to the creditors of Greek City-States, Italian and Jewish bankers were not 
endowed with any legal recourse against defaults 220 . However, while judicial creditor 
protection is absent in medieval sovereign debt, creditors effectively tied lending to the 
 
215 See the study of these clauses by Migeotte (n 210). 
216 For a study of this early quasi-international litigation on sovereign debt see Ager (n 212). 
217 See the examples mentioned in Migeotte (n 210); Migeotte (n 206); Ager (n 212). 
218 There seems to be only two instances where Rome relied on debt to fund itself, respectively during the first 
and second Punic wars. At both times, the Republic was famously in dire circumstances and on the verge of 
collapse, leading historians to argue that in those cases the line between actual lending with the intention on 
seeing repayment and charity is blurred. There are some mentions of Emperors borrowing in their own names, 
however, given the structure of the Imperial Roman constitution, said debt does not appear to have been 
attributed to Rome itself. See Jean Andreau, ‘Existait-Il Une Dette Publique Dans l’Amtiquité Romaine?’, La 
dette publique dans l’histoire : « Les Journées du Centre de Recherches Historiques» des 26, 27 et 28 
novembre 2001 (Comité pour l’Histoire économique et financière 2006).  
219 For an overview of the relationship between the Bardi bank and the English crown see Edwin S Hunt, ‘A 
New Look at the Dealings of the Bardi and Peruzzi with Edward III’ (1990) 50 The Journal of Economic 
History 149. 
220 Regarding the latter the repudiation of debts owed to Jewish bankers had been actively encouraged by the 
IVth Lateran Council in 1213. The reasoning of the Council was that, while Jewish bankers escaped the 
prohibition of usury required by the Catholic doctrine, their practices were ‘cruel’, ‘treacherous’ and their 
interest rates ‘excessive’ which justified repudiation of debts and confiscation of the Jewish merchants’ 
property. See Dyson (n 189) 175; Mark Koyama, ‘The Political Economy of Expulsion: The Regulation of 
Jewish Moneylending in Medieval England’ (2010) 21 Constitutional Political Economy 374. 
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obtention of tax-farming competences, or trade in restricted goods. In practice, therefore, 
creditors could obtain repayment via the obtention of streams of revenues which would 
otherwise have flown to the sovereign itself.  
For example, Italian banks operating in England obtained a monopoly on the trade of English 
wool in exchange for their loans to the crown221. Similarly, the Medici bank obtained, from 
its loan to the papacy, the right to collect annates222, and the fees owed by bishops for their 
instauration223.  
Similar relationships were developed by medieval city-States and their creditors, with the 
latter obtaining rights to farm taxes on behalf of the city, and to pay themselves with the 
proceeds of said tax collection224.  
These schemes, for creditors, had the advantage of substituting a debtor immune to 
enforcement (the sovereign), with a stream of revenue whose originator could effectively be 
coerced into repayment (the taxpayer). Tax evasion, indeed, could effectively be punished, 
if needed, by recourse to excommunication225.  
Outside medieval Europe, similar relationships can be found Ottoman Empire’s 
management of its debt from the 16th century onwards226. Like its European counterparts, 
the Sublime Port assigned to its creditors the collection of specific tax-revenues in order to 
secure lending. Tax farming rights were first granted on the basis of specific individual 
contracts called Mukataa, but from the 16th century onwards, those rights were auctioned 
off to potential lenders227. 
 
221 Meir Kohn, ‘Merchant Banking in the Medieval and Early Modern Economy’ [1999] Dartmouth College, 
Department of Economics Working Paper 
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223 Raymond De Roover, The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397-1494 (1963) 212; Tim Parks, Medici 
Money: Banking, Metaphysics, and Art in Fifteenth-Century Florence (WW Norton 2005) 47–48. 
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(2006) 10 Review of Finance 487; Michele Fratianni and Franco Spinelli, ‘Italian City-States and Financial 
Evolution’ (2006) null European Review of Economic History 257. 
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226 Şevket Pamuk, ‘The Evolution of Financial Institutions in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1914’ (2004) 11 
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Assignment of specific tax streams to a debt emission continued well into the 20th century. 
One can for example mention a 1919 Greek bond, secured by a tobacco tax228 or the use of 
guano as a security by Peru during the 19th century229. 
These examples of early sovereign lending practice highlight two fundamental aspects of 
sovereign lending supporting this thesis. Creditor protection, in one form or another has 
historically been a key aspect of sovereigns’ access to foreign credit. However, the 
effectivity of the mechanism protecting creditors has usually been limited. Even if medieval 
bankers obtained the rights to farm taxes, these rights were pointless once repudiated by the 
debtor. The same goes for tax revenues as a security for sovereign bonds as said rights were 
of little use against a sovereign deciding to repudiate them230.  
2.3.3 Sovereign Lending Between the 19th Century and the 1950s 
The previous section underlined the fact that creditor protection, usually through extra-
judicial means, has been a regular feature of sovereign lending throughout history. Similarly, 
sovereign debt in the 19th and early 20th century was propped up by a series of measures 
designed to maximise creditor’s chances to see that the debts they had extended would be 
repaid. 
Sovereign debt regulation in the early 19th and 20th century is the direct backdrop behind the 
modern creditor protection model. First, diplomatic protection, leading to lawsuits before 
arbitral tribunals and later the PCIJ, provides the first examples of modern international 
litigation on sovereign debt231. However, despite this limited recognition of creditor’s rights, 
the competence of international jurisdictions remained uncertain. Debates upon whether 
creditors of sovereigns, or of entities controlled by sovereigns, possessed remedies for 
repayment in international law were a recurring occurrence232. Thus, while international 
 
228 Buchheit and Pam (n 14). 
229 Catalina Vizcarra, ‘Guano, Credible Commitments, and Sovereign Debt Repayment in Nineteenth-Century 
Peru’ (2009) 69 The Journal of Economic History 358. 
230 Buchheit and Pam (n 14). 
231 See e.g. French Company of Venezuelan Railroads Case (France v Venezuela) (n 109); Case Concerning 
the payment of various serbian loans issued in France (France v Serbia) (n 195); Case concerning the Payment 
in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France (France v Brazil) (n 34); Canevaro Claim (Italy v. 
Peru), Award (n 164). 
232 See e.g. Biens Britanniques au Maroc espagnol (Réclamation 53 de Melilla - Ziat, ben Kiran) (great Britain 
v Spain) (1925) 2 UNRIAA 729. Discussed in Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and 
Tribunals (n 2). Citing David Bederman, ‘Creditors’ Claims in international law’ (2000) 34 international 
lawyer 235, 329.  
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litigation on sovereign debt was a possibility, its realisation was often mired with legal 
uncertainty.  
Moreover, as enforcement usually required relying on diplomatic protection by the creditor’s 
national state, enforcement before international tribunals was often denied for political 
reasons233. 
Creditors, beyond those uncertain judicial remedies could also rely on a series of extra-legal 
mechanisms to ensure that sovereign debts would be repaid. 
The most infamous of these mechanisms, was gunboat diplomacy: the reliance by the 
creditor’s State on military force against sovereign debtors to ensure that debts owed to its 
nationals would be repaid234. There are two caveats regarding the use of gunboat diplomacy 
as a mean to protect creditors. The first is that, in practice, the use of force to enforce 
contractual obligations was not a usual mean of settling disputes related to sovereign debt235.  
From a creditor protection standpoint, the second issue tied to gunboat diplomacy is that it 
relies on some form of espousal of the creditor’s claims by their national State. This means 
that in practice the decision to enforce sovereign debt contracts was not purely a financial 
one, but also was heavily linked to politics236. For creditors this does little to reduce the 
political risk tied to lending to sovereigns and therefore renders gunboat diplomacy 
somewhat inefficient as a creditor protection device.  
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Moreover, following the Drago-Porter convention, gunboat diplomacy, as an avenue for 
enforcing sovereign debt contracts, was legally closed237. 
Another central pillar of sovereign lending in the 19th and early 20th century is the reliance 
on the Gold Standard, mentioned supra. For creditors, the Gold Standard provided a check 
against the ability of States to devalue their currencies to repay their debts. In addition, the 
Standard acted as a signal for adherence to the traditional liberal values of the time238. Indeed, 
the Gold Standard appeared to be the ideal tool to promote 19th century “laissez-faire” 
principles as it created a common currency system with fixed exchange rate therefore 
fostering international trade239.  
As previously mentioned, this meant that States who had adopted the Gold Standard usually 
benefitted from better borrowing conditions than those who had not240. This led its adoption 
globally, starting with Western Europe, then the US, Canada and Australia, until most States 
chose to follow the trend241. Reliance on the Gold Standard would, however, falter with the 
participants in the first World War abandoning it to fund themselves through the conflict242.  
Following the first World War, all the European participants in the hostilities243 would 
default or need a debt restructuring244. This was followed in the 1920s and 1930s by defaults 
from most of Eastern Europe and Latin American States due to the worldwide financial 
crisis245. At the international level, a limited response was heralded by the League of Nations, 
acting as a facilitator between a series of heavily indebted nations and international banks246, 
but the League’s intervention remained limited in scope and efficiency.  
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In general, the bond market of the 19th and early 20th can be characterised as a period of great 
economic disturbance and near total lack of efficient remedies for creditors, especially post 
Drago-Porter convention. This combination between a complete lack of reliable remedies by 
creditors and waves of defaults easily explains why after World War II private creditors were 
reticent to lend to risky sovereigns, leading them to turn to the Bretton Woods institutions 
for capital247.  
2.3.4 The 1970s and 1980s sovereign syndicated loan market 
As previously mentioned, sovereign debt between the second World War and the 1970s, for 
developing States, mostly flew from the Bretton Woods institutions and from other States. 
Private lending only emerged in the 1970s as inflation reduced the IMF capacity to provide 
for loan arrangements248 and as Western banks were blessed with fresh capital flows from 
the Middle East. Historically high oil prices after the 1973 crisis lead to increased deposits 
by petrol exporting countries into US and European Banks. This increase in liquidities was 
then recycled by the banks to fund South American States' sovereign debt 249 . This 
arrangement not only filled the hole left by the decrease in IMF lending, but also allowed 
developing countries to borrow without being constrained by IMF conditionality250. As a 
result, the debt of Latin American Nations rose massively, an increase that would soon prove 
unsustainable for the debtors251.  
The sovereign debt market of the 1970s features several peculiarities compared to previous 
instances of sovereign lending. First, the contractual instruments underlying petro-dollar 
recycling were syndicated loans252. Syndicated loans are loans extended by a group of banks 
-the syndicate- under the management of a lead or agent bank on a several liability basis253. 
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Syndication provides several advantages for the players involved254. The several nature of 
the loan enables banks to make vast sums of money available to their debtor without one 
bank shouldering all the default risk255. As the liability is several, each bank is individually 
responsible for making the funds available, while profits are shared pro-rata between the 
members of the syndicate256. Decision making, within the syndicate, is democratic with 
decisions taken on a majority or qualified majority basis257. As the contractual instrument 
underlying the debt is a loan, and not a security, the contract is not easily transferable, 
meaning that there was no large-scale secondary debt market258. 
Moreover, the 1970s are characterised by a progressive adoption of the relative doctrine of 
sovereign immunities, and the loan contracts of the time usually featured immunity waiver 
clauses259. The consequences of such a change will be examined the next chapter. For the 
purpose of this section, it suffices to underline that this change enabled creditors, for the first 
time, to enforce sovereign debt contracts before domestic courts.  
As the syndicated market involved a limited number of recurrent players, and because of the 
rules of syndication260, if a restructuring was needed, creditors usually managed to do so 
simply by negotiating261. Thus, litigation during the syndicated loan era was particularly 
rare262.  
This lack of litigation can be explained by examining the incentives against litigating for 
creditors. Large commercial banks, the bulk of the syndicated loan market, are repeat players 
within the sovereign debt market263. As such, they benefit from a return of the debtor to 
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capital markets, as said return will provide them with the payment of new interests, as well 
as the obtention of fees during the lending process264.  
In addition, the rules of syndication prohibit the preferential treatment of creditors over other 
members of the syndicate and enforce a strict equality between members265. This, again, 
limited the incentives towards holding out as the entirety of the syndicate was bound to 
identical conditions during a restructuring266.   
Similarly, States in the syndicated loan market had an interest in not opportunistically 
defaulting. Since market access was guarded by a small number of banks, opportunistic 
defaults could be easily punished, and further market barred267.  
From a game-theoretical point of view, the relationship between States and their creditors at 
the time can be seen as an iterated version of the prisoner’s dilemma. In the classic, one-
round version of the prisoner’s dilemma, players are incentivised to defect to maximise their 
profits as defection cannot be punished in subsequent rounds. In the iterated version, since 
defection can be punished, players are incentivised towards cooperation268.  
In the syndicated loan market, each individual loan is a round of the game between the banks 
and the sovereign. If the sovereign defaults opportunistically, the banks can punish it in the 
next round, either by preventing the sovereign from borrowing or by raising the interest rate. 
Similarly, if one bank defects by deciding to litigate against a sovereign acting in good faith, 
other banks can punish it by excluding it from future syndicates. In practice, this situation 
leads to path-dependency between the sovereign and its creditors. Cooperative creditors are 
rewarded by being able to play future rounds of the game, therefore they have no interest in 
litigating, unless they are facing a debtor acting in bad faith. A similar relationship is at play 
between the large banks involved in the negotiation of a restructuring deal themselves269. 
Larger creditors, in charge of assembling a syndicate270  and negotiating the terms of a 
restructuring deal constantly deal with each other and therefore play a similar game271. This, 
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again, fosters cooperation between the main lenders, facilitating the restructuring process272. 
Finally, because of the democratic rules of the syndicate, in case of restructuring, decision-
making is simplified as restructuring proposals only need to convince a qualified majority 
of lenders273. 
However, if the club-like nature of the syndicated loan market encourages cooperation in 
times of restructuring, it also creates the conditions for concentrating sovereign default risks 
to major players within the financial sector274.  
As previously underlined, there was no widespread secondary debt market during the 
syndicated loan era of sovereign debt. This meant that the entirety of the default risk of 
sovereigns sat in the balance sheets of the small number of banks involved in syndicated 
lending. Moreover, the recycling of petro-dollars at the basis of the syndicated loan market 
was resting on the perception that “countries don't go bust”275. As a result, banks started to 
lend Latin American countries sums well over their capital-adequacy requirements276. A 
posteriori, this appears to have been a recipe for disaster. A small number of major lenders 
were over-exposed to the credit risk of a limited number of debtors and were not holding the 
capital required to face an eventual default. The final nail in this coffin was that sovereign 
lending in the 70s and 80s was mostly extended to Latin American States, leading to fear of 
a large financial collapse when these countries started defaulting in the 1980s277.  
The crisis began on the 22nd of August 1982, with Mexico declaring that it could not face its 
external debt obligations278. During 1983 fifteen other South American debtors were facing 
the same situation279, threatening to bring major US banks down with them280.  
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A first step toward preventing this collapse was for the creditors to extend maturities on the 
loans and to agree to provide extended credit in collaboration with the IMF281. The idea was 
to avoid default while buying the banks more time to increase their capital reserves282. 
However, this delay proved insufficient, prompting the US government to intervene in the 
crisis with a plan from Treasury Secretary James Baker283. The plan involved the cooperation 
of private creditors and multilateral financial institutions284. The aim was to provide new 
loans, on a voluntary basis, to the most indebted States, amounting to $29 billion ($20 billion 
coming from the banks, and $9 billion from the IMF and the World Bank)285. In exchange, 
the debtors agreed to open up to foreign trade and investment and liberalize State 
enterprises286. 
Meanwhile, US banks were creating a secondary market allowing them to swap sovereign 
loans portfolios to hedge default risks287. Basically, a bank would consolidate several loans 
it held against a specific sovereign and swap them against a similar portfolio from a 
sovereign deemed more trustworthy288. This embryo of secondary market was at the time 
purely limited to US commercial banks 289 . However, with the crisis worsening, banks 
opened it to third parties interested in speculating over such portfolios, offered with 
significant discounts290. This also allowed debtor States to buy-back some of their own debt, 
therefore managing to reduce it, thanks to the low price of the securities on the secondary 
market291.  
A last step was built on the foundations of this emerging secondary market292: the Brady 
Plan, named after yet another US Treasury Secretary (Nicholas Brady). The new secondary 
market, in addition to paving the way for securitisation, had allowed banks to amass cash 
reserves large enough for them to withstand important debt write-offs293. The Brady plan 
relied on voluntary participation from lender banks to provide a third series of loans, as well 
as the reduction of the old debt. In exchange, the old loans would be securitized and sold to 
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the public, backed by US securities294 . Basically, several loans were tied together and 
repackaged as bonds, then sold at discount to the secondary market. The benefits of the bond 
sale were then used to off-set the losses incurred by banks295. 
As will be seen in the following section, bonded sovereign debt is structurally different from 
syndicated-loan debt. The main difference lies in the transferability of bonds. Bonds, as 
opposed to loans, are negotiable instruments, and involve a significantly higher number and 
diversity of creditors296. This spreading of the risk across multiple class of actors enabled 
the financial sector to maintain high levels of lending while spreading default risk away from 
major financial institutions. However, bonded sovereign debt brought with it another issue, 
managing restructuring processes across vast numbers of actors with sometimes widely 
differing motivations297.  
2.3.5 The Modern Bond Market 
The current sovereign bond market is a direct heir of the Brady plan. The transferability of 
sovereign bonds, allowing for the creation of a secondary market, has opened up the 
sovereign debt market to a broader range of creditors, ranging from institutional investors to 
hedge funds and retail investors298.  
From a systemic risk perspective 299 , this broadening of the creditor-base prevents the 
concentration of the default risk of sovereigns in one single sector of international finance. 
However, this heterogeneity of creditors shatters the club-like mentality that was reigning 
during the syndicated loan era, making restructurings more difficult300. 
From a contract law perspective, while syndicated loans feature ad hoc provisions enabling 
creditors to restructure a sovereign’s debt via majority votes, historically, bonds did not 
benefit from such clauses301. The lack of mechanisms designed to facilitate restructuring 
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created a complex game of cooperation between States and their creditors when 
restructurings were needed302.  
By default, sovereign bonds being contracts, they cannot be modified unilaterally by either 
party. Restructuring of bonded debt therefore requires changes to be made to each separate 
bond, with both the debtor and bondholders agreeing to said changes. In practice, the consent 
of all parties is collected via a bond exchange. During a restructuring, the bonds issued by 
the sovereign, and that the sovereign wants to be restructured, are offered for a swap against 
other bonds designed to facilitate repayment303. 
Each individual bondholder during such a process can decide whether to participate in the 
restructuring, and if they hold out, the original bonds they hold remain completely untouched 
by the process and are thus enforceable. This means that, in the bond market, for 
restructurings to be successful, States need to provide an offer that will garner the approval 
of a critical mass of creditors304. 
Against that background, the heterogeneity of creditors and their investing strategies became 
from the 1990s onwards, a source of collective action issues. Indeed, some bondholders have 
no economic incentives towards a quick return of the State to capital markets305. To come 
back to the prisoner’s dilemma analogy, while large banks or institutional creditors are 
playing a repeated version of the game, some bondholders are playing a single round version. 
Therefore, they are incentivised towards refusing restructuring proposals from the sovereign, 
and use any available remedy in order to obtain payment knowing that they cannot be 
punished in subsequent rounds. 
Two main categories of bondholders fit this description: retail investors and vulture funds. 
Retail investors generally invest in sovereign bonds for savings purposes. Their positions 
 
302 Ghosal and Miller (n 158); Dellas and Niepelt (n 297); Buchheit and Gulati, ‘Sovereign Bonds and the 
Collective Will’ (n 89); Anna Gelpern, ‘How Collective Action Is Changing Sovereign Debt Cover Story’ 
(2003) 22 International Financial Law Review 19. 
303 Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch (n 4) 7; Steven L Schwarcz, ‘Idiot’s Guide to Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Conference on Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The View from the Legal Academy’ (2004) 53 Emory Law 
Journal 1189, 1193. Alternatively, debt restructurings can involve debt buy-backs, via which a sovereign 
repurchases its own bonds, thus cancelling the debt. 
304 Dellas and Niepelt (n 297); Ghosal and Miller (n 158); Gelpern, ‘How Collective Action Is Changing 
Sovereign Debt Cover Story’ (n 302). 
305 Buchheit and Gulati, ‘Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will’ (n 89); Gelpern, ‘How Collective Action 
Is Changing Sovereign Debt Cover Story’ (n 89); Kaplan (n 89); Krueger (n 76); Lee Buchheit and Elena Daly, 
‘Minimizing Holdout Creditors: Carrots’, Sovereign debt management. R. Lastra, L. Buchheit (eds.) (Oxford 
University Press) 4–5. 
Understanding Sovereign debt  73 
are usually less diversified than their institutional counterparts’306, meaning that they are 
more exposed to the default risk of specific sovereigns. Individuals do not benefit from a 
return of the debtor to the capital market. The debtor is not one of their clients, future interest 
payment will not flow in their directions and they are not in a position where future bond 
issuance will yield to the payment of fees. Thus, it is hardly surprising to notice that litigation 
of sovereign debt restructurings by retail investors is a growing phenomenon307. 
Vulture funds, on the other hand, have developed their trading strategies based on the legal 
remedies available to them under the creditor protection model. These funds rely on a risky, 
but potentially highly rewarding investment strategy: buying debt instruments from 
distressed sovereigns at a steep discount and either pressuring the creditor’s government or 
suing in order to be paid on the full value of the debt308.  
Economically, this strategy can be read as a form of arbitrage.  Arbitrage is usually defined 
as “the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same, or essentially similar, security in two 
different markets for advantageously different prices”309. Sovereign bonds, effectively trade 
at two different prices: their market price, at which they are bought and sold on the secondary 
market, and their judicial price, the value that can obtained before courts and tribunals310. 
Effectively, vulture funds purchase their bonds at a discounted market price and realise them 
at their judicial price.  
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Under usual circumstances, arbitrage opportunities tend to be closed by market actors311. If 
a share of Apple Inc. is trading at $100 on the New-York Stock Exchange and $101 on the 
Chicago Stock Exchange, investors will flock to the NYSE, raising the demand on shares of 
Apple and sell in Chicago, bringing prices in line in both exchanges. However, the judicial 
value of the bonds rests entirely on the efficiency of the remedies designed to protect 
creditors. Hence, other market actors cannot by themselves, close the window for arbitrage.  
The first major case involving such manoeuvres involved the Dart family and Brazil312. The 
Darts purchased Brazilian debt on the secondary market between 1991 and 1993, at a 
discount between 75% and 60%313, and stored it in a Cayman based bank, specially created 
for that purpose: CIBC314. In 1993, Brazil negotiated a restructuring with major US banks 
leading to a swap between its outstanding loans and new bonds with a reduced face value315, 
in the context of a Brady deal316. All creditors agreed to the restructuring, except the Dart 
who in the meantime had amassed Brazilian debt for a total face-value of $1.4 billion, 
making them Brazil’s largest creditor317. The original debt instruments, however, required a 
majority of creditors to agree in order to trigger an acceleration clause318. Thus, aware of the 
Darts attempts and fearing a lawsuit, Brazil instructed Banco da Brazil to repurchase debt to 
ensure that the Dart would not own securities over the 49% threshold319. 
This lead CIBS to sue Brazil, Banco Central and Citibank (acting as an agent bank in the 
original instruments) in order to seek payment acceleration320. The Court denied summary 
judgments, and the parties later settled out of court with Brazil granting the Darts $25 
millions in cash and $52.3 million in bonds321. 
More recently, NML and Elliott relied on the pari passu322 clause against Argentina and 
Peru in order to attempt to coerce both sovereigns into settling out of court323. These judicial 
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means are particularly disruptive to the restructuring process. Reliance on the pari passu 
clause, notably, can disrupt entire restructuring processes324. Similarly, retail investor’s use 
of investment arbitration threatens to disrupt restructuring processes by enabling creditors to 
challenge regulatory measures designed to facilitate restructurings325.  
The effect of these delays and inefficiencies are not purely financial. Restructuring processes 
have dire effects on the debtor’s population326. Lengthening them unnecessarily prolong 
these sufferings. Because these inefficiencies were rooted in the efficient remedies granted 
to creditors under the creditor protection model, a change of model, a different way to 
regulate the sovereign debt market was necessary, leading to the advent of the anti-holdout 
model.  
 
324 Kaplan (n 89); Gelpern, ‘How Collective Action Is Changing Sovereign Debt Cover Story’ (n 89); Fisch 
and Gentile (n 73); Christopher Wheeler and Amir Attaran, ‘Declawing the Vulture Funds: Rehabilitation of a 
Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation’ (Social Science Research Network 2003) SSRN Scholarly Paper 
ID 1575301 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1575301> accessed 6 November 2015; Krueger (n 76). 
325 Waibel, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box’ (n 81); Julien Cazala, ‘- « Crise de La Dette Souveraine Grecque et 
Arbitrage En Matière d’investissement », Cahiers de l’arbitrage - Paris Journal of International Arbitration, 
2015, N° 4, Pp. 722-729.’ 
<https://www.academia.edu/32784883/_Crise_de_la_dette_souveraine_grecque_et_arbitrage_en_mati%C3%
A8re_d_investissement_Cahiers_de_l_arbitrage_-
_Paris_Journal_of_International_Arbitration_2015_n_4_pp._722-729> accessed 6 March 2019. 
326 Lumina, ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other Related International 
Financial Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Mission to Argentina)’ (n 6); Lumina, ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the Effects of 
Foreign Debt and Other Related International Financial Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of All 
Human Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Mission to Greece )’ (n 6). 
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3 The Creditor Protection Model 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, this thesis has shown that sovereign debt can be understood as 
functioning via a mixture between a reputational model of cooperation between sovereigns 
and their creditors, and the provision, at the margins of credible commitment devices by 
borrowers.  
A brief historical analysis of sovereign debt thus, logically reveals that some measure of 
creditor protection has, since the 4th century B.C., been the norm within the sovereign debt 
market. However, historically, these measures have insufficiently guaranteed creditor 
protection as they usually relied on a form of espousal by the creditor’s national State. 
This equilibrium began to change from the 1970s onwards. When developing sovereigns 
returned to capital markets, thanks to petro-dollar recycling, they did so in a completely 
different legal environment, as private creditors could sue sovereigns before domestic courts 
and, from the 1990s onwards, international courts. Litigation, however remained rare under 
the club-like structure provided by syndicated banking, and began when, following the 
Brady Plan, sovereign indebtedness became bonded, thus leading to creditor heterogeneity. 
The norms applied to sovereign debt at the time, as will be shown in this chapter, can be 
understood as seeking to incentivise private creditors towards lending by providing them 
with efficient remedies against sovereigns. This thesis has dubbed this paradigmatic 
regulatory model the ‘creditor protection model’. Its analysis is divided in three sections. 
The first section provides a general theory of the creditor protection model by highlighting, 
the necessary elements for the model to function. It illustrates them with a series of domestic 
law examples showing how these components have worked in practice. These examples have 
mostly been drawn from the practice of US courts since most sovereign debt transactions 
flow through New-York327, but also because said practice has been the most controversial in 
recent years328. This brief survey of domestic court’s and market actor’s practice is not 
 
327 Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (n 5) 4; Kupelyants (n 53) 6; Das, 
Papaioannou and Trebesch (n 4) 151–153; Michael Bradley and G Mitu Gulati, ‘Collective Action Clauses for 
the Eurozone: An Empirical Analysis’ (Social Science Research Network 2013) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 
1948534 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1948534> accessed 24 January 2020. Reference to the practice of 
other domestic courts and tribunals will however be made when relevant. 
328 See e.g. Gathii (n 161); Miller and Thomas, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ (n 73). 
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intended to be exhaustive but merely to highlight the fact that the creditor protection model 
is not purely an international law phenomenon, but has also been implemented at the 
domestic level329. 
The second objective of this chapter, treated in section 2, is to analyse how the creditor 
protection model has been implemented in International law. Section 2 inter allia focuses on 
the characterisation of sovereign bonds as investments for the purpose of the ICSID 
convention, on the characterisation of sovereign debt as an acta de iure imperii, and on the 
law of necessity as it applies to sovereign debt. 
Finally, the last section of this chapter analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the creditor 
protection model. Its main takeaway is that creditor protection can provide an efficient way 
to incentivise creditors to lend to States, if economic incentives encourage creditors to 
cooperate when restructurings are necessary. Thus, in an environment, such as the post-
Brady plan bond market when said incentives are lacking, the creditor protection model leads 
to collective action issues330  as it provides holdouts with the means of disrupting debt 
restructurings, and incentivises them to do so.  
3.2 A General Theory of the Creditor Protection Model 
The purpose of the creditor protection model is to offer creditors efficient legal remedies to 
coerce the sovereign debtor towards fulfilling the obligations flowing from the sovereign 
debt relationship. It can therefore be understood as a judicial way of creating credible 
commitment for the sovereign debtor, as the efficient legal remedies granted to ensure that 
the debtor cannot renege upon its debt without facing legal consequences331. This reduces 
the legal and political risks tied to lending to sovereigns as it disincentivises them against 
repudiation332.  
 
329 For a more exhaustive survey of domestic court’s practice regarding sovereign debt see: Megliani, Sovereign 
Debt (n 50); Kupelyants (n 53). 
330 On collective action issues see Gelpern, ‘How Collective Action Is Changing Sovereign Debt Cover Story’ 
(n 89); Buchheit and Gulati, ‘Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will’ (n 89); Dellas and Niepelt (n 297); 
Ghosal and Miller (n 158). 
331 On credible commitment theory see North (n 124); Vizcarra (n 229); Yang (n 191). 
332 On the role of contractual remedies in reducing the legal and political risks tied to sovereign lending see: 
Choi, Gulati and Posner (n 114); Eichengreen, Haussman and Panizza (n 114). 
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Thus, courts within the creditor protection model play the same role as Parliament did after 
the Glorious Revolution333, or as the Gold Standard played prior to World War I334, they 
effectively constrain States’ options when it comes to debt. By doing so, in theory, the 
creditor protection model not only benefits creditors, whose position in the sovereign debt 
relationship is protected, but also the sovereign itself who benefits from lower interest rates 
and improved access to capital markets335. 
To effectively incentivise States towards repayment, the creditor protection model needs to 
fulfil three distinct conditions. First, creditors need to have access to courts, independent 
from the sovereign. Second, the obligations arising from the sovereign debt relationship need 
to be given effect. Finally, courts need to grant creditors remedies that will effectively coerce 
the debtor into repayment. 
The combination of these three conditions creates a system in which creditors themselves 
can judicially enforce the obligations arising from the sovereign debt relationship, be ensured 
that their rights are neither waved away by courts or altered by the debtor, and that the 
remedies they obtain will coerce the debtor towards repayment, thus avoiding efficient 
breaches.  
Before individually analysing each of these conditions, it should be noted that the purpose 
of this section and the next is to expose the internal logic of the creditor protection model, 
namely that judicial creditor protection incentivises lending and is therefore economically 
efficient. This internal logic, while intellectually sound336 effectively leads to inefficiencies 
within the sovereign debt market, as will be analysed in section 3. However, if one wants to 
understand how these inefficiencies arose, one first needs to understand how, in theory, the 
creditor protection model can work.  
 
333 North and Weingast (n 124); North (n 124); Beckett (n 188). 
334 Bordo (n 193). 
335 North and Weingast (n 124); North (n 124); Oosterlinck, Ureche-Rangau and Vaslin (n 192). 
336 The idea that efficient legal remedies are incentives to enter transaction is well rooted in the law and 
economics tradition. Posner notably advances the idea of ‘efficient breach’, stating that parties to a contract are 
incentivised towards compliance, unless the benefits from breach outweigh the costs engendered by the 
remedies granted to the other contracting party. See  Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2d ed, 
Little, Brown 1977) 56, cited in Klass (n 146) 363. See also John N Adams and Roger Brownsword, ‘The 
Ideologies of Contract’ (1987) 7 Legal Studies 205, 206–213; Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law: Text, Cases, 
and Materials (Eighth edition, Oxford University Press 2018) 9: highlighting the importance of ‘sanctity of 
contract’ type doctrines. For an application to sovereign debt see Choi, Gulati and Posner (n 114); Gathii (n 
161). 
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3.2.1 Creditor Access to Courts Independent from the Sovereign 
3.2.1.1 Creditor Access to Courts: Overview 
Logically, the first step in ensuring that creditors benefit from efficient legal remedies 
against the sovereign debtor is to provide them with access to independent, competent for a 
for litigating sovereign debt.  
Historically, the existence of such jurisdictions has been lacking. Domestically, access to 
courts against a foreign sovereign has been inexistent as States were shielded by their 
immunity of jurisdiction337. Internationally such access was conditional on the national state 
of the creditor agreeing to espouse its national’s contractual claim. Since diplomatic 
protection adds a layer of political uncertainty to enforcement, and since litigating sovereign 
debt before the domestic courts of the debtor is tainted by fear of interference by debtor, 
access by creditors themselves to independent courts and tribunals is required under the 
creditor protection model. 
Finally, access to courts is necessary for enabling creditors to obtain the legal remedies 
designed to coerce the sovereign were it to attempt not to fulfil its obligations. These 
remedies, as will be seen infra need to be judicial as it guarantees that the creditors 
themselves can wield them against a reluctant sovereign, further depoliticising 
enforcement338. The combination of these factors guarantees that the sovereign debtor can 
credibly commit to the obligations arising from the sovereign debt relationship.  
In domestic law, two main examples of legal mechanism designed to ensure the competence 
of independent courts will be analysed in this section. First, the presence of forum selection 
clauses in sovereign debt contracts, second the creditor-friendly interpretation of the Act of 
State Doctrine, the comity defence and the champerty defence, by US courts.  
 
337 On sovereign immunities and sovereign debt see: Weidemaier, ‘Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt’ 
(n 82); Delaume (n 82). 
338 This difference renders judicial remedies more efficient than the more ‘political’ remedies which have been 
historically en vogue such as gunboat diplomacy, diplomatic settlement or the ‘quasi-receivership’ of debtor 
States. On these questions see Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals (n 2) 22–
58. See also Weidenmier (n 175); Weidemaier, ‘Contracting for State Intervention’ (n 236); Ahmed, Alfaro 
and Maurer (n 95). 
The Creditor Protection Model  80 
3.2.1.2 Creditor Access to Domestic Courts: Forum Selection Clauses 
The sovereign bonds of developing States typically feature forum selection clauses. The 
elected jurisdiction is usually, either the second district of New-York, or London courts339, 
as both jurisdictions are usually recognised for their expertise in financial matters340. 
Forum selection clauses pursue numerous separate objectives in transnational contract law. 
They foster certainty as they enable contracting parties to know ex ante which jurisdiction 
will be competent over disputes, they enable parties to choose the jurisdiction they see fit, 
either in terms of expertise or of closeness to the contract’s place of performance, etc341.  In 
addition to these functions, forum selection clauses, in sovereign debt contracts, also allow 
creditors to ensure that sovereigns cannot either legislate in order to prevent disputes from 
being brought on the basis of sovereign debt contracts342, or that any other undue influence 
by the sovereign on the outcome of a dispute linked to the geographic location of the elected 
for is impossible. 
Forum selection clauses lower the political risks tied to lending to a sovereign, as the latter 
cannot interfere in the dispute settlement process, and therefore incentivises lending343. 
However, the mere election of an independent domestic court is not sufficient to guarantee 
that creditors will, in practice, have access to said court. In order to guarantee that litigation 
actually occurs, further procedural obstacles for litigation against sovereigns need to be 
lifted344.  
 
339 Megliani, Sovereign Debt (n 50) 233; Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch (n 4); Kupelyants (n 53) 6. 
340 On choice-of-law clauses in sovereign bonds see in general: Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch (n 4); George 
Weisz, Nancy Schwarzkopf and Mimi Panitch, ‘Selected Issues in Sovereign Debt Litigation’ (1991) 12 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business 1; Horatia Muir Watt, ‘L’immunité Souveraine 
et Les Fonds “Vautours”’ [2012] Revue Critique de Droit International Prive 789. 
341 David H Taylor, ‘The Forum Selection Clause: A Tale of Two Concepts’ (1993) 66 Temple Law Review 
785. 
342 For example by enacting legislation preventing their own domestic courts from litigating on their own bonds.  
343 Choi, Gulati and Posner (n 114). 
344 A potential obstacle to the effectivity of forum selection clauses could have been the forum non conveniens 
doctrine. However, on average, both US and English courts tend to respect contractual parties’ decisions to 
elect them for dispute resolution. See The Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore Co [1972] US Supreme Court 407 U.S. 
1 (1972); Taylor (n 341)., for US practice. For the UK see Spiliada Maritime v Cansulex [1987] AC 460 (House 
of Lords); Kupelyants (n 53) 73–75.  
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3.4.2.3 Creditor Access to Domestic Courts: the Act of State Doctrine, Comity and 
Champerty 
In addition to sovereigns’ immunity from jurisdiction, analysed in section 2, a series of 
potential procedural obstacles to a creditor’s ability to enforce sovereign debt contracts 
before domestic common law courts can be mentioned: the Act of State doctrine, the comity 
defence and the champerty defence.  
The common ground between these three norms is that they all prevent domestic courts from 
litigating a dispute over which they would normally be competent. In the case of the Act of 
State doctrine and the comity defence, incompetence stems from the sovereign nature of the 
debtor. For champerty it is the potentially speculative nature of litigation which can provide 
an obstacle against the enforcement of the contractual rights of creditors.  
The Act of State doctrine prevents a US court, competent over a case, from hearing it if the 
case concerns the validity of the act of a sovereign on its own territory345. The act of State 
doctrine has mostly been developed by US and UK courts, and is usually absent from civil 
law regimes346. As early as the 1980s, it was recognised in the Allied Bank347 case that the 
territorial limitation of the doctrine prevented it from applying in sovereign debt cases, as 
long as payment, was due in the US348. With most sovereign bonds subjected to New-York 
and specifying payment within the US349, it appears that the potential of the Act of State 
doctrine’s to limit litigation against defaulting sovereigns is quasi nil350. 
A second potential procedural obstacle to litigations against sovereigns by their creditors 
before US and UK courts is the comity defence. Comity is a conflict of law norm351 allowing 
 
 345 M Erin Kelly, ‘The Act of State Doctrine and Allied Bank Note’ (1986) 31 Villanova Law Review 291; 
Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (n 5) 28; Underhill v Hernandez (1897) 168 
US 250 (US Supreme Court). See also in English law: Blad v Blamfield (1674) 36 ER 992 (English Court of 
Chancery). 
346  Fausto de Quadros and John Henry Dingfelder Stone, ‘The Act of State Doctrine’, Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public international law (OUP 2013). 
347 Allied Bank v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago (Rehearing) (n 262). See also Libra Bank v Banco 
Nacional de Costa Rica [1981] New-York Southern District Court 81 civ 7624 (CBM). On the convoluted 
process leading to the adoption of the Allied Bank decision see Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring (n 5) 35–38. 
348 Allied Bank v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago (Rehearing) (n 262); Kelly (n 345); Kupelyants (n 53) 
182–183; Marc Lewyn, ‘Foreign Debt - Act of State Doctrine - Unilateral Deferral of Obligations by Debtor 
Nations Is Inconsistent with United States Law and Policy: Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito 
Agricola de Cartago’ (2015) 15 Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 657. 
349 Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch (n 4); Megliani, Sovereign Debt (n 50) 233; Kupelyants (n 53) 6. 
350 For a recent English interpretation of the Act of State doctrine see Belhaj and another (Respondents) v Straw 
and others (2017) 3 UKSC (UK Supreme Court). Cited in Kupelyants (n 53) 182. 
351 Donald Earl III Childress, ‘Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws’ (2010) 
44 U.C. Davis Law Review 11. On comity see Adrian Briggs, The Principle of Comity in Private international 
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for the recognition of acts linked to a foreign State’s sovereignty by a domestic court who 
would otherwise have jurisdiction over them352. Fundamentally, comity relies on a balance 
of interests between the State of the elected forum for dispute settlement and a foreign 
State353. 
The applicability of the comity defence to sovereign debt restructuring in the US was settled 
in the Pravin Banker354 case. Pravin had acquired, from another bank, an assignment on $9 
millions of Peruvian debt. In 1992, the Banco Popular del Peru, stopped making interest 
payments on said debt, thus triggering an event of default355.  
The bank was originally owned by the Peruvian State but was privatized in 1992, following 
an agreement between Peru and the IMF356. The court concluded that granting Peru an 
indefinite stay in the proceedings, on the basis of comity, would transform the United-States 
government policy of ‘voluntary restructuring’357 into a “judicially-enforced bankruptcy 
proceedings”358. This justified, in the eyes of the court, refusing to apply the defence to Peru. 
Here again, the attachment of American jurisdictions to the enforceability of sovereign debt 
contracts, as well as its link to the efficiency of the sovereign debt market, is made clear359. 
A final defence raised by sovereign debtors against the competence of domestic courts has 
been the champerty defence. The champerty doctrine prohibits the acquisition of a debt-title 
with the sole purpose of suing the debtor360.  
 
law (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/the-hague-academy-collected-
courses/*ej.9789004227286.065_182> accessed 27 January 2020; Thomas Schultz and Jason Mitchenson, 
‘Rediscovering the Principle of Comity in English Private international law’ (2018) 26 European Review of 
Private Law 311; Jörn Axel Kämmerer, ‘Comity’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public international law 
(Oxford University Press 2006). 
352 Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (n 5) 31; Kämmerer (n 351); Hilton v 
Guyot (1895) 159 U S Rep 113 (United States Supreme Court). Regarding English court’s appraisal of comity 
see Kupelyants (n 53) 35. On average, English courts have been reluctant to renounce to their competence on 
the basis of the comity defence. See e.g. Goldman Sachs International v Novo Banco [2015] EWHC 2371 
(Appeals Court). 
353 Hilton v. Guyot (n 352); Childress (n 351). 
354 Pravin Banker Ltd v Banco Popular del Peru [1997] United States Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit 
96–7183. See also Kupelyants (n 53) 103. For a commentary on Pravin Banker see Olivares-Caminal, Legal 
Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (n 5) 80. 
355 Pravin Banker Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru (n 354); Wheeler and Attaran (n 324). 
356 Wheeler and Attaran (n 324). 
357 This policy had been expressly mentioned in the Allied Bank II, amicus curiae opinion, submitted by the 
US government. See Allied Bank v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago (Rehearing) (n 262); Lewyn (n 348). 
358 Pravin Banker Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru (n 354); Wheeler and Attaran (n 324). 
359 Gathii (n 161). 
360  Champerty is codified for New York in: Purchase of claims by corporations or collection agencies (New-
York Judiciary Law); Ronald L Cohen and Robert M Schwartz, ‘Champerty and Claims Trading’ (2003) 11 
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 197; Hays (n 278). 
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Champerty came into play during vulture fund litigation, with Peru raising it against 
Elliott 361 . The case opposed the hedge fund to Peru’s national bank following Peru’s 
restructuring. Elliott, had purchased heavily discounted Peruvian bonds and was attempting 
to obtain payment on their full value before US courts362. Banco de la Nacion sought to 
dismiss the case by relying on champerty363, arguing that the fund’s investing strategy was 
chmapertuous. It was decided by the Court of Appeal that Elliott’s purchase of Peruvian 
bonds could not be characterised as such since the intent of the fund was not solely to bring 
suit but rather to be paid in full364. Elliott tied, in its argument, the unavailability of the 
champerty defence and the functioning of the secondary debt market365. In Elliott’s opinion, 
a broad reading of the champerty provision in the New-York judiciary law, would make the 
operation of the secondary bond market impossible since it would create uncertainty 
regarding the enforceability of the bonds of most creditors366. To quote the funds’ lawyers, 
the champerty defence “makes Wall Street tremble”367.  
The policy implication of a narrow interpretation of the champerty defence are laid out 
clearly. Ensuring the enforceability of sovereign debt contracts, even the heavily discounted 
bonds of a distressed sovereign, is deemed necessary for the efficient functioning of the 
sovereign debt market.  
3.2.2 The Sanctity of Creditors’ Rights368 
3.2.2.1 The Sanctity of Creditors’ Rights: Overview  
In addition to declare themselves competent, courts and tribunals, under the creditor 
protection model, need to give effect to the obligations of the debtor regarding the sovereign 
debt relationship. This ensures that the rights of creditors will, in practice, be judicially 
 
361 Cohen and Schwartz (n 360); Hays (n 278). See Infra.  
362 Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion (n 28). 
363 ibid. 
364 Elliott Associates L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion (n 263); see commentary in Cohen and Schwartz (n 302). A 
similar approach has been followed by English courts in Camdex International Ltd v Bank of Zambia (No 2) 
(1996) 1997 Wkly Law Rep 632 (Court of Appeal); Hagan (n 76); Charles Proctor, ‘Vulture Funds and 
Sovereign Debt - The Zambian Experience’ (2007) 2007 Journal of South African Law 629. English courts 
seem to have similarly opted for a narrow reading of the champerty defence, limiting its uses for sovereign 
debt cases. See Kupelyants (n 53) 193. 
365 Elliott Associates L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion (n 323). 
366 ibid. 
367 ibid. 
368 The term was originally coined by Gathii, as mentioned supra, Gathii (n 161). 
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protected. This second component of the creditor protection model requires the combination 
of three distinct elements.  
1. There needs to be a legal obligation tied to the repayment of the sovereign’s debt. 
2. This obligation needs to lead to a recognition of the State’s responsibility. 
3. This obligation cannot be emptied of its substance by the State’s conduct or its 
regulatory activity.  
The first element, in practice, is the least problematic, as it is self-evident that creditors need 
to have actual rights against the debtor to obtain efficient remedies coercing the sovereign 
to repay. In domestic law, said rights, broadly speaking are the contractual rights enshrined 
in the debt instrument emitted by the sovereign369.  
The second element can be more problematic. Indeed, the mere finding of a breach by a 
court is not sufficient to lead to the obtention of remedies by creditors. This finding needs to 
be accompanied by an absence of valid legal defence by the debtor. The debates surrounding 
the necessity defence as it applies to economic circumstances illustrate these difficulties. 
The last element requires courts to prevent the State from emptying its obligations of their 
substance. States may do so in two main ways, either by legislating to alter the conditions of 
repayment, or by behaving in such a way that the obligations flowing from the sovereign 
debt relationship become meaningless.  
Two main development have occurred, in domestic law, to guarantee the sanctity of 
creditor’s rights. First, contractual mechanisms protect sovereign debt contracts against 
regulatory intervention. Second, the rateable payment interpretation of the pari passu clause 
prevents States from behaving in such a way as to create de facto senior categories of debt.  
3.2.2.2 Contractual guarantees against a debtor’s regulatory intervention 
Historically, the sovereign nature of the debtor has enabled it to unilaterally alter the 
conditions under which the debt had been subscribed370. Historically, currency devaluations 
 
369 Kupelyants underlines that in English and US law “It is a fundamental principle that the creditor may 
thus recover its contractual entitlement in full” Kupelyants (n 53) 171. 
The rights held by creditors in international will be analysed infra in the next section. 
370 On the political risks tied to unilateral modifications of the sovereign debt contract see Choi, Gulati and 
Posner (n 114); Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann, ‘Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility’ (National 
Bureau of Economic Research 1999) Working Paper 7418 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w7418>; Eichengreen, 
Haussman and Panizza (n 114). 
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have been one of the main ways through which sovereign have altered, without consent from 
heir creditors, the conditions of their loans in order to facilitate repayment371.  
Unilateral attempts by sovereign to regulate over their debt are not however a purely 
historical phenomenon. Argentina, during its restructuring, famously enacted laws via which 
it attempted to prevent itself from repaying holdout creditors372. More recently, following its 
sovereign debt crisis, Greece unilaterally altered its domestic bonds in order to retroactively 
fit them with a Collective Action Clause373. 
In order to limit the legal and political risks tied to lending to sovereigns, the creditor 
protection model needs to remove the obligations arising from the debt relationship from the 
regulatory sphere of influence of the debtor 374 . Several domestic law examples of 
mechanisms designed to prevent States from regulating themselves out of their indebtedness 
can be mentioned.  
As far as choice-of-law is concerned, most bonds elect either New-York or English law375. 
For issuing States and their creditors, the election of these two legal orders makes sense as 
it prevents debtors from being able to legislate to modify the conditions of the contract376.  
Regarding payment, sovereign bonds are usually payable in dollars, and not the issuer’s 
currency. Similarly, payment is cleared by a third party, either a clearing house for bonds 
issued in Europe (i.e. Euroclear or Clearstream) or an American investment bank acting as 
trustee377. 
 
371 See Bullock (n 213); Eichengreen and Hausmann (n 370); Flandreau and Sussman (n 114). 
372 Decreto 1735/2007 Establécense los alcances, términos y condiciones del proceso de reestructuración de la 
deuda del Estado Nacional instrumentada en los bonos cuyo pago fue objeto de diferimiento según lo dispuesto 
por el Artículo 59 de la Ley No 25.827, mediante una operación de canje nacional e internacional. Suplemento 
de Prospecto, aplicable a la oferta internacional. Procedimiento Operativo para la República Argentina. Valor 
nominal máximo de los bonos que serán emitidos, Bonos Internacionales de la República Argentina y Bonos 
de la República Argentina. Modelo de Convenio de Fideicomiso. On the Lock Law see Porzecanski (n 164); 
NML Capital, LTD., et al. v The Republic of Argentina (n 28). More broadly, for an overview of Argentina’s 
convoluted restructuring process see Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (n 5) 
235–284. 
373 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18); Boudreau (n 90); Iversen (n 164); Kupelyants (n 53) 142. On Collective 
Action Clauses, see infra. 
374 Choi, Gulati and Posner (n 91). 
375 Megliani, Sovereign Debt (n 56) 233; Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch (n 4), 41-43. 
376 A 1958 English case brought against Greece illustrates the efficiency of said choice-of-law clauses. In 
National Bank of Greece and Athens v Metliss, it was ruled that a Greek moratorium act could not affect bonds 
emitted under English law. National Bank of Greece and Athens v Metliss [1958] AC 509 (Court of Appeal); 
Kupelyants (n 53) 141–142. 
377 Lee C Buchheit, ‘Trustees versus Fiscal Agents for Sovereign Bonds’ (2018) 13 Capital Markets Law 
Journal 410. 
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Here again, the purpose of these clauses is to prevent the debtor from being able to 
unilaterally alter the conditions of payment or to act as a buffer against a devaluation of the 
debtor’s currency during a financial crisis378. There are three main exceptions to the use of 
these clauses. First US treasuries are issued in dollars, under US law and elect US 
jurisdictions379. Similarly, UK gilts are issued in British pounds, under UK law and elect UK 
jurisdictions380. Finally, the bonds of members of the Eurozone usually elect their own 
domestic law and jurisdiction and are payable in Euros381. 
The fact that these States are able to issue bonds domestically can be explained by the 
“original sin hypothesis” put forward by Eichengreen et al.382.  The hypothesis, originally 
developed to explain the presence of currency clauses, states that certain developing 
countries are not able to borrow, either domestically383 or abroad384, in their own currency 
due to the distrust of financial markets. Indeed, these States suffer from greater volatility and 
are therefore more prone to see the value of their currency depreciate. In addition, these 
governments often suffer from a high debt-to-revenue ratio 385  which incentivises them 
towards debasing their currencies386. 
Thus, poorer governments since they are usually cursed with lower fiscal revenues and 
higher levels of debts may be tempted to devaluate their own currency to fulfil their 
contractual obligations with greater ease. This creates an additional risk for creditors as, in 
addition to the default risk of the debtor, they would also be facing a greater exchange rate 
risk387. Thus, borrowing abroad and in a foreign currency effectively binds those States for 
the future and acts as a credible commitment device. The same applies to borrowing under 
foreign law, or repayment via a third party geographically distinct from the debtor. Those 
measures prevent regulatory interventions from sovereigns which are perceived as riskier by 
capital markets. 
 
378 Eichengreen and Hausmann (n 370). 
379 Megliani, Sovereign Debt (n 50) 233. 
380 ibid. 
381 ibid. Although there are exceptions to this rule. Belgium notably floats debt abroad. Kupelyants (n 53) 113. 
382 Eichengreen, Haussman and Panizza (n 114). 
383 Eichengreen and Hausmann (n 370). 
384 ibid; Eichengreen, Haussman and Panizza (n 114). 
385 Governments whose fiscal revenues are weak compared to their debt.  
386  Eichengreen, Haussman and Panizza (n 114); Robert Lucas and Nancy Stokey, ‘Optimal Fiscal and 
Monetary Policy in an Economy without Capital’ (1983) 12 Journal of Monetary Economics 55; Guillermo A 
Calvo and Pablo E Guidotti, ‘On the Flexibility of Monetary Policy: The Case of the Optimal Inflation Tax’ 
(1993) 60 The Review of Economic Studies 667. 
387 Choi, Gulati and Posner (n 114). 
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3.2.2.3 The Rateable Payment Interpretation of the pari passu clause 
The pari passu clause is a standard contractual clause present in both sovereign and 
corporate debt instruments388. Its role, in a corporate context, is to prevent a debtor from 
issuing other debt instruments ranking senior to those containing the clause389. A standard 
version of the clause reads as such: 
“The Notes rank, and will rank, pari passu in right of payment with all other present and 
future  unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness of the Issuer.”390 
The problem with this seemingly innocuous contract language is that in a sovereign debt 
context, given the absence of a bankruptcy mechanism, the meaning of “rank in right of 
payment” 391  is uncertain. As opposed to corporate bankruptcies, sovereign debt 
restructurings lack a liquidation phase in which rank of payment would have any meaning392. 
The clause and its ambiguities mainly attracted the attention of commentators since Elliott 
used it to disturb Peru’s restructuring by seizing the funds destined to pay the creditors 
having accepted a restructuring offer393. Elliott had purchased Brady bonds emitted by Peru, 
for a total of $20.7 million and due in September 2000394. After obtaining from New-York 
Courts a decision granting it $55.6 million395, the fund sought enforcement. Peru, however, 
had decided to satisfy in priority the creditors having agreed to a debt restructuring. Elliott 
argued, and the New-York district court agreed supported by an expert opinion by 
Lowenfeld, that doing so constituted a breach of the pari passu clause396. 
 
388 Buchheit and Pam (n 14). 
389 ibid. 
390 ibid. Other drafting of the clause are mentioned by Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, ‘Understanding the Pari 
Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments: A Complex Quest’ (2009) 43 international lawyer (ABA) 1217. 
391 See e.g. Buchheit, ‘The Pari Passu Clause Sub Specie Aeternitatis’ (n 75). 
392 Olivares-Caminal, ‘Rank Pari Passu or Not to Rank Pari Passu’ (n 9), 1222; Buchheit and Pam (n 43), 4. 
393 Elliott Assocs., L.P. (n 323). For an analysis of the historical origins of the pari passu clause see Buchheit 
and Pam (n 75); Benjamin Chabot and Mitu Gulati, ‘Santa Anna and His Black Eagle: The Origins of Pari 
Passu?’ [2014] Capital Markets Law Journal <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3237>; 
Weidemaier, Scott and Gulati (n 75). For a critique of the ‘contract originalist’ approach to the pari passu 
clause, and of the relevance of such historical research for contemporary interpretations of the clause see W 
Mark C Weidemaier, ‘Indiana Jones, Contracts Originalist’ (2014) 9 Capital Markets Law Journal 255. Finally, 
on the failure of bond drafters to adapt to the challenges raised by the clause see Gulati and Scott (n 75). 
394 Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion (n 22); Buchheit and Pam (n 9), 6-8; Bratton (n 42), 823-824. 
395 Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion (n 28); Bratton (n 74); Olivares-Caminal, ‘Understanding the 
Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments’ (n 390) 1223–1224. 
396 Elliott Associates L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion (n 323). 
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The court adopted a ‘rateable payment’, sometimes dubbed ‘plain English reading’, of the 
clause397. Under this reading, pari passu forces States to pay all their creditors pro rata, at 
the same time, rather than paying a group of creditors, then another398. This interpretation 
relies on the idea that in a sovereign default, order of payment and rank of payment are 
identical. Summarily put, paying a group of creditors first amounts to create a senior 
category of instruments which would violate the pari passu clause399. Rateable payment thus 
guarantees the effectivity of the payment obligation arising from the sovereign debt contract.  
The policy implications of such an interpretation of the clause are made clear in Lowenfeld’s 
expert opinion:  
“(…) A borrower from Tom, Dick, and Harry can't say 'I will pay Tom and Dick in full, 
and if there is anything left over I'll pay Harry.' If there is not enough money to go around, 
the borrower faced with a pari passu provision must pay all three of them on the same 
basis.” 400  
If one subscribes to the idea, as Lowenfeld seems to, that in sovereign insolvencies order of 
payment is equivalent to seniority401, this interpretation guarantees holdout creditors’ right 
of payment sagainst a State attempting to favour restructured debt. Indeed, following the 
previous postulate, paying the restructured debt first, leads to creating a quasi-senior 
category of instruments. Hence, if States lack sufficient funds to satisfy all creditors the 
holdout debt will not be repaid in full402. The clause, read as such further lowers the legal 
risks attached to sovereign lending, as it prevents sovereigns from altering payment order 
and thus acts as another credible commitment device. 
 
397 For an analysis of said interpretation see e.g.: Wright (n 14); Cohen (n 74); Zamour (n 74); Kupelyants (n 
53) 244–245. 
398 A possible use of the clause might have been to guarantee ranks of payments when sovereign bonds used to 
be secured on specific streams of assets. See Buchheit and Pam (n 91); For a narrow intepretation of the clause 
see: Kensington International Ltd v Republic of the Congo [2003] EWHC 2331 (Comm) (EWHC (Comm)); 
Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China v Grenada [2014] United States Court of Appeals, second Circuit 
12–2619–CV; Republic of Nicaragua v LNC Investment LLC [2004] Cour d’Appel Bruxelles (9th ch) 
2003/KR/334. 
399 Philip Wood, ‘The Origins and Future of Non-Discrimination in Sovereign Bankruptcies: A Comment’ 
(2014) 9 Capital Markets Law Journal 293. 
400 Elliott Associates L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion (n 46); Lee C Buchheit and Jeremiah S Pam, ‘The Hunt for 
Pari Passu Cover Story’ (2004) 23 International Financial Law Review 20. 
401 Wood, ‘The Origins and Future of Non-Discrimination in Sovereign Bankruptcies’ (n 399). 
402 ibid. 
The Creditor Protection Model  89 
3.2.3 Efficient Remedies to guarantee repayment 
3.2.3.1 Efficient Remedies: Overview 
The final condition for the creditor protection model to function is the existence of legal 
remedies enabling creditors to effectively coerce the sovereign. Historically creditors not 
only had to face difficulties in finding competent jurisdictions, but until recently also lacked 
ways to enforce rulings in their favour403.  
Indeed, while domestic courts’ decisions overwhelmingly tend to favour creditors, the 
debtor’s immunity from execution limits their ability to ensure that they are respected. These 
difficulties to find attachable goods belonging to sovereigns reluctant to pay are easily 
illustrated by NML’s enforcement saga against Argentina404. NML, Elliott’s sister-fund had 
purchased, a series of bonds issued by the South American Republic, at a steep discount405. 
It also obtained from US courts a favourable court decision against Argentina, for more than 
$2 billions406. Armed with this order, NML engaged in an odyssey of enforcement attempts 
on at least three continents407, leading even to a dispute ITLOS408 and to a dispute involving 
the launch by SpaceX of Argentinean satellites409, with little to show in terms of results. 
Throughout those attempts, and nearly systematically, NML ran into Argentina’s immunity, 
preventing it from seizing any of the republic’s assets.  
 
403 On enforcement difficulties regarding sovereign debt contract see Gregory R Day, ‘Market Failure, Pari 
Passu, and the Law and Economics Approach to the Sovereign Debt Crisis’ (2013) 22 Tulane Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 225; Kupelyants (n 53) 277; Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before 
International Courts and Tribunals (n 2) 124. 
404 Ingenito and Hioureas (n 82). 
405 ibid; Jamison Joiner, ‘Past Due: An Introduction to Sovereign Debt, the Ongoing Dispute between NML 
Capital and Argentina, and Possible Ramifications of the Dispute’s Outcome Case Note’ (2015) 21 Law and 
Business Review of the Americas 85. 
406 NML capital v Republic of Argentina [2010] United States Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit 09-2707-
cv (L), 09-2708-(CON), 09-2867-(CON), 09-2710-(CON), 09-2711-(CON), 09-2712-(CON), 09-2713-(CON), 
09-2714-(CON), 09-2715-(CON), 09-2716-(CON), 09-2717-(CON), 09-2810-(CON), 621 Fed Report 3rd Ser 
230. 
407  ‘NML Capital Limited (Appellant) v Republic of Argentina (Respondent) - The Supreme Court’ 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2010-0040.html> accessed 6 June 2015; République d’Argentine c 
NML Capital LTD [2012] Cour de Cassation (Belgium) C.11.0688.F, 2013 J Trib 290; NML Capital Limited v 
Republic of Argentina [2011] UK Supreme Court UKSC 2010/0040, 2011 UKSC 31; The Republic v High 
Court (Commercial Division), Accra, ex p Attorney-General, NML Capital Ltd 1st Interested Party; Republic 
of Argentina, 2nd Interested Party [2013] Ghana Supreme Court J5/10/2013; Société NML Capital c 
République d’Argentine [2013] Cour de Cassation (1ère ch civ)  (France) 10-25.938; Société NML Capital c 
République d’Argentine [2013] Cour de Cassation (1ère ch civ)  (France) 11-13.323; Société NML Capital c 
République d’Argentine [2013] Cour de Cassation (1ère ch civ)  (France) 11-40.450; NML Capital Ltd c 
République d’Argentine [2014] Cour de Cassation (Belgium) C.13.0537.F. 
408 The ‘ARA Libertad’ case (Argentine v. Ghana) (n 20). 
409  ‘Argentina Faces Creditor Lawsuit over U.S. Satellite Contract’ Reuters (26 March 2014) 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-court-argentina-idUSL1N0MM28U20140326> accessed 13 May 2019. 
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In order to really incentivise lending to sovereigns, the creditor protection model needs to 
put in place judicial remedies that enable creditors to effectively coerce the sovereign. 
Domestically, such a remedy has been found, again, in the the pari passu clause with courts 
imposing pro rata payment as a remedy410.  
3.2.3.2 The pari passu clause and pro rata payment 
Pro rata payment as a remedy, prevents debtors from making any payment on the 
restructured bonds without paying the holdouts at a similar rate. This, effectively, forces the 
debtor to either pay holdout debts, or to artificially default on the restructured debt. Faced 
with such a possibility, States usually cave in and pay holdouts to avoid the consequences 
of default411. This remedy changes the dynamic between States and their holdout creditors. 
Not only are the latter able to obtain satisfactory judgments from domestic courts, but via 
pro rata payment, they also possess an efficient remedy with which they can ensure that 
judgments cannot be ignored by a debtor. 
Pro rata payment as a remedy differs from rateable payment as an interpretation of the 
clause412. Pro rata payment is a judicial remedy, a measure imposed by a court or tribunal 
as a response to the breach of an obligation. Rateable payment is the obligation whose breach 
must be established by creditors in order to obtain the remedy.  
Moreover, while pro rata payment is usually used as a remedy for breaches of the pari passu 
clause interpreted in a rateable payment fashion413, the 2012 NML capital case shows that 
the clause’s interpretation and its remedy do not always go hand in hand414. 
Pro rata paymen, has been heavily criticised in the legal scholarship on sovereign debt415. 
As will be seen in section 3,  its use has been one of the main causes of inefficiency created 
by the creditor protection model. However, put in its intellectual and historical context, pro 
rata payment makes economic sense. Faced with a sovereign debtor whose assets are 
 
410 Day (n 346), 224-225. 
411 For the consequences of a rateable interpretation of the clause see e.g. Buchheit and Pam (n 43), 8-9. 
412 On rateable payment as a remedy, see Zamour (n 74). 
413 See Elliott Associates L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion (n 323); Elliott Assocs., L.P. (n 323). 
414 Zamour (n 74); NML Capital, LTD., et al. v The Republic of Argentina (n 28). As will be underlined during 
the analysis of the anti-holdout model, the interpretation of the Court of Appeal in NML is less restrictive than 
the rateable payment interpretation as traditionally understood. 
415 It could be pointed out that pro rata payment still lacks teeth as a remedy as it has only been used to punish 
breaches of the pari passu clause. However, given the structure of the modern bond market, and if the rateable 
payment interpretation or the NML interpretation of the clause is adopted, any refusal by a State to repay 
holdouts will lead to a breach of the clause. Indeed, by doing so, the debtor favours the restructured debt over 
the holdout debt, breaching the pari passu clause.  
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difficult to attach, creditors effectively lack ways via which to effectively ensure that their 
rights will be respected. Pro rata payment shatters this equilibrium by enabling holdouts to 
hold the rest of the creditor-base hostage until they have been satisfied.  
This capacity to effectively coerce the sovereign, however disruptive, acts as an incentive 
for private entities to lend to States. Absent such remedies there is effectively no way for 
creditors of ‘rogue States’ to ensure that the judgments they obtain against the debtor will 
have any effect. Hence, pro rata payment, ex ante reassures creditors by providing them 
with the means to constrain debtors to repay their debts.  
3.3 The Creditor Protection Model in international law 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Creditor protection, as a policy, is not merely apparent at the domestic and contract law level. 
Developments in international law have similarly attempted to reduce the unique risks tied 
to sovereign lending. 
The most obvious area where international law has developed in that direction is by 
providing creditors with multiple fora for dispute settlement. Notably, the law on sovereign 
immunities evolved towards the recognition of sovereign debt restructurings as acta de iure 
gestionis416, thus ensuring that sovereign debt can be adjudicated before domestic courts. 
Similarly, the competence of Investment tribunals on sovereign bonds417 provides creditors 
with access to independent international courts and enables them to mobilise the remedies 
arising from International Investment Law418. Finally, the European Court of Human Rights 
has, on several occasion, recognised that sovereign debt restructuring could potentially 
violate article 1 of the 1st protocol to the ECHR419. 
 
416 See notaby: Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. (n 24). 
417 Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic (n 17); Giovanni Alemanni and Others v. The Argentine Republic 
(Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (n 17); Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic 
(n 17). 
418  On the potential role of ICSID tribunals in sovereign debt disputes see alexander Szodruch, ‘State 
Insolvency – Consequences and Obligations under Investment Treaties’, The International Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) : Taking Stock after 40 Years. R. Hofmann, C. Tams (eds.) (nomos 
2007); Waibel, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box’ (n 81); Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and 
Tribunals (n 2) 209–251. 
419 De Dreux-Brézé c France [2001] European Court of Human Rights 57969/00; Thivet v France [2000] 
European Court of Human Rights 57071/00; Malysh and others v Russia [2010] European Court of Human 
Rights 30280/03; Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18). 
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However, while the competence of international courts for sovereign debt disputes is 
probably the most important development within the international law on sovereign debt, it 
is not the sole aspect of the creditor protection model which has been implemented at the 
international level.  
The applicability of Investment Law and Human Rights law to the sovereign debt 
relationship, like forum selection clauses, helps guaranteeing that the sovereign cannot 
unilaterally alter the content of the obligations it owes creditors. In the same vein, the narrow 
interpretation of the necessity defence can be read as a way to guarantee the sanctity of 
creditor’s rights even during difficult economic circumstances. 
Regarding enforcement, the remedies granted by Investment Tribunals and Human Rights 
courts both have the potential to provide creditors with some additional means to coerce the 
debtor into repayment.  
3.3.2 Creditor Access to Independent International Courts 
The first condition for the functioning of the creditor protection model is to grant creditors 
access to independent courts. International law has provided such access at three different 
levels: first, via the characterisation of sovereign bonds as acta de iure gestionnis. Second, 
via the characterisation of sovereign bonds as investments by investment tribunals. Finally, 
via the recognition that sovereign debt restructurings could potentially amount to a violation 
of the right to property as enshrined in the ECHR. 
3.3.2.1 Sovereign Defaults and Restructurings as acta de iure gestionnis 
International law distinguishes between two types of immunities. Immunity from 
jurisdiction is a procedural norm preventing a domestic forum to perform its adjudicative 
function against a sovereign420. Immunities from execution, on the other hand prevents the 
application of measures of constraint upon sovereign defendants, or certain categories of 
 
420 James Crawford and Ian Brownlie, Brownlie’s Principles of Public international law (8th ed, Oxford 
University Press 2012) 489; European Convention on State Immunity (Basel) 1972; Jurisdictionnal Immunities 
of the State (Germany v Italy; Greece intervening) (2012) 2012 C J Rep 99 (International Court of Justice); 
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (New York) 2004. 
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goods belonging to them, by foreign courts421. Both norms are recognised in customary 
international law422, and find sources in domestic law423.  
The justification for granting immunities to sovereigns harkens back to the fundamental 
principle that par in parem non imperium habetur424. It is deeply rooted within the notions 
of sovereignty and equality425.  Up until the middle of the 20th century, International law, 
and most domestic courts, sanctioned an absolute reading of jurisdictional immunities.  In 
the absence of a reliable international forum for enforcement, this left bondholders without 
judicial recourses in case of default or repudiation426.  
From the 1950s onwards, the law on State immunity would evolve towards a restrictive 
reading of jurisdictional immunities427. In the US and the UK, main fora elected in sovereign 
bonds, this evolution was materialised in respectively the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act 
(FSIA)428 and the Sovereign Immunity Act429 (SIA). International law evolved similarly, 
and the restrictive theory of State immunity is now considered customary430. 
The restrictive theory still recognises immunity as the default position but introduces one 
exception for commercial acts undertaken by sovereigns. It distinguishes between acta de 
iure imperii, covered by the immunity, and acta de iure gestionnis  ¸ over which domestic 
courts can have jurisdiction431 . The criteria used for the distinction are debated within 
 
421 Crawford and Brownlie (n 420) 502; European Convention on State Immunity (Basel); United Nations 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (New York); Jurisdictionnal Immunities 
of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece intervening) (n 420). 
422 See Jurisdictionnal Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece intervening) (n 420). 
423 E.g. ‘State Immunity Act 1978’ <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1978/33> accessed 6 June 2015; 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act 1976. 
424 Peter-Tobias Stoll, ‘Sovereign Immunity’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public international law (Oxford 




426 Weidemaier, ‘Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt’ (n 47), 69-71. 
427 Weidemaier, ‘Contracting for State Intervention’ (n 174), 340-342; Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring (n 5) 7. 
428 Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act. 
429 Sovereign Immunity Act 1978 1978; Kupelyants (n 53) 63. 
430 Jurisdictionnal Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece intervening) (n 420). 
431 The distinction between both types of acts is be customary, it is followed in both the UN Convention on 
Jurisdictionnal Immunities and the European Convention on State Immunity. While both conventions have not 
entered into force, they are largely considered to reflect CIL. See United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property (New York); European Convention on State Immunity (Basel); 
Jurisdictionnal Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece intervening) (n 420); Crawford and Brownlie 
(n 420) 490. 
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international instruments on immunity432. Some focus solely on the nature of the State’s 
act433, while others focus not only on its nature but also on its purpose434.  
In the US, the characterisation of sovereign bonds under the law of immunities was settled 
by the Supreme Court in the 1992 Weltover case435. The Weltover case finds its source in 
the 1980s Argentina crisis and the emission in 1982 of US registered bonds by Argentina to 
refinance its debt. Said bonds, once at maturity were unilaterally restructured by Argentina 
due to a lack of sufficient dollar reserves436, leading to litigation in the US437. 
One of the questions at stake was whether Argentina’s restructuring of its 1982 bonds, 
undertaken by presidential decree, constituted a commercial act under the FSIA. The 
Supreme Court, underlining that the FSIA aims at codifying the restrictive theory of State 
immunities, decided that the nature of the acts, rather than their purpose, ought to be taken 
in consideration for this assesment438. The Court thus defined a commercial act as an act that 
both a private or a sovereign party could undertake in “trade, traffic and commerce”439. A 
sovereign activity, a contrario, is one that a private party does not have the legal ability to 
undertake. Thus, as both private entities and sovereigns can emit and restructure bonds440, 
Argentina’s restructuring constituted a commercial act over which US courts could have 
jurisdiction441. By focusing on the private nature of debt restructurings, the Supreme Court 
views sovereign debt as fundamentally contractual, hence enabling domestic litigation.  
This focus on the contractual nature of State indebtedness similarly features in a recent case 
before the European Court of Justice. The case was referred to the ECJ by a German 
domestic court regarding the applicability of Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 on the service 
in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial 
 
432 Jurisdictionnal Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece intervening) (n 420); Stoll (n 424); United 
Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (New-York) 2005; European 
Convention on State Immunity (Basel). 
433 E.g. European Convention on State Immunity (Basel). 
434 E.g. United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (New-York). 
435 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. (n 18), 609-610. For a broader commentary on Immunities under 
the FSIA see Kupelyants (n 53) 73–77. 
436 Avi Lew, ‘Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.: Interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act’ (1994) 
17 Fordham international law Journal 726; Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. (n 22). For a view of the 
Weltover decision within the broader US case-law on immunity see David E Gohlke, ‘Clearing the Air or 
Muddying the Waters--Defining a Direct Effect in the United States under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act after Republic of Argentina v. Weltover Comment’ (1995) 18 Houston Journal of international law 261. 
437 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. (n 18) 609-610. 
438 ibid. 
439 ibid, 614. 
440 ibid, 616-615. 
441 ibid; Lew (n 436). 
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matters442. The applicability of said regulation depends on the characterisation of the subject 
matter of the dispute as a ‘civil or commercial matter’. From such a characterisation depends 
not only the applicability of Regulation No 1393/2007 but also whether the acts of a 
sovereign would be covered by immunity443.  
The case concerned German bondholders bringing action before domestic German courts 
following the retroactive insertion of a Collective Action Clause in their bonds444. They 
claimed that such action constituted not only an unlawful interference within their property 
rights but also a breach of contract445. The ECJ ruled that, while the Greek legislative 
intervention constituted a legislative act, “it is not obvious that the adoption of [the Greek 
Bondholder Act 4050/2012] led directly and immediately to changes to the financial 
conditions of the securities in question(…).”446  
It added: 
“[T]he issue of bonds does not necessarily presuppose the exercise of powers falling 
outside the scope of the ordinary legal rules applicable to relationships between 
individuals, hence the rules of private law.” 447 
As a result, the court ruled that the action brought by the German bondholders against Greece 
ought to be characterised as a civil or commercial matter 448 . The ECJ’s reasoning in 
Fahnenbrock echoes closely the Weltover decision. The focus is put on the contractual nature 
of the acts of the sovereign, not on its purpose or effects. Here, even though Greece had 
introduced the retrofit CAC through legislative means, the European Court focuses on the 
nature of the borrowing instrument underlying the debtor’s obligations.  
 
442 Stefan Fahnenbrock et. al. C Hellenische Republic (n 307). 
443 In EU law, the distinction between civil and commercial matter is aligned on the distinction between acta 
de iure imperii and acta de iure gestionnis. The characterisation also leads to the applicability of the European 
private international law regulations. See  Regulation No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) 2012, article 1; Regulation No 593/2008 on 
the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) 2008, article 1; Eirini Lechouritou et al v Dimosio tis 
Omospondiakis Dimokratias tis Germanias [2007] CJCE C-292/05. 
444 Stefan Fahnenbrock et. al. C Hellenische Republic (n 307) paras 11–23. On Fahnenbrock see also Hayk 
Kupelyants, ‘The German Taxpayer and the Greek Sovereign Debt’ Lexis PSL (2015); Sebastian Grund, ‘The 
Legal Consequences of Sovereign Insolvency – a Review of Creditor Litigation in Germany Following the 
Greek Debt Restructuring’ (2017) 24 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 399. 
445 Stefan Fahnenbrock et. al. C Hellenische Republic (n 247) paras 11-23. 
446 ibid, para 57. 
447 ibid, para 53. 
448 ibid., para 59 
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At the heart of the debate on the characterisation of sovereign debt restructuring as acta de 
iure imperii or acta de iure gestionnis is the ability of creditors to easily enforce the 
contractual obligations arising from sovereign bonds449. Insisting on the contractual nature 
of the bonds, as the European Court of Justice450 and the Supreme Court451 do leads logically 
to their enforceability before domestic courts. Said competence matters for three main 
reasons. First, domestic courts are the main forum for adjudicating the contractual 
obligations arising from sovereign debt452.  
Second, the competence of domestic courts on sovereign debt cases is well established 
within the jurisdictions usually elected in sovereign bonds, furthering legal certainty. A 
contratio, as will be exposed infra there are debates regarding the characterisation of bonds 
as investments453. This ease of access to domestic courts, and the quasi-certainty that they 
will be competent enables creditors to know ex ante, that a default or repudiation will be 
justiciable. 
Finally, in terms of remedies, while both international and domestic courts can award 
damages, so far, only domestic courts have granted pro rata payment to holdouts as a remedy. 
The ability to obtain pro rata payment as a remedy empowers creditors, pro rata payment 
has proved a very efficient way of coercing the State towards repayment. Damages, on the 
other hand, have historically proven difficult to obtain from a State refusing to pay. 
Domestic courts’ relative cheapness, the certainty of their competence and the potential 
efficiency of their remedies, mean that the characterisation of bonds and restructurings as 
 
449 It should be noted that in a 2005 judgment, the Italian court of cassation considered that acts undertaken for 
the purpose of restructuring sovereign debt as acta de iure imperii. The case concerned Argentina’s 2000 
restructuring and had been brought before Italian courts by Italian bondholders. While the court agrees that the 
emission of bonds constitutes an acta de iure gestionnis, it ruled, considering the “whole context of the 
transaction” that Argentina’s restructuring constituted an acta de iure imperii since it aimed at managing an 
economic crisis. See Ordinanza (n 25); Megliani, Sovereign Debt (n 51) 246; Fabio Bassan, The Law of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 96. Such an interpretation of the law of immunities 
appears however to be marginal.  
449 Stefan Fahnenbrock et. al. C Hellenische Republic (n 307). 
450 Stefan Fahnenbrock et. al. C Hellenische Republic (n 307). 
451 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. (n 24). 
452 Unless investment tribunals are competent for the dispute on the basis of a BIT featuring an umbrella clause. 
In this case, arguably, the investment tribunal could adjudicate a breach of contract by the sovereign. It should 
however be underlined that the effect of umbrella clauses is quite uncertain as their interpretation has been 
heavily debated. On the application of umbrella clauses to sovereign debt instruments see Szodruch (n 418) 
151–153. 
453 See e.g. Poštová banka, a.s. and Istrokapital SE v. Hellenic Republic (Award) (n 17); Francesco Montanaro, 
‘Poštova Banka SA and Istrokapital SE v Hellenic RepublicSovereign Bonds and the Puzzling Definition of 
“Investment” in International Investment Law’ (2015) 30 ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 
549; Ortolani (n 81). 
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acta de iure gestionnis is essential to enable sovereigns to credibly commit to their debt 
obligations454.  
3.3.2.2 The Competence of Investment Tribunals on Sovereign debt 
As domestic court recognised their competence over sovereign debt restructurings, ICSID 
tribunals have opened a new avenue for creditor litigation: Investor State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS). 
Under the ICSID convention, the competence 455  of International Investment Tribunals, 
ratione materiae, is usually determined via a “double-barrelled” test456. Under said test, the 
competence of a tribunal has to be established under both the specific bilateral investment 
treaty invoked, and article 25 of the ICSID convention.  
While the ICSID convention does not define the term investment, it is generally accepted in 
arbitral case-law that an investment is composed of four key elements457:  
1. The contribution of an asset (regardless of its size) 
2. For a certain duration 
3. Creating a risk for the investor 
4. And contributing to the development of the host State458 
 
454 On the potential inefficiencies of ICSID arbitration to coerce debtors see Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before 
International Courts and Tribunals (n 2) 124; Szodruch (n 418). 
455 The criteria to determine the competence of investment tribunals are heavily debated. However, when it 
comes to sovereign debt, investment tribunals have, on average, applied the double-barrelled test, followed by 
the Salini criteria, hence their analysis here. The focus on the Salini test and the double barrel test should 
therefore not be understood as an affirmation that both doctrines are unchallenged in the case-law and the 
scholarship on investment. On the notion of investment and the competence of investment tribunals ratione 
materiae see Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Identify or Define? Reflections on the Evolution of the Concept of 
Investment in ICSID Practice’, International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of 
Christoph Schreuer. C. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch, S. Wittich (eds.) (Oxford University Press 2009); 
Engela C Schlemmer, ‘Investment, Investor, Nationality, and Shareholders’ [2008] The Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law 
<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199231386.001.0001/
oxfordhb-9780199231386-e-2> accessed 27 August 2018; Brigitte Stern, ‘The Contours of the Notion of 
Protected Investment’ (2009) 24 ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 534. 
456 Salini Costruttori S.pA and Italstrade S.pA v Kingdom of Morocco (decision on jurisdiction) [2002] ICSID 
ARB/00/4, 129 J Droit Int 196; David AR Williams, ‘Jurisdiction and Admissibility’ [2008] The Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law 
<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199231386.001.0001/
oxfordhb-9780199231386-e-22> accessed 27 August 2018; Schlemmer (n 455); Nadakavukaren Schefer (n 40) 
75. 
457 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco (decision on jurisdiction) (n 456); 
Nadakavukaren Schefer (n 40) 75; Schlemmer (n 455); Williams (n 456). 
458 See Salini Costruttori S.pA and Italstrade S.pA v Kingdom of Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction (ICSID); 
and discussions in Williams (n 423); Schlemmer (n 422). 
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Several cases have examined whether sovereign credit instruments fall within the scope of 
this definition. In Fedax vs Venezuela459 an arbitral tribunal examined this question for 
promissory notes issued to recognise a deb from Venezuela to a private company460. These 
notes were negotiable on a secondary market461, like sovereign bonds. This lead Venezuela 
to claim that they could not constitute an investment as the nexus between the issuer and the 
holder of the instrument was too diffuse. In particular, the Venezuelan government argued 
that the mere holder of a note did not contribute to the economic development of the issuer462. 
The arbitral tribunal concluded that the negotiable nature of the notes per se could not 
prevent their characterisation as an investment as the host State “enjoyed a continuous 
credit”463 during their maturity. Hence, noteholders, through mere possession, could be 
deemed to contribute to the economic development of their debtor464. In addition, the tribunal 
underlined the fact that the existence of a dispute regarding the payment of a principal sum 
and interests evidenced the existence of an investment for creditors465.  
In Abaclat v. Republic of Argentina466, an arbitral tribunal examined whether sovereign 
bonds issued by Argentina, and held by several Italian nationals, could be characterised as 
investments. It is worth noting that the Abaclat tribunal did not subscribe to the Salini test. 
Instead, it focused on the raison-d’être of Article 25 ICSID, i.e. to “encourage private 
investment while giving the Parties the tools to further define what kind of investment they 
want to promote”467.  
The Abaclat tribunal thus limited its examination of the definition of investment to the Italy-
Argentina BIT, reasoning that it would be nonsensical to refuse investors the protection that 
 
459 Fedax NV v The Republic of Venezuela, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction [1997] ICSID 
ARB/96/3; Ortolani (n 81). 
460 For a commentary on Fedax, see also C Chatterjee, ‘Investment-Related Promissory Notes Are Investments 
under the ICSID Convention: Fedax N. V. v. The Republic of Venezuela’ (2002) 3 The Journal of World 
Investment &amp; Trade 147. 
461 Fedax NV v The Republic of Venezuela, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (n 426) paras 
18-19 Ortolani (n 51) 387. 
462 Fedax NV v The Republic of Venezuela, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (n 426) para 
19. 
463 Ibid para 40. 
464 Ibid para 40. 
465 ibid; Ortolani (n 51) 387. 
466 Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic (n 12), para 364. 
467 ibid; Ortolani (n 81). 
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both sovereigns intended to grant on the basis of the Salini criteria468. As said definition 
encompassed sovereign bonds, the tribunal recognised its competence over the dispute. 
As opposed to Abaclat, the Ambiente Ufficio469 decision applied the Salini test to determine 
the characterisation of Argentinian sovereign bonds470. The case also concerned Italian 
bondholders, acting against the Argentinian restructuring measures.  
The Ambiente tribunal also reached the conclusion that the bonds should be characterised as 
investments. It reasoned that the bondholders had made a significant contribution, not as 
individuals, but considering the bond issue as a whole471. The tribunal also considered the 
maturity of the bonds to constitute a sufficient length of time, not examining the duration for 
which secondary market holders had held the bonds472. It similarly agreed that bondholders 
were facing a risk different from a mere commercial risk given the possibility of regulatory 
intervention by the debtor in case of restructuring473. The bonds, according to the tribunal, 
also provided their holders with regular returns, in the form of interest and principal payment. 
Finally, it was found that the funds raised from the bond issuance were ultimately made 
available to Argentina and thuscontributed to its development474. 
The reasoning of these arbitral tribunals is noteworthy in that the characterisation of 
investment, and the protection granted the ICSID convention, follows the bonds across 
holders on the secondary market. Even if a bondholder has purchased bonds a day before 
they reached maturity, for cents on a dollar, they would still be considered to have made a 
substantial contribution to the development of the issuing State for a lengthy period of time. 
In other words, the identity of the bondholders does not matter, bonds are by themselves 
investments independently from those who hold them at the time of litigation. 
 
468 Ortolani (n 81). 
469 Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic (n 17). In addition to Abaclat and Ambiente, a 
third case was brought against Argentina by Italian bondhoders, Alemanni, as the reasoning in Alemanni does 
not differ in any substantial fashion from Ambiente, this thesis will not focus on its findings. See Giovanni 
Alemanni and Others v. The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (n 17); Ortolani 
(n 81) 402.  
470 Ortolani (n 81) 388–389. 
471 ibid; Ortolani (n 51) 388. 
472 Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic (n 12) para 483; Ortolani (n 51) 389. 
473 Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic (n 12) para 484; Ortolani (n 51) 389. 
474  Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic (n 12) paras 485-487; Ortolani (n 51) 489. 
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In order to lead to the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal, bonds also have to be covered by 
the definition of investment in the relevant BIT. In both Abaclat and Ambiente, said BIT was 
the Argentina-Italy treaty, defining investments as:  
“ (…), any kind of asset invested or reinvested by an individual or a legal entity of one 
Contracting Party in the territory of the other Party, in conformity with the laws and 
regulations of the latter.”475 
The treaty also provides a non-exhaustive list of types of investment, including: 
“(c): obligations, private or public titles or any other right to performances or services 
having economic value, including capitalized revenues’”476 
And 
“(f): any right of economic nature conferred under law or contract, as well as any license 
and concession granted in compliance with the applicable provisions applicable to the 
concerned economic activities, including the prospection, cultivation, extraction and 
exploitation of natural resources’”477. 
Both the Abaclat and Ambiente tribunals considered that article 1 of the Argentina-Italy BIT 
defined investment broadly and that the notion of obligation in lit. c) did not exclude 
sovereign bonds478. Similarly, both tribunals agreed that bonds could also fall under lit. f) as 
they enshrine contractual rights479.While both Abaclat and Ambiente tribunals recognised 
their jurisdiction over the Argentinian sovereign bonds, the case did not move to the merit. 
In Abaclat Argentina preferred settling out of court480, while Ambiente was discontinued for 
lack of funding481. 
 
475 Agreement between Italy and Argentine Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investment (signed 
in Buenos Aires) 1990; Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic (n 17); Abaclat and Others 
v. Argentine Republic (n 17). 
476 Agreement between Italy and Argentine Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investment (signed 
in Buenos Aires), article 1. Cited in Ortolani (n 81) 391. 
477 Agreement between Italy and Argentine Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investment (signed 
in Buenos Aires), article 1. Cited in Ortolani (n 81) 391. 
478 Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic (n 12), para 354; Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine 
Republic (n 12), para 491; Ortolani (n 51) 391. 
479 Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic (n 12), para 354; Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine 
Republic (n 12), para 491; Ortolani (n 51) 391. 
480 Ortolani (n 51) 384. 
481 ibid. 
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Thus, while the competence of investment tribunals over sovereign debt is not automatic, 
the broad language used in BIT definitions of investment, and its generous interpretation in 
the case-law, means that future investment tribunals are likely to recognise their competence 
over sovereign debt disputes482.  
This should not however be taken as meaning that ISDS is a friar’s balm for creditors. While, 
the majority of the case law on the competence of investment tribunals on sovereign debt 
has been in favour of creditors, the recent Poštová case483, casts a doubt as to whether 
sovereign bonds can be characterised as investments.  Moreover, for ISDS to be available, 
creditors need to be nationals of a State having signed a BIT with the debtor484 and this BIT 
needs to not exclude sovereign debt485, rendering ISDS less certain than domestic litigation.  
Despite these uncertainties, access to investment tribunals can be a powerful tool for 
creditors fearing a debt repudiation. While the competence of domestic courts is limited to 
breaches of contract, investment tribunals can adjudicate disputes focusing on regulatory 
interventions by the debtor, regardless of any contractual breach.  This is particularly useful 
when the debtor attempts to legislate upon its bond to modify their content, thus leading to 
a loss for creditors without any actual breach having occurred.  
For example, the Poštová case previously mentioned focused on the already discussed 
retroactive introduction by Greece of a Collective Action Clause in its domestic bonds486. 
This clause lead to all Greek domestic bonds to be restructured, even those whose holders 
had not consented. Said holders saw the value of their bonds being altered and faced the 
possibility of a lower return on their bond without any breach of contract having occurred487. 
Absent international litigation, whether before international tribunals488 or Human Rights 
Courts489 , this would have left creditors with no judicial recourse against the Hellenic 
Republic.  
Against that background, and despite its inherent uncertainties, the competence of 
investment tribunals on sovereign debt cases can thus act as a way for the sovereign to 
 
482 For a more in-depth analysis of BIT drafting on sovereign debt, see chapter 4 and 5. 
483 Poštová banka, a.s. and Istrokapital SE v. Hellenic Republic (Award) (n 17). 
484 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction (n 458); 
Schlemmer (n 455). 
485 For a list of treaties explicitly excluding sovereign debt see Annex I. 
486 Poštová banka, a.s. and Istrokapital SE v. Hellenic Republic (Award) (n 17); Montanaro (n 453). 
487 As the Greek regulatory measure had actively altered the bonds, the contract between Greece and its 
creditors had technically not been breached. 
488 Poštová banka, a.s. and Istrokapital SE v. Hellenic Republic (Award) (n 17). 
489 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18). 
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credibly commit to repayment by enabling creditors to hold the sovereign accountable, even 
when it relies on its regulatory powers. 
3.3.2.3 The European Court of Human Rights and Sovereign Debt 
In addition to arbitral tribunals and domestic commercial courts, creditors of sovereigns have 
also seized the European Court of Human Rights over matters related to sovereign debt490. 
The ECtHR case-law on sovereign debt has been, on average, less discussed by the legal 
scholarship than the case-law of US courts or Investment tribunals 491 . This is easily 
explained by a series of reasons. First, the ECtHR case-law on sovereign debt is fairly limited. 
The Strasbourg court merely ruled on sovereign debt a handful of times, first following the 
fall of the USSR and the 1990s Russian debt restructuring, including a settlement over the 
Tsarist debt repudiation492, and more recently regarding the Greek restructuring493.  
As investment tribunals, Human Rights Courts enable creditors to litigate regulatory actions 
by the State which impact repayment but are not constitutive of a breach of contract. Again, 
this allows creditors to potentially obtain a guarantee against a regulatory debt repudiation.  
However, as opposed to investment tribunals, the competence, ratione personae of the 
ECtHR is not subject to the conclusion of a BIT between the debtor and the creditor’s 
nationals, but merely requires that the creditor falls under the debtor’s jurisdiction 494 . 
Moreover, as far as the case-law of the ECtHR is concerned there seems to be, at today’s 
 
490 De Dreux-Brézé c. France (n 419); Thivet v. France (n 419); Malysh and others v Russia (n 419); Mamatas 
et autres v. Greece (n 18). 
491 See nevertheless, Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals (n 2) 182–187. 
492 Malysh and others v Russia (n 419); De Dreux-Brézé c. France (n 419); Thivet v. France (n 419). It should 
be noted that the Thivet and De Dreux-Brézé cases were not brought directly against the debtor (or in this case 
its successor) but again France which had agreed to settle the tsarist debt question by treaty with the Russian 
Federation. Claimants alleged in particular that said treaty was a breach of their rights as protected by article 1 
of the first protocol. 
493 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18). 
494 It also requires, logically, the debtor to be a signatory to the ECHR. European Convention on Human Rights 
(Rome) 1950, article 1. In general, the notion of jurisdiction in article 1 is understood in a territorial fashion, 
meaning that an applicant present on a sovereign’s territory will be considered to be in said sovereign’s 
jurisdiction. However, the Court has expanded the notion of jurisdiction so as to encompass cases where 
applicants were under the control of a respondent State while not on its territory. See e.g. Banković and others 
v Belgium and 16 Other contracting States [2001] European Court of Human Rights 52207/99; Loizidou v 
Turkey European Court of Human Rights 15318/89; Angelika Nußberger, ‘The Concept of “Jurisdiction” in 
the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 65 Current Legal Problems 241; Marko 
Milanovic, ‘From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in Human Rights 
Treaties’ (Social Science Research Network 2008) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1139174 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1139174> accessed 28 January 2020. 
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date, little doubt that the contractual rights arising from sovereign bonds are protected under 
article 1 of the first protocol495.  
From a creditor’s perspective this means that the competence of Human Rights Courts on 
sovereign debt cases is more predictable than that of investment tribunals 496 . Finally, 
examining the competence of the European Court of Human Rights on sovereign debt cases 
could shed light on potential similar adjudication before other Human Rights Courts or the 
European Court of Justice497. 
So far, the ECtHR has mostly been seized on the basis of article 1 of the first protocol, 
protecting the peaceful enjoyment of possessions. Article 1 states:  
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The 
preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce 
such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”498 
For article 1 of the first protocol to apply, ratione materiae, sovereign debt contracts need to 
be characterised as possessions499. Possessions, in the court’s case-law, are depend upon the 
existence of a substantial economic interest for the applicant500. Contractual rights satisfy 
this condition as “a ‘legitimate expectation’ of obtaining an ‘asset’ may also enjoy the 
protection of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1”501.  
 
495 Regarding the European Convention of Human Rights, the language used by article 1 of the first protocol 
does not guarantee against expropriation sensu stricto, but protects the “peaceful enjoyment of possessions”. 
The meaning of this expression will be examined infra in this section.  
496 In all of the aforementioned four cases the court recognised its competence in sovereign bond cases. De 
Dreux-Brézé c. France (n 419); Thivet v. France (n 419); Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18); Malysh and 
others v Russia (n 419). 
497 A series of cases related to sovereign debt were brought before the ECJ. In addition to the aforementioned 
Fahnenbrock case, the court was also seized by Italian claimants following the decision to exempt the bonds 
held by the European Central Bank from the Greek restructuring process. However, as opposed to the cases 
which are the focus of this thesis, this specific case did not oppose creditors and the sovereign debt but rather 
bondholders and the ECB itself. Some of the conclusions drawn from the case by the ECJ will, however, be 
examined in next part. See Alessandro Accorinti and others v. European Central Bank (n 19). 
498 European Convetion on Human Rights (Rome). 
499 For a brief discussion of this case-law and its applicability to sovereign bonds see Belle (n 135). 
500 Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal [2007] European Court of Human Rights 73049/01, para 63; Mamatas et 
autres v. Greece (n 13), paras 18-20. 
501 Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal (n 465), para 65; Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 13), paras 18-20. 
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Hence, sovereign bonds, can be characterised as possessions, if their enforceability is 
supported by a continuous domestic case-law, as is often the case given their contractual 
nature 502 . Meaning that, so far, the Strasbourg court has systematically declared its 
competence over sovereign debt cases. 
3.3.2.4 The Competence of International Courts: Overview 
Access to courts, in International law, is guaranteed at two levels. First, as the doctrine of 
sovereign immunities evolved, and as sovereign bonds were interpreted as acta de iure 
gestionnis, International law has enabled creditors to seize domestic courts. Their 
competence has enabled creditors to access a cheap and reliable dispute settlement forum 
over which the contractual aspects of sovereign debt could be litigated, and particularly 
efficient remedies obtained.  
Second, international litigation on sovereign debt allows creditors to litigate regulatory 
measures implemented by the debtor to reduce its debt obligations. The competence of 
investment tribunals on sovereign debt is heavily debated, and access to an investment 
tribunal is somewhat uncertain for creditors. However, the Fedax and Argentine cases show 
that ISDS may potentially provide creditors with means to engage the debtor’s responsibility 
beyond mere contract breaches before international jurisdictions. Similarly, the competence 
of the European Court of Human Rights provides creditors with means to see that their 
property rights over sovereign debt titles are not violated by debtors.  
These multiple fora for dispute settlement provide creditors with access to jurisdictions, the 
first step in ensuring that they obtain the efficient remedies at the centre of the creditor 
protection model. As regularly pointed out throughout this thesis, this does not only benefit 
creditors, but also debtors as the credible commitment provided by the creditor protection 
model enables them to access capital markets under more favourable conditions. 
The competence of multiple jurisdictions over sovereign bonds should not however be 
understood as void of negative consequences. As will be highlighted at the end of chapter 4, 
this multiplicity of courts and tribunals able to litigate sovereign debt matters creates a risk 
of fragmentation of the law on sovereign debt503. Moreover, litigation before international 
 
502 De Dreux-Brézé c. France (n 419); Thivet v. France (n 419); Malysh and others v Russia (n 419); Mamatas 
et autres v. Greece (n 18). 
503 Klabbers (n 23) 146. 
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courts is potentially highly disruptive to the restructuring process, as will be seen at the end 
of this chapter.  
These weaknesses, however, only manifest when the ability to litigate is abused by holdout 
creditors. In a world where all stakeholders are incentivised towards bringing the sovereign 
debtor back to debt sustainability, ensuring that rogue States can be brought before a broad 
array of jurisdiction enhances the efficiency of the sovereign debt market by incentivising 
creditors to lend to all sovereigns. 
3.3.3 The Sanctity of Creditor Rights in international law 
The second condition for functioning of the creditor protection model is the recognition by 
courts and tribunals of the responsibility of the debtor in case of non-payment. To recall, this 
recognition requires a combination of three elements: first the existence of obligations tied 
to repayment, second the recognition of the State’s responsibility and third, the inability of 
the sovereign to empty its obligations from their substance. 
As was exposed in the previous section, in domestic law, the recognition of these obligations 
has been straightforward as the contractual rights of creditors are well established. However, 
the obligation to repay sovereign debts as enshrined in sovereign bonds or syndicated loan 
is not an international obligation, but rather a domestic law obligation504. International law, 
however, can potentially provide creditors with a series of rights. First, creditors are 
protected against unlawful direct or indirect expropriation by the sovereign debtor. The 
prohibition of unlawful expropriation has been recognised customarily 505 , but also in 
Investment Treaties506 and Human Rights Treaties507. 
In addition to their rights to property creditors of States can benefit from further treaty-based 
protections in investment law. If their national State has entered into a BIT with the debtor, 
creditors usually have a right, to a fair and equitable treatment, national treatment and most-
 
504 Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals (n 2) 63. 
505  See e.g Case concerning the Factory at Chorzow (claim for indemnity) (merits) (n 40); Reinisch, 
‘Expropriation’ (n 40) 411; Nadakavukaren Schefer (n 40) 196. As underlined by Reinisch, the customary 
prohibition of expropriation also covers intangible rights. See Rudloff Case 9 RIAA 244 (US-Venezuelan 
Claims Commission). 
506 The US model BIT, for example states “Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment 
either directly or indirectly (…)”. ‘US Model BIT’. Cited by Nadakavukaren Schefer (n 40) 204. 
507 European Convention on Human Rights (Rome) article 14. 
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favoured nation treatment 508 . Similarly, if the debtor is a signatory to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, creditors are also entitled protection against discrimination509. 
While the fact that creditors benefit from those international rights against sovereign debtors 
is opened to little debate, their exact content within the context of sovereign debt is uncertain. 
The central issue is that, as previously mentioned, no investment case pertaining to sovereign 
debt has reached the merit stage. Similarly, the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights on the subject matter has been rather limited. 
This dearth of case-law should not however be interpreted as meaning that international law 
does not burden sovereign debtors with obligations towards their creditors. This section will 
thus briefly examine how the prohibition of expropriation is applicable to the contractual 
rights held by creditors of sovereigns, and how standards of treatment contained in BITs 
similarly apply to creditors. Finally, this section will also examine how the narrow 
interpretation of economic necessity by international courts signifies that the obligations of 
debtors cannot easily be circumvented by their reliance on difficult economic circumstances.  
3.3.4.1 Expropriation and Sovereign Debt 
It has usually been agreed by international courts and tribunals that intangible contractual 
rights fall within the scope of the prohibition of unlawful expropriation. First, contractual 
rights are usually explicitly mentioned as a protected category of investment within BITs510. 
Similarly, most of the investment case-law on sovereign debt tends to consider that sovereign 
bonds are a protected category of investment511. Moreover, contractual rights are similarly 
protected by the customary standard on expropriation512.  
 
508 For an overview of the potential rights available to bondholders under BITs see Waibel, ‘Opening Pandora’s 
Box’ (n 81). 
509 European Convention on Human Rights (Rome), protocol 1, article 1. 
510 Reinisch, ‘Expropriation’ (n 40) 410. 
511 Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic (n 17); Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic 
(n 17); Giovanni Alemanni and Others v. The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility) 
(n 17); Nakajima (n 81); Ortolani (n 81). 
512 On the applicability of the customary prohibition of unlawful expropriation to ‘intangible rights’ see Rudloff 
Case (n 505); Case concerning the Factory at Chorzow (claim for indemnity) (merits) (n 40); Case concerning 
certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia  (merits) (1926) Series A-No 7 Collect Judgm (Permanent 
Court of International Justice); Oscar Chinn case (Britain v Belgium) (1934) 63 PCIJ Ser AB (Permanent Court 
of International Justice); Reinisch, ‘Expropriation’ (n 40) 410. It should be noted that a minority of the case-
law tends to refuse to link the prohibition of expropriation of contractual rights with the existence of a physical 
asset. On this question see Waibel, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box’ (n 81) 743. Citing Starrett Housing Corporation 
v Iran (Iran-US Claims Tribunl); Phelps Dodge International Corp v The Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran-US 
Claims Tribunals). This line of decision seems however to be marginal. Similarly, mixed-claims commissions 
have sometimes refused to recognise that unsecured bonds could be expropriated. See Compagnie Generale 
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The key question, when analysing whether non-payment by a sovereign amounts to 
expropriation, lies in the distinction between breach of contract and expropriation. Broadly 
speaking, the case-law on expropriation seems to recognise that the criteria for this 
distinction lies in the way in which the sovereign acts. For its acts to be characterised as 
expropriatory, the debtor ought to have relied on its ‘sovereign capacity’ or its ‘public 
powers’. As such, “the mere non-performance of a contractual obligation is not to be 
equated with a taking of property, (…)”513. 
As far as sovereign debt is concerned, this means that non-payment for economic reasons, 
or even mala fide refusal to pay, may not be tantamount to expropriation514. A contrario, a 
repudiation of a sovereign’s debt via regulatory means would more likely be characterised 
as such.  
It should be noted that the law on expropriation as it currently stands would protect creditors, 
not only against direct expropriation, such as a regulatory debt repudiation, but also against 
indirect expropriation. Indirect expropriation is usually defined as: measures which result in 
the effective loss of management, use or control, or a significant depreciation of the value, 
of the assets of a foreign investor’515. For example, Greece’s recent insertion of a collective 
action clause within its bonds could be characterised as an indirect expropriation as it 
resulted in a loss of control of the creditor’s rights over their bonds516. 
In the current state of the law, not all expropriatory acts are unlawful. Expropriation is 
allowed if it is carried out for a public purpose 517 , following due process, is non-
 
des Eaux de Caracas [Belgian Waterworks] v Venezuela (1903) 9 RIAA 333 (Commission Belgium-
Venezuela); Boccardo v Venezuela (Italy v Venezuela) (1903) 99 Ralston Law Proced 80. Cited in Waibel, 
‘Opening Pandora’s Box’ (n 81) 744. 
513 See e.g. Waste Management, Inc v United Mexican States (‘Number 2’) [2004] ICSID ARB(AF)/00/3, para 
174; Reinisch, ‘Expropriation’ (n 379) 418. 
514 Waibel, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box’ (n 81) 745. 
515 Reinisch, ‘Expropriation’ (n 40) 442. 
516 On this question see Boudreau (n 90); Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18). 
517 There seems to be a confusion in the case-law on expropriation between public purpose as a condition for 
the lawfulness of the expropriatory act and public purpose as the differentiating element between a mere breach 
of contract and an expropriation. Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals (n 2) 
745–746. The Olguin tribunal notably seemed to consider that mere non-payment did not amount to 
expropriation as the host State non-performance of a contractual obligation was not accompanied by specific 
intent. Eudoro Armando Olguín v Republic of Paraguay [2001] ICSID ARB/98/5; Waibel, ‘Opening Pandora’s 
Box’ (n 81) 746; CH Schreuer, ‘The Concept of Expropriation under the ETC and Other Investment Protection 
Treaties’ (2005) 2 Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) para 118 <https://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=596> accessed 29 January 2020. See also, SGS Société Générale de 
Surveillance SA v Republic of the Philippines, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction [2004] 
ICSID ARB/02/6; CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Republic of Argentina (Award) [2005] ICSID 
Tribunal ARB/10/8. 
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discriminatory and is accompanied by a prompt, adequate and effective compensation518. Of 
these conditions, the most critical from a creditor protection standpoint, is the obtention of a 
compensation.  
At today’s date, ICSID case-law tends to consider that payment of an ‘adequate’ 
compensation519 entails payment of the ‘market-value’ of the expropriated item520. Given 
that the market value of sovereign bonds fluctuates on the secondary market, and given that 
the bonds of a restructuring sovereigns are usually traded at a discount, it is unlikely that a 
debt holder would be entitled to the bonds’ legal value521.  
Beyond investment and customary law, the property rights of creditors of States part to the 
ECHR are also protected by article 1 of the first protocol522. Article 1 of the first protocol 
does not prohibit all interference by sovereigns with the property rights of applicants. Rather, 
it limits said interferences to a set of conditions. First, any interference with the right of 
applicants must be lawful, i.e. based in domestic law and not arbitrary523. The interference 
must also serve a public purpose524. Finally, the interference must strike a fair balance 
between the rights of applicants and the public purpose pursued by the sovereign525. 
 
518 Nadakavukaren Schefer (n 39) 169; W Michael Reisman and Robert D Sloane, ‘Indirect Expropriation and 
Its Valuation in the BIT Generation’ (2003) 74 British Yearbook of international law 115, 134. 
519 Compensation in this context differs from compensation as a remedy arising from a breach of international 
law. While the compensation as a condition for the lawfulness of an expropriation is calculated at the time of 
the expropriation, compensation as a remedy for breach aims at restoring the injured party to its situation pre-
breach of international law. See the discussions in Amoco International Finance Corporation v The 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, National Iranian Oil Company, National Petrochemical Company 
and Kharg Chemical Company (US-Iran Claims tribunal);  cited by Reisman and Sloane (n 483) 136.  
520 It should be noted that the valuation of what constitutes an ‘adequate’ compensation in international law is 
heavily debated. A full exposé of such debates is unfortunately impossible within the limited contents of this 
thesis. As such, while this thesis espouses for the sake of its argument that compensation requires payment on 
the market value of the expropriated item, it does not intend to argue that such a position is universally accepted 
by investment tribunals. For an overview of these debates see notably Reisman and Sloane (n 518). 
521 Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals (n 2) 301. 
522 Sensu stricto, article 1 of the first protocol does not protect property rights, but rather the ‘peaceful’ 
enjoyment of possessions. However, mutatis mutandis, the protection offered by the ECHR can be understood 
as following the same purpose as the protection of property in general international law and investment law.  
523 DJ Harris and others, Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Third edition, Oxford University Press 2014) 670; Case of the former King of Greece and others v Greece 
[2000] European Court of Human Rights 25701/94; Jahn and Others v Germany [2005] European Court of 
Human Rights 46720/99, 72203/01 and 72552/01; Špaček, s.r.o v the Czech Republic (European Court of 
Human Rights); Carbonara and Ventura v Italy (European Court of Human Rights); Beyeler v Italy [2000] 
European Court of Human Rights 33202/96. 
524 The public purpose condition has been interpreted extremely broadly by the Strasbourg court. In practice, 
only regulatory measures taken “without reasonable foundation” are likely to be found as lacking public 
purpose. Harris and others (n 488) 668; citing Jahn and Others v. Germany (n 488); Pressos Compania Naviera 
SA and others v Belgium [1995] European Court of Human Rights 17849/91. 
525 Harris and others (n 523) 668–672. 
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As already underlined, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights does not 
provide greater clarifications when it comes to whether ordinary sovereign debt 
restructurings amount to expropriation. The De-Dreux Brézé and Thivet cases focused on 
tsarist bonds still held by the applicants in the 1990s526. The Court, in both cases, summarily 
dismissed the applicants’ arguments by underlining that following such a length of time, a 
reasonable investor could not hope to be paid in full on the face value of the bonds527. The 
recent Mamatas528 case fits within the anti-holdout model rather than the creditor protection 
model.  
The only relevant interpretation of article 1 of the first protocol is therefore the one in Malysh 
v Russia529.  The Malysh case finds its source in the economic reforms undertaken by the 
Gorbashev government and aiming to transition the Russian economy towards the free 
market. One of these reforms was the emission by the Russian government of “commodity 
bonds” exchangeable against consumer goods. These bonds were not legal tender per se, but 
had a set nominal value and were transferable. The claimants in Malysh, were holders of 
Urozhay-90 (Harvest 90) bonds, commodity bonds given to agricultural workers in exchange 
for grain. In 1995, the bonds were recognised by Russia as part of its internal debt in the 
Commodity Bonds Act. The act also promised repayment within 10 years. In 2000, the 
Russian federation undertook a vast restructuring process, which culminated in 2009 with 
the enactment of legislation on the buyout by Russia of its commodity bonds for a fraction 
of their value530. 
The applicants claimed that Russia’s failure to pay, as wells as the legislation it enacted on 
the bonds ,constituted an infringement of the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions531. The 
Court underlined that:  
“(the) rule of law underlying the Convention and the principle of lawfulness in Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1 require States not only to respect and apply, in a foreseeable and 
consistent manner, the laws they have enacted, but also, as a corollary of this duty, to 
ensure the legal and practical conditions for their implementation. In the context of the 
present case, those principles required the Russian State to fulfil in good time, in an 
 
526 De Dreux-Brézé c. France (n 419); Thivet v. France (n 419). 
527 De Dreux-Brézé c. France (n 419); Thivet v. France (n 419). 
528 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18). 
529 Malysh and others v Russia (n 419). 
530 For an overview of the facts of the case see ibid 5–13. 
531 Malysh and others v Russia (n 419). 
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appropriate and consistent manner, the legislative promises it had made in respect of 
claims arising out of the Urozhay-90 bonds.”532 
In the paragraph above, the court highlights that it is the passivity of the Russian government 
when it came to provide actual measures designed to enable repayment of the holders of 
commodity bonds that was problematic. This passivity regarding payment justifies in the 
eyes of the court the finding of a breach by the Russian Federation.  
The peculiarity of the facts in the Malysh case533 renders the finding of principles applicable 
to most sovereign debt restructurings difficult. Realistically, all that can be glanced from 
Malysh is that States cannot ignore, for long periods of time, their obligations to creditors. 
The protection granted by the court is thus fairly minimal as it did not feel the need to 
pronounce itself more broadly on the protection guaranteed by article 1 as applied to 
sovereign debt. 
It should also be added, regarding the protection of property by the Strasbourg court, that 
while the proportionality of expropriatory measures entails payment of an adequate 
compensation to the property-holder, said compensation, as with ICSID tribunals is 
calculated on the basis of the market value of the expropriated asset534. 
In general, the protection of property rights serves a dual purpose within the creditor 
protection model. These guarantees against expropriation provide a direct right to creditors, 
enforceable before international courts in lieu of the contractual obligations against the 
sovereign. Thus, the protection of property can be used by creditors as a substitute to actions 
for breach of contract. Moreover, the protection of property protects sovereign debt contracts 
from a debtor’s attempt to empty sovereign debt obligations of their substance, either by 
relying on regulations altering the content of sovereign debt contracts or, as in the Malysh 
case, via the debtor’s behaviour.  
 
532 ibid 82. 
533 Mostly, the fact that Russia for more than 10 years did very little to negotiate with its domestic creditors, 
and claimed that the inclusion of the Harvest 90 bonds in its internal debt was a ‘mistake’.  
534 See e.g. James and others v the United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights); Waibel, ‘Opening 
Pandora’s Box’ (n 81) 302. 
The Creditor Protection Model  111 
3.3.4.2 Other International Obligations and Sovereign Debt 
In addition to the protection of property rights, BITs also protect creditors from 
discrimination on the basis of their nationality535. In particular, National Treatment clauses 
could prevent a restructuring State from favouring domestic holders of bonds over foreign 
bondholders protected by a BIT536. Similarly, Most Favoured Nation clauses would prevent 
a restructuring State from discriminating against creditors of a specific nationality, in favour 
of another group of foreign creditors537.  
While, so far, no arbitral tribunal has examined whether restructuring States have breached 
the two aforementioned clauses, it can be argued that their insertion in BITs shield foreign 
creditors against attempts of sovereign to discriminate in order to facilitate repayment. 
Beyond protection against discrimination, BITs provide creditors with two other shields 
against reluctant debtors: fair and equitable treatment (FET) clauses and umbrella clauses.  
FET clauses are boilerplate BIT dispositions538 which have been described as ‘catch-all 
provisions for investor protection’539, whose interpretation is ‘surrounded by considerable 
fog’540. Broadly speaking541, breaches of the clause have been found when sovereigns’ 
 
535 It should be noted that discrimination, not only on the basis of nationality, but also on other grounds is 
similarly prohibited under the European Convention on Human Rights. European Convetion on Human Rights 
(Rome), article 14. 
536 Waibel, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box’ (n 81) 740. Domestic holders of bonds should not be confused with 
holders of domestic bonds. Holders of domestic bonds might be both nationals of the restructuring States or 
foreign investors, thus, a State restructuring its domestic debt in a more favourable fashion than its external 
debt might not breach a domestic treatment clause. On the other hand, were a State to discriminate on the basis 
of nationality in favour of national holders of its bonds would likely be found to have breached a national 
treatment clause. 
537 As pointed out by Waibel, such a situation seems unlikely as in most cases a sovereign does not know in 
advance the identity and nationality of most of its creditors. Thus, if discrimination occurs it will most likely 
be between national holders of bonds and foreign holders, thus leading to a breach of a national treatment 
clause or on the basis of acceptance of the restructuration offer. ibid. 
538 Michael Waibel, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment As Boilerplate’ (Social Science Research Network 2019) 
SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3401770 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3401770> accessed 29 January 2020. It 
should be noted that beyond treaty protection a customary fair and equitable protection seems to be recognised 
as, notably, asserted in the Neer case. L F H Neer and Pauline Neer (USA) v United Mexican States (1926) IV 
Rep Int Arbitr Awards 60 (Mexico-USA General Claims Commission); On this question see Todd J Grierson-
Weiler and Ian A Laird, ‘Standards of Treatment’ [2008] The Oxford Handbook of International Investment 
Law 265–272 
<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199231386.001.0001/oxfordhb-
9780199231386-e-8> accessed 29 January 2020; Christoph Schreurer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment in 
Arbitral Practice’ (2005) 6 Journal of World Investment & Trade 357, 359–364. 
539 Nadakavukaren Schefer (n 39) 327; Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in 
Investment Treaties’ (2005) 39 The international lawyer 87. 
540 Waibel, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box’ (n 81) 748. 
541  Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours’ (2013) 12 Santa Clara Journal of 
international law 7; Schreurer (n 545); Waibel, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box’ (n 80) 748. 
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regulatory activity have lacked transparency542, when investors legitimate expectations have 
not been protected543, when investors have been coerced by the host State544, when due 
process has not been respected545, and when sovereigns acted in bad faith546.  
For creditors, the main advantage of FET clauses is that their operation is independent of a 
finding of discrimination by the sovereign547. Moreover, the catch-all nature of the clause 
potentially provides debt holders with a variety of potential ways to protect themselves 
against debt repudiations. Notably, a sovereign reneging upon its debt might be found to act 
in bad faith. This could also be characterised as a breach of due process, or the debtor’s 
actions could be read as a non-respect of investors legitimate expectations548. 
Beyond treaty breaches, debt holders may be able to rely on umbrella clauses. Umbrella 
clauses are clauses whose purpose is to, arguably, extend the scope of application, ratione 
materiae of BITs to other obligations States have assumed towards investors549.  
Umbrella clauses typically stipulate that the State should “observe any obligation it may 
have entered to”; “constantly guarantee the observance of the commitments it has entered 
into” or “observe any obligation it has assumed”550.  
 
542 See e.g. Emilio Agustín Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain (award) [2000] ICSID ARB/97/7; Técnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed, SA (Award)v The United Mexican States [2003] ICSID arbitral tribunal No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2; Dolzer (n 539) 92. 
543 See e.g. Electrabel SA v The Republic of Hungary (award) [2005] ICSID ARB/07/19; LG&E Energy Corp, 
LG&E Capital Corp, and LG&E International, Inc .v Argentine Republic (Decision on liability) [2006] ICSID 
Tribunal ARB/01/2; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, SA.and Vivendi Universal, SA v Argentine 
Republic (Award) [2010] ICSID ARB/03/19; Saluka Investments BV v The Czech Republic (UNCITRAL); 
Dolzer (n 541) 19. 
544 See e.g. Eureko BV v Republic of Poland (partial award) (ICSID); Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech 
Republic (n 550); Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the international law of Foreign 
Investment (Oxford University Press 2008) 169. 
545 Including the provision by the host State of a stable and predictable legal framework. See e.g. Técnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. (Award) v. The United Mexican States (n 547); CMS Gas Transmission 
Company v. The Republic of Argentina (Award) (n 522); Tudor (n 549) 171; Siemens AG v The Argentine 
Republic (award) [2007] ICSID ARB/02/8. 
546 On the relationship between FET clauses and good faith see Martins Paparinskis, ‘Good Faith and Fair and 
Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law’ (Social Science Research Network 2014) SSRN 
Scholarly Paper ID 2512664 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2512664> accessed 25 September 2017. 
Commenting on Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. (Award)v. The United Mexican States (n 506); 
TECO Guatemala Holdings, LLC v Republic of Guatemala [2013] ICSID arbitral tribunal ARB/10/23; Ioan 
Micula, Viorel Micula, SC European Food SA, SC Starmill SRL and SC Multipack SRL v Romania [2013] 
ICSID arbitral tribunal ARB/05/20. 
547 Waibel, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box’ (n 81) 748. 
548 That is if the debt repudiation is the result of the sovereign acting in a public capacity and not in a 
commercial capacity. Again, treaty dispositions do not, in general, shield investors from mere contract breach.  
549 Irmgard Marboe and August Reinisch, ‘Contracts between States and Foreign Private Law Persons’, Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public international law (Oxford University Press 2011). 
550 See the study of umbrella clause drafting in Katia Yannaca-Small, ‘Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause 
in Investment Agreements’ (2006) 3 , OECD Working Papers on International Investment. 
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While the effect of umbrella clauses has been heavily debated, it is generally agreed that 
they “elevate” contractual obligations owed by the host to the status of treaty obligations551. 
Thus, while generally the competence of an international investment tribunal is not triggered 
by a mere breach of contract, umbrella clauses bring those contractual obligations within the 
scope of application ratione materiae of BITs. This enables investors to seize international 
tribunals when their contractual rights have been breached552.  
Again, there has been little substantial case-law on the application of umbrella clauses to 
sovereign debt contracts553. Umbrella clauses have the potential to enable creditors to seize 
international investment tribunals not only for breaches of treaty obligations, but also for 
breaches of contract. In effect, such clauses could ‘internationalise’ the payment obligation 
enshrined in sovereign bonds, thus making it directly enforceable before investment 
tribunals. Umbrella clauses, thus participate in the recognition of the enforceability of 
payment obligations arising from sovereign debt contracts554.  
3.3.4.3 Circumstances Absolving the Debtor for Breaches of International Obligations: 
Economic Necessity 
The recognition by courts and tribunals that States have obligations towards their creditors 
is not sufficient to guarantee that creditors obtain efficient remedies enticing them to partake 
in sovereign lending. In addition, courts must recognise the sovereign’s responsibility when 
these obligations are left unfulfilled. When it comes to sovereign debt, the main defence 
available to States is to claim that the breach of creditors’ rights arose as a result of economic 
necessity. 
 
551 Marboe and Reinisch (n 513); Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (Brill 
1995) 81–82; Christoph Schreuer, ‘Travelling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks 
in the Road’ (2004) 5 The Journal of World Investment &amp; Trade vii; see e.g. Fedax NV v The Republic of 
Venezuela [1998] ICSID ARB/96/3; SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, 
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (n 482); CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The 
Republic of Argentina (Award) (n 482); Enron Corporation and Ponderossa Assets LP v Argentine Republic 
(Award) (ICSID Tribunal); Sempra Energy International v The Argentine Republic (Award) [2007] ICSID 
Tribunal ARB/02/16. 
552 Again, it should be noted that the effect of umbrella clauses has been the object of heavy debates both in 
the investment law scholarship and in the case-law. The position articulated supra, seems however to be the 
most commonly shared within the field. For other interpretations see e.g. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance 
SA v Islamic Republic of Pakistan (decision on jurisdiction) (ICSID); Joy Mining Machinery Limited v Arab 
Republic of Egypt (award on jurisdiction) [2004] ICSID ARB/03/11. See also in general Schreuer (n 515); 
Yannaca-Small (n 514). 
553 The Fedax case, notably, was brought against Venezuela on the basis of an umbrella clause, however the 
debates on the application of the clause were limited. Fedax N.V. v. The Republic of Venezuela (n 551). 
554 On the relationship between “commitment” and umbrella clauses see also Thomas W Walde, ‘The Umbrella 
Clause in Investment Arbitration: A Comment on Original Intentions and Recent Cases’ (2005) 6 Journal of 
World Investment & Trade 183. 
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Necessity, as a defence, is invoked to preclude the wrongfulness of an international act that 
might otherwise have led to the recognition a State’s responsibility555. The purpose of the 
necessity defence is to allow States to act in what would normally be a breach of international 
law in order to protect themselves against grave and imminent perils556. 
The necessity defence is enshrined in article 25 of the ILC articles on State responsibility557 
reading: 
 “1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness 
of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act:  
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave 
and imminent peril; and  
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which 
the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.  
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding 
wrongfulness if:  
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking 
necessity; or  
(b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.”558  
Article 25, has been recognised by the ICJ as codifying customary international law559. It 
lists a series of conditions for the successful invocation of the necessity defence. Given the 
 
555 international law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,  
with Commentaries’ <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf>; Attila 
Tanzi, ‘Necessity, State Of’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public international law (Oxford University Press 
2013); August Reinisch, ‘Necessity in Investment Arbitration’ (2010) 41 Netherlands Yearbook of 
international law 137; Tarcisio Gazzini, Wouter G Werner and Ige F Dekker, ‘Necessity Across international 
law: An Introduction’ in IF Dekker and E Hey (eds), Netherlands Yearbook of international law Volume 41, 
2010: Necessity Across international law (T M C Asser Press 2011) <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-
737-1_1> accessed 15 May 2019. 
556 international law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,  
with Commentaries’ (n 562); Tanzi (n 562). 
557 international law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,   
with Commentaries’ <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf> 71. 
558 ibid 80. 
559  Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (1997) 1997 ICJ Rep 7 
(International Court of Justice) para 49; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) 2004 ICJ Rep 136 (International Court of Justice) para 140; Reinisch 
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exceptional nature of the defence, the article ought to be interpreted narrowly and the 
conditions are cumulative560. 
First, the act for which the State invokes the necessity defence must be the only way via 
which a State could protect itself against a grave and imminent peril. Therefore, the necessity 
defence will not be available to a State if other less convenient means of protecting its 
interests were available561. Necessity must be invoked to protect an essential interest of the 
State, the essential nature of the interest being decided on a case by case basis562. In addition, 
the peril against which the State is acting ought to be grave and imminent, meaning that the 
danger must be certain, and not of a long-term or hypothetical nature563. 
Second, as underlined by article 25, 1, b), the necessity defence will be refused to a State for 
breaches of peremptory norms of International law564, or if reliance on necessity is precluded 
by treaty565. Finally, the invocation of the necessity defence will fail if the State invoking it 
has contributed to the situation of necessity566. 
Once successfully invoked, necessity shields a State from international responsibility as long 
as the situation from which necessity arose lasts. Once this situation has passed, compliance 
with the international obligation is, once again, mandatory. Furthermore, compensation is 
owed for any loss encountered by the party to which the obligation was due, as per article 
27567. 
 
and Binder (n 24) 6; Christina Binder, ‘Stability and Change in Times of Fragmentation: The Limits of Pacta 
Sunt Servanda Revisited international law and Practice’ (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of international law 909. 
560 Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (n 559) para 51; Tanzi (n 555); 
Reinisch, ‘Necessity in Investment Arbitration’ (n 555). 
561 international law Commission (n 4), article 25, commentary para. 15; Reinisch and Binder (n 6) 39. 
562 international law Commission (n 4), article 25, commentary para. 15; Attila Tanzi, ‘Necessity, State of’, 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public international law (Oxford University Press 2013). 
563 Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (n 523) para 54; Matthew Parish, 
‘On Necessity’ (2010) 11 Journal of World Investment & Trade 169.  
564  international law Commission (n 4), article 26; Tanzi (n 519). 
565 Tanzi (n 555). 
566 Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (n 523) para 40, citing Yearbook 
of the international law Commission, 1980, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 34. 
567 international law Commission (n 4), article 27; Tanzi (n 8); Reinisch and Binder (n 6). This obligation to 
compensate must be distinguished from full reparation following the breach of an international obligation, 
since article 27 does not, for example, encompass lost profits. This obligation to compensate must be 
distinguished from full reparation following the breach of an international obligation, since article 27 does not, 
for example, encompass lost profits 
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Because of those narrow conditions, reliance on necessity in economic matters, while 
technically possible is often difficult, as evidenced by a series of early 20th century cases568. 
In the French Company of Venezuelan Railroads case 569  France acted in diplomatic 
protection of a French company against Venezuela. The latter had requisitioned equipment 
belonging to the Company during a civil war. Venezuela claimed that necessity absolved it 
from said contractual obligations and the arbitral tribunal agreed, underlying that 
“[Venezuela's] first duty was to itself. Its own preservation was paramount.”570.  
In the Société Commerciale de Belgique case571, Greece argued that economic necessity 
shielded it against the responsibility arising from late payment of arbitral awards to a Belgian 
Company. Greece posited, inter alia, that paying the aforementioned awards would alter the 
“normal functioning of its public service”572. Interestingly, while the PCIJ declined to review 
the case of jurisdictional grounds, Belgium had not contested Greece’s argument573. 
The applicability of the necessity defence in economic circumstances has been the object of 
an often-contradictory case-law before ICSID tribunals. The cases were brought, mainly, 
following the 2000s Argentine financial crisis, thus justifying their analysis here. They all 
 
568 A series of early cases has also concerned force majeure in an economic context. While force majeure and 
necessity have been used interchangeably by the early XXth century international case-law, the present section 
will only focus on the cases which concerned what would, today, fall under necessity. As opposed to necessity, 
force majeure refers to a material impossibility to fulfil international obligations due to elements external to 
the States’ conduct. See, international law Commission, ‘“Second Report on State Responsibility by Mr. James 
Crawford, Special Rapporteur (Addendum) A/CN.4/498/Add.2”’ 
<https://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup13/James%20Crawford’s%20Second%20Report%20on%20State%20Res
ponsibility.pdf>; Simon Hentrei and Ximena Soley, ‘Force Majeure’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
international law (Oxford University Press 2011); Case Concerning the payment of various serbian loans 
issued in France (France v Serbia) (n 196); Russian Claim for Indemnities: Arrears of interest claimed by 
Russia in indemnities due individuals injured in the war or 1877-1878 (Russia v Turkey) (1912) 11 Rep Int 
Arbitr Awards 421 (Permanent Court of Arbitration). 
569 French Company of Venezuelan Railroads Case (France v Venezuela) (n 96); ‘Addendum - Eighth Report 
on State Responsibility by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur - the Internationally Wrongful Act of the 
State, Source of International Responsibility (Part 1)’, Yearbook of the international law Commission, vol II 
(1980) <<http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_318_add5-7.pdf>>; Waibel, Sovereign Defaults 
before International Courts and Tribunals (n 2). 
570 French Company of Venezuelan Railroads Case (France v Venezuela) (n 96), p. 535. The tribunal also 
underlined that Venezuela had not intended to injure or harm the French company by taking action, justifying 
the application of the necessity defence. 
571 Société Commercial de Belgique (Belgium v Greece) (1939) A/B 78 Perm Court Int Justice Judgm Orders 
Advis Opin 159 (Permanent Court of International Justice); cited in ‘Addendum - Eighth Report on State 
Responsibility by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur - the Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, Source 
of International Responsibility (Part 1)’ (n 534) para 28; Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International 
Courts and Tribunals (n 2). 
572 Société Commercial de Belgique (Belgium v Greece) (n 537); cited in‘Addendum - Eighth Report on State 
Responsibility by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur - the Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, Source 
of International Responsibility (Part 1)’ (n 534) para 28. 
573  ‘Addendum - Eighth Report on State Responsibility by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur - the 
Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, Source of International Responsibility (Part 1)’ (n 569). 
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stemmed from a similar factual background: the measures enacted by Argentina following 
the crisis, and in particular the suspension of the peso-dollar convertibility which was legally 
guaranteed at the time574. Given that ICSID tribunals have recognised their jurisdiction575 
over sovereign debt cases, understanding the ICSID case-law on necessity is a required step 
to understand how creditor protection is achieved in international law.  
The interpretation of the necessity defence within international investment law is linked to a 
first issue: the articulation of the customary standard with ad hoc necessity clauses within 
BITs576. The debate within the case-law is centred on whether necessity clauses within 
treaties import within the dispute a standard of interpretation different from the customary 
necessity defence577. 
The necessity clause in the US-Argentina BIT, at stake in the cases analysed here, reads:  
“This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for 
the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the Protection of its own 
essential security interests.”578 
The articulation between the two dispositions was settled in the Sempra 579  annulment 
decision. It was decided by the committee that priority should be given to the treaty over the 
customary standard as the first operates as a form of lex specialis. The customary standard, 
however, remained used by arbitral tribunals in order to interpret the necessity defence 
featured in article XI580. 
 
574 Waibel, ‘Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration’ (n 27); Asif H Qureshi, ‘A Necessity Paradigm of 
“Necessity” in International Economic Law’ in IF Dekker and E Hey (eds), Netherlands Yearbook of 
international law Volume 41, 2010: Necessity Across international law (T M C Asser Press 2011) 
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-737-1_5> accessed 15 May 2019. 
575 Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic (n 5); Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic 
(n 5); Ortolani (n 139). 
576  Waibel, ‘Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration’ (n 29); Reinisch, ‘Necessity in Investment 
Arbitration’ (n 555); LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc .v. Argentine 
Republic (Decision on liability) (n 543); Enron Corporation and Ponderossa Assets L.P. v Argentine Republic 
(Award) (n 551); Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic (Award) (n 551). 
577  Waibel, ‘Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration’ (n 29); Reinisch, ‘Necessity in Investment 
Arbitration’ (n 555). 
578  Treaty between the United-States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investment (Buenos Aires) 1991. 
579 See Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic (Award) (n 515) para 348. 
580 ibid; Reinisch and Binder (n 30). A similar reasoning is applied in the Suez decision, also involving 
Argentina, with a similar factual background but on the basis of the France-Italy BIT. Impregilo S.pA v 
Argentine Republic (Award) [2011] ICSID ARB/07/17. 
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In CMS581 the arbitral tribunal refused to grant Argentina the benefit of the necessity defence. 
Interpreting necessity under the light of the customary standard, it underlines that the actions 
undertaken by Argentina to stabilise its financial situation did not constitute “the only way” 
via which Argentina could avert the effects of the crisis582. This is despite the fact that the 
tribunal recognised that “the situation was difficult enough to justify the government taking 
action to prevent a worsening of the situation and the danger of total economic collapse”583. 
Similarly, the tribunal was not convinced that Argentina had not contributed to its own 
damage584. 
The reasoning justifying this narrow interpretation of the customary standard in CMS 
underlines the economic logic behind its narrow interpretation of the necessity defence. The 
tribunal notes: 
“If strict and demanding conditions are not required or are loosely applied, any State 
could invoke necessity to elude its international obligations. This would certainly be 
contrary to the stability and predictability of the law”585.  
Similarly, in Enron586 , the arbitral tribunal justifies interpreting article XI of the US-
Argentina BIT narrowly by invoking the object and purpose of the treaty. It states that: 
 “[T]he object and purpose of the Treaty is, as a general proposition, to apply in 
situations of economic difficulty and hardship that require the protection of the 
international guaranteed rights of its beneficiaries. To this extent, any interpretation 
resulting in an escape route from the obligations defined cannot be easily reconciled with 
 
581 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina (Award) (n 517). 
582 ibid para 33; See also Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic (Award) (n 507); Total SA v The Argentine Republic (Decision on liability) [2010] ICSID 
ARB/04/01; Waibel, ‘Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration’ (n 23) 645-646; Reinisch, ‘Necessity in 
Investment Arbitration’ (n 519) 200-201. 
583 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina (Award) (n 482), para 322. 
584 ibid para 329; Waibel, ‘Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration’ (n 23) 642; Reinisch, ‘Necessity in 
Investment Arbitration’ (n 519) 203. See also Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.and Vivendi 
Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic (Award) (n 543); Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic (Award) (n 580); 
Binder (n 559); El Paso Energy International Company v The Argentine Republic (Award) [2011] ICSID 
ARB/03/15. It should be noted that the CMS tribunal has relied on Argentina’s difficult economic 
circumstances at the time of the breach to lower the amount of compensation owed to CMS. For a critique of 
this decision see Waibel, ‘Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration’ (n 29) 644. 
585 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina (Award) (n 482) para 317. 
586 Enron Corporation and Ponderossa Assets L.P. v Argentine Republic (Award) (n 551). 
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that object and purpose. Accordingly, a restrictive interpretation of any such alternative 
is mandatory.”587 
The arbitral tribunal in Sempra, concurs, also relying on the object and purpose of the BIT 
to justify interpreting the BIT standard of necessity in light of the customary standard.588 
Both tribunals, in Enron and Sempra ruled that the economic crisis unfolding in Argentina 
did not reach a sufficient threshold to trigger the necessity defence under the customary 
standard, since the very existence of Argentina was not at stake because of the crisis589. In 
addition, they underlined, as in CMS , that the actions taken by Argentina did not constitute 
the only way to prevent the damage caused by the financial crisis and that Argentina had 
contributed to said damage.590  
Overall, most arbitral tribunals591  seemed reluctant, given the narrow conditions of the 
necessity defence, to recognise that Argentina’s actions and circumstances could amount to 
a State of necessity.  While these cases have not focused on sovereign debt per se, their 
interpretation matters highlights the difficulty of debtors to rely on necessity to avoid their 
payment obligations. The argument advanced by commentators is that necessity is an ill-
 
587 ibid, para 331. 
588 Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic (Award) (n 515), para 300; Bart M Szewczyk, 
‘Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic’ (2011) 105 American Journal of international law 547. 
589 Enron Corporation and Ponderossa Assets L.P. v Argentine Republic (Award) (n 515), para 299; Sempra 
Energy International v. The Argentine Republic (Award) (n 515), para 338; See also Total S.A. v. The Argentine 
Republic (Decision on liability) (n 549). 
590 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina (Award) (n 517); Enron Corporation and 
Ponderossa Assets L.P. v Argentine Republic (Award) (n 551); Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine 
Republic (Award) (n 551). 
591 Contra e.g. Continental Casualty Company v The Argentine Republic [2011] ICSID ARB/03/9. See infra 
Part III. LG&E fits somewhat uneasily within the creditor protection/anti-holdout dichotomy exposed here. On 
the one hand, the LG&E tribunal relies on the customary criteria to interpret the BIT necessity defence, 
indicating a desire for creditor protection. On the other hand, its interpretation of the criteria, in casu, is 
sufficiently broad that it concludes that Argentina’s responsibility should be absolved. Notably, it interpreted 
the essential interest criteria as shielding sovereign interests broader than those related to security. It notes in 
that regard “To conclude that such a severe economic crisis could not constitute an essential security interest 
is to diminish the havoc that the economy can wreak on the lives of an entire population and the ability of the 
Government to lead. When a State’s economic foundation is under siege, the severity of the problem can equal 
that of any military invasion.” LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc .v. 
Argentine Republic (Decision on liability) (n 543) para 238. Overall, the tribunal in LG&E also opts for a 
particularly ‘hands-off’ approach when it comes to assessing Argentina’s governments, in particular in its 
assessment of the ‘only way’ criteria. However, as with the French Company case, it can reasonably be argued 
that it is less the interpretation of the tribunal which led to Argentina’s responsibility to be expunged and more 
the specific circumstances of the case, in particular the severity of the Argentinean crisis. Read as such, LG&E 
would be interpreted as fitting within the creditor protection model, despite the sovereign’s responsibility not 
being recognised. For a broader comment on LG&E see Waibel, ‘Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID 
Arbitration’ (n 29). 
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fitted defence for debtor States592. The high threshold593 it requires makes its application to 
sovereign debt cases difficult, and the ICSID cases on necessity are a prime example of this 
phenomenon.  
The narrow interpretation of the necessity defence strengthens the rights of creditors when 
sovereigns face dire financial situations, and enhances the predictability of their 
circumstances. As highlighted by the CMS594 and Enron tribunals595, the predictability of the 
rights granted to investors in BITs requires that these rights remain enforceable even in cases 
where the sovereign debtor is in difficult circumstances. As such, the logic of the CMS and 
Enron tribunals is similar to the original sin hypothesis mentioned supra596. As the purpose 
of creditor protection is to reduce the political risk linked to contracting with sovereigns, and 
as sovereigns facing economic hardship are more likely to violate creditor’s righs, to be 
efficient the remedies granted to creditors must be efficient in such circumstances597.  
The problem with this logic is that limiting the ability of States to curb the rights of creditors 
when they are in difficult financial circumstance can sometimes prevent debtors from 
enacting measures that could shield their population from the damages caused by a financial 
crisis. In that context, such a narrow reading of the necessity defence, one that requires the 
very existence of the sovereign to be at stake to be triggered, could be counter-productive as 
it deters States from preventatively acting in order to limit the often dire consequences of a 
sovereign debt crisis.  
3.3.4 Efficient Remedies in international law 
The final condition for the creditor protection model to function is the obtention by creditors 
of efficient remedies designed to coerce States into repayment. As far as international law is 
concerned, two broad types of remedies are available to creditors. The first is the seizing of 
the debtor’s assets by creditors, the second is the obtention of damages. 
 
592 See in general Waibel, ‘Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration’ (n 29). 
593 For a brief exposé of Argentina’s economic situation, contrasted with arbitral decisions and the “grave and 
imminent” nature of Argentina’s peril see: Qureshi (n 574). 
594 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina (Award) (n 517). 
595 ibid; Enron Corporation and Ponderossa Assets L.P. v Argentine Republic (Award) (n 551). 
596 Also known as the original sin theory. Eichengreen, Haussman and Panizza (n 114); Flandreau and Sussman 
(n 114). 
597 Qureshi (n 574); Andrea K Bjorklund, ‘Emergency Exceptions: State of Necessity and Force Majeure’ 
[2008] The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law 
<https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199231386.001.0001/oxfordhb-
9780199231386-e-12> accessed 15 May 2019. 
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3.3.4.1 Immunity from Execution and Sovereign Debt 
As with immunities from jurisdiction, international law has evolved towards restricting 
sovereign immunities from execution. The current state of the law is that, while immunity 
remains the norm, assets owned by the sovereign and used for commercial purposes are not 
protected from attachment attempts598. The key element for the distinction between assets 
used for ‘commercial purpose’ and those use for ‘governmental purpose other than 
commercial’ lies in the nature of the asset on which execution is attempted599.  
Sovereigns’ immunity of execution can be contractually waived, and are waived in sovereign 
bonds 600 . Said waiver ought to be express and cannot be inferred from a waiver of 
jurisdictional immunity601.  
The restrictive theory applied to execution fits within the creditor protection model, as it 
enables creditors to obtain the sums via which they can obtain payment by attaching the 
debtor’s assets. In practice, finding assets on which judgments can be executed has proven 
a particularly complex task for creditors602, as shown once again by NML.  
In Belgium and France, notably, NML sought to attach the sums held by the Argentine 
embassy in several banks603. Argentina, in its bonds, had waived it immunity of execution. 
However, both Belgian and French courts ruled that accounts held by diplomatic missions, 
 
598 Stoll (n 424). 
599 Jurisdictionnal Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece intervening) (n 384) para 118; Stoll (n 
388); James Crawford, ‘Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign Immunity’ (1981) 75 American 
Journal of international law 820; international law Commission, ‘Comments and Suggestions by the Working 
Group on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property’, ‘Report of the international law Commission 
on the Work of its 51st Session. (1999); Kupelyants (n 409) 287–288. 
600 On immunity waivers Weidemaier, ‘Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt’ (n 47); Delaume (n 52) 812; 
Kupelyants (n 33) 288–289. For a court interpretation see See e.g. A Company v Republic of X (1990) 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 520 (Queen’s Bench Division (commercial court)). 
601 Most modern immunity waivers tackle both immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from execution. The 
typical boilerplate immunity waiver in sovereign bonds is similar to the following: 
“To the extent that the Republic may in any jurisdiction claim or acquire for itself or its assets immunity 
(sovereign or otherwise) from suit, execution, attachment (whether in aid of execution, before judgment or 
otherwise) or other legal process (whether through service or notice or otherwise), the Republic irrevocably 
agrees for the benefit of the Holders of Notes not to claim, and irrevocably waives, such immunity, to the fullest 
extent permitted by the laws of such jurisdiction.”. Merrill Lynch Int’l, U.S. $22,000,000,000 The Lebanese 
Republic Global Medium-Term Note Program 104 (2009) quoted in Weidemaier (n 99) 87, at note 126. 
602  Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals (n 2) 124; 154–155; Jeremy 
Ostrander, ‘The Last Bastion of Sovereign Immunity: A Comparative Look at Immunity from Execution of 
Judgements Notes and Comments’ (2004) 22 Berkeley Journal of international law 541. 
603 République d’Argentine c. NML Capital LTD (n 407); Société NML Capital c. République d’Argentine (n 
407); Société NML Capital c. République d’Argentine (n 407); Société NML Capital c. République d’Argentine 
(n 407); NML Capital Ltd c. République d’Argentine (n 407). 
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in virtue of the principle ne impediatur legatio, were protected by a special immunity which 
could only be waived expressly, and not by a general immunity waiver604.  
Beyond diplomatic accounts, creditors of sovereigns have also sought to obtain payment on 
the foreign exchange accounts of central banks605. The case-law on the immunity of central 
bank accounts is particularly complex given that, on the one hand, central banks act usually 
with a public purpose606 while, on the other hand, the nature of the acts of central banks is 
usually private607. To further muddy the waters, the relationship between governments and 
central banks, including their degree of independence, varies heavily from State to State608.  
Broadly speaking, the degree of immunity accorded to central banks varies heavily. Some 
States grant central bank assets a broad protection. The UK notably, provides a near-absolute 
immunity to central bank assets609. The US similarly protects assets of a central bank “held 
for its own account (…) or its parent government”610 . This immunity does not protect 
 
604  See Société NML Capital c. République d’Argentine (n 407); Société NML Capital c. République 
d’Argentine (n 407); Société NML Capital c. République d’Argentine (n 407); NML Capital Ltd c. République 
d’Argentine (n 407). On the special nature of accounts held by diplomatic legations and their impact on 
sovereign debt processes see e.g. Bonafè (n 82); Pierre D’Argent, ‘Saisie de Comptes d’ambassade, Immunité 
d’exécution et Renonciation Contractuelle.’ 2013/15 Journal des Tribunaux 290. NML sought to contest before 
the ECtHR the compatibility of jurisdictional immunities with article 6 of the Convention, but the claim was 
ultimately dismissed by the Strasbourg court. NML capital LTD v France European Court of Human Rights 
23242/12. 
605 Paul L Lee, ‘Central Banks and Sovereign Immunity’ (2002) 41 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
327, 327. 
606 Broadly speaking, implementing monetary policy, but also acting as guarantors of the stability of the 
financial system by providing lending in last resort. 
607 Notably, the purchase and holding of low-risk securities. Ernest T Patrikis, ‘Foreign Central Bank Property: 
Immunity from Attachment in the United States Symposium: Default by Foreign Government Debtors’ (1982) 
1982 University of Illinois Law Review 265, 265. 
608 For an overview of the case law on central bank immunities see Lee (n 605); Thomas Baxter and David 
Gross, ‘Special Immunities: Central Bank Immunity’’, Sovereign Debt Management. R. Lastra, L. Buchheit 
(eds) (Oxford University Press 2014); Patrikis (n 607). 
609 Section 14(4) of the Sovereign Immunities Act States: “Property of a State’s central bank or other monetary 
authority shall not be regarded for the purposes of subsection (4) of section 13 above as in use or intended for 
use for commercial purposes; and where any such bank or authority is a separate entity subsections (1) to (3) of 
that section shall apply to it as if references to a State were references to the bank or authority”. However, the 
immunity of the central bank assets can be lifted via an explicit waiver. See also AIG Capital Partners Inc v 
Republic of Kazakhstan (2006) 1 WLR 1420 (England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court)); 
Kupelyants (n 53) 294; Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (n 5) 55–57. 
610 EM LTD, NML Capital, Ltd, Plaintiffs–Appellees, v BANCO CENTRAL DE LA REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA, 
Republic of Argentina, Defendants–Appellants (2011) 652 F 3d 172 (US Court of Appeals Second Circuit); 
Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, ‘Immunity from Execution of Central Bank Assets’, The Cambridge Handbook of 
Immunities and international law. T. Ruys, N. Angelet, L. Ferro (Cambridge University Press 2019) 272. For 
an overview of the US case-law on central bank immunities see Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring (n 5) 46–54. 
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holdings of central banks used for commercial banking purposes611. This specific immunity 
of central bank assets can, like diplomatic immunities, be waived contractually612.  
In theory these limits to sovereigns’ immunity of execution favours creditors, as it provides 
them with more potential attachable assets. In practice, however, the seizure of State’s 
property has not proved a particularly efficient way of obtaining repayment for creditors.  
First, the discovery of such assets is both an uncertain and costly prospect. It is made 
especially more difficult by the fact that the sovereign against which enforcement is sought 
is both facing economic difficulties613 and might be reluctant to have said assets seized614. 
Beyond these material difficulties, the byzantine case-law briefly on specific immunities 
adds another layer of uncertainty for creditors. In particular, the contradictions in the case-
law on embassy and central bank accounts, two of the most common form foreign sovereign 
monetary holdings, makes it impossible for creditors to know, ex ante, if the costs tied to 
enforcing judgments abroad are worth undertaking.  
3.3.4.2 Remedies arising from Investment and Human Rights Law 
Beside the attachment of goods or funds belonging to sovereigns, international law provides 
creditors with one other main type of remedy: damages.  
Damages615, within the ICSID system (and generally in international law), are traditionally 
understood to be compensatory and not punitive616. This means that the purpose of damages 
is to restore the victim of a breach of an international obligation as close as possible to the 
situation said victim would have been in, were the breach not to have occurred. To quote the 
famous Chorzow factory dictum:  
 
611 Wuerth (n 610) 272. 
612  See EM LTD., NML Capital, Ltd., Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. BANCO CENTRAL DE LA REPÚBLICA 
ARGENTINA, Republic of Argentina, Defendants–Appellants. (n 610). 
613 And might therefore liquidate some of its foreign holdings. 
614 And could therefore either seek to keep them hidden or to hold them in such a way as to make attachment 
more difficult. 
615 Damages, within this section are understood as “the legal duty to pay for the detrimental consequences that 
the victim of an unlawful act has suffered”. Compensation, on the other hand refers to sums of money awarded 
to claimants as “financial reparation for expropriatory or quasi-expropriatory conduct.  Hence, damages are the 
remedy granted to claimants as a reparation for breaches of their rights, while compensation is a condition for 
the lawfulness of expropriation measure. On this question see Thomas W Wälde and Borzu Sabahi, 
‘Compensation, Damages, and Valuation’ [2008] The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law 1052 
<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199231386.001.0001/
oxfordhb-9780199231386-e-26> accessed 25 March 2019.  
616 Case concerning the Factory at Chorzow (claim for indemnity) (merits) (n 40); Wälde and Sabahi (n 615). 
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“The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act—a principle 
which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions 
of arbitral tribunals—is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all 
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.”617 
There are two issues when it comes to the award of compensatory damages to creditors. The 
first is the valuation of the damage to creditors arising from a sovereign’s breach of a treaty 
obligation, the second is the enforcement of arbitral awards.  
The purpose of damages in International Investment Law being the compensation of the 
economic loss suffered by the investor, a tribunal in a sovereign debt case will need to 
determine the value of the bondholder’s investment. The way investments are valued by 
arbitral tribunals is usually by reference to their ‘fair market value’, understood as a 
‘reasonable price that would normally be paid by a willing buyer for the asset’618. In the 
case of sovereign bonds, said value is easily found in the value at which the bonds a quo are 
publicly traded619. The total amount of damages will not however automatically be identical 
to the market value of the bonds. Indeed, damages seek to compensate for the entirety of the 
economic losses of the investor and therefore include interest for non-payment620. 
The fact that the value of a sovereign’s bonds is anchored by its market value, will hardly 
satisfy creditors in most circumstances, as the bonds of a restructuring sovereign trade at a 
discount.  Moreover, even if one ignores the issues surrounding the valuation of sovereign 
bonds, obtaining payment from a reluctant debtor following investment litigation might not 
be straightforward. On the one hand, holders of an arbitral award are in a comparatively 
better positions than creditors having sought redress before domestic courts. Indeed, article 
53 and 54 of the ICSID Convention create a system where arbitral awards are quasi-
 
617 Case concerning the Factory at Chorzow (claim for indemnity) (merits) (n 379) para 47. 
618 Sergey Ripinsky and Kevin Williams, Damages in International Investment Law (BIICL 2008) 182–84. For 
an application see e.g. Starrett Housing Corporation v. Iran (n 512); Sempra Energy International v. The 
Argentine Republic (Award) (n 551); Enron Corporation and Ponderossa Assets L.P. v Argentine Republic 
(Award) (n 551); Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt [1992] ICSID 
ARB/84/3. 
619 For example, the tribunal in British Gas v. Argentina evaluated BG’s damage by reference to the drop in 
the company’s share following Argentina’s actions. BG Group Plc v The Republic of Argentina (final award) 
(UNCITRAL); Ripinsky and Williams (n 618) 216. See also Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited 
v. Arab Republic of Egypt (n 618). Contra Enron Corporation and Ponderossa Assets L.P. v Argentine 
Republic (Award) (n 551). The argument in Enron was that in an illiquid market, the value of publicly traded 
shares inaccurately represents the value of the underlying assets. While this reasoning is coherent for shares it 
seems that it does not translate to sovereign bonds as the underlying asset is a debt with no other inherent value. 
620 Wälde and Sabahi (n 615) 1106. 
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automatically recognised by domestic courts 621 . This, logically, reduces the legal 
uncertainties linked to the enforcement. On the other hand, obtaining payment from a 
sovereign, still requires the discovery of attachable assets belonging to said sovereign. Given 
the current State of the law of immunities such discovery process is fraught with uncertainty, 
and is thus particularly unsatisfactory from a creditor protection perspective622.  
Remedies obtainable under the European Convention of Human Rights face a similar set of 
issues623. As with investment tribunals, the main form of remedy granted by the Strasbourg 
Court is the award of damages624, or ‘just satisfaction’625 in the language of the Convention. 
These damages are, like those awarded by arbitral tribunals, essentially compensatory. When 
it comes to compensation for expropriation, the Court, like ICSID tribunals, bases the 
appropriateness of the compensation on the market value of the expropriated property626.  
3.3.4.3 The Efficiency of international law Remedies: Overview 
The picture when it comes to the obtention by creditors of efficient remedies in international 
law is muddier than in other areas of the creditor protection model. On the one hand, changes 
in the law of immunities have theoretically increased the likelihood that creditors will find 
attachable assets with which they can repay themselves. On the other hand, in practice, 
finding such assets can often prove difficult for creditors, and contradictions within the 
international case-law on immunities renders this process unpredictable.  
 
621  Article 54 states that “Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this 
Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if 
it were a final judgment of a court in that State.” Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (Washington) 1965, art 54. See also Alan S Alexandroff and Ian A Laird, 
‘Compliance and Enforcement’ [2008] The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law 
<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199231386.001.0001/
oxfordhb-9780199231386-e-29> accessed 25 March 2019. 
622 Article 55 of the ICSID convention makes clear that the recognition of arbitral award does not entail any 
modifications within the law of immunities. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (Washington). 
623 It should be noted that the primary duty to provide remedies under the system created by the European 
Convention on Human Rights lies within the domestic court system of the member States, with the Court 
playing a subsidiary role.  
624 The Court has, rarely, opted for a form of restitution in kind, but only in cases involving violations of article 
6 of the Convention.  
625 European Convention on Human Rights (Rome), article 41. On just satisfaction see e.g. Octavian Ichim, 
Just Satisfaction under the European Convention on Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2015); Linos-
Alexander Sicilianos, ‘The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in the Execution of Its Own 
Judgments: Reflections on Article 46 ECHR’, Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights - Effects and 
Implementation (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG 2014). 
626 See e.g. the reasoning of the Court in Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 34), examined infra. 
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Moreover, international courts and tribunals’ reliance on damages as a remedy, means that 
creditors can hardly find more efficient ways to coerce States.  
This lack of creditor protection at the international level, should however be tempered by 
two caveats. First, a dearth of effective enforcement mechanisms is less a symptom of the 
international law on sovereign debt per se, and more a sickness of the international legal 
regime in general. Second, despite this lack of effective enforcement, it should be noted that, 
on average, decisions of international courts are respected by the losing party 627 . This 
potentially indicates that while the remedies provided by international law might not be per 
se efficient, the potential fallout from a lost international case may be enough to coerce 
debtors into repayment.  
3.4 The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Creditor Protection 
Model 
3.4.1 The Strengths of the Creditor Protection Model 
3.4.1.1 The Law on Sovereign Debt as a Credible Commitment Device 
The main strength of the creditor protection model is that it enables sovereign debtors to 
credibly bind themselves to their sovereign debt obligations. It does so by subjecting 
sovereigns to the jurisdiction of independent courts and tribunals which protect creditor’s 
rights and provide them with relatively efficient remedies. 
Credible commitment devices lower the legal and political risks tied to sovereign lending 
for creditors628; thus, at the margin, reducing the costs of borrowing for the sovereign629. 
This new form of credible commitment differs from previous historical trends for two 
reasons. First, as opposed to domestic constitutional institutions630, judicial enforcement of 
sovereign debt is fully independent from the sovereign and functions for domestic as well as 
external debt. Second, as opposed to the previous international methods of enforcement631 
 
627 See Guzman (n 110) 7–8. 
628 North and Weingast (n 124); ibid; Choi, Gulati and Posner (n 114). 
629 Choi, Gulati and Posner (n 114). 
630 North and Weingast (n 28); North (n 87); Stasavage (n 126); Oosterlinck, Ureche-Rangau and Vaslin (n 
128). 
631  Supersanctions, gunboat diplomacy and diplomatic protection. Mitchener and Weidenmier (n 91); 
Weidenmier (n 175); Weidemaier, ‘Contracting for State Intervention’ (n 236). 
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domestic court litigation, ICSID arbitration and ECtHR litigation are independent from the 
political motivations of a sovereign espousing creditors’ claims, thus fostering certainty.  
Moreover, changes in the law of immunities, the automatic recognition of arbitral decisions 
under ICSID and pro rata payment as a remedy for breaches of the pari passu clause, have 
increased the likelihood that creditors will be able to effectively coerce the sovereign into 
respecting its sovereign debt obligations. This can be one either by obtaining payment via 
the attachment of the debtor’s assets or by forcing the debtor into settling out of court.  
The credible commitment aspects of the creditor protection model are further reinforced by 
the fact that sovereign debt is contractually removed from the debtor’s sphere of regulatory 
influence. This occurs contractually via choice-of-law and currency clauses, and by 
internationally the fact that treaty obligations and custom protect creditors against regulatory 
intervention by the debtor. 
Finally, the narrow interpretation of the necessity defence, and the rateable payment 
interpretation of the pari passu clause prevent debtors from emptying their sovereign debt 
obligations of their substance, thus further ensuring that the rights of creditors will be upheld. 
These credible commitment devices foster certainty when it comes to sovereign debt, 
theoretically lowering borrowing prices for sovereigns. These better borrowing conditions, 
in turn, lower the negative impacts of sovereign indebtedness on the debtor’s population. 
3.4.1.2 Creditor Protection and the Rule of Law 
From a deontological standpoint, a second strength of the creditor protection model is that 
the systematic protection of creditor’s rights aids in preventing sovereigns from repudiating 
their debts, thus strengthening the rule of law at a global level.  
While debt repudiations have been rare632, the ability of States to ignore, without facing real 
punishment, the contractual obligations of private entities has often been the norm. This 
ability is problematic from an accountability and a rule-of-law standpoint. Given the 
importance of these two values in contemporary transnational law633, ensuring that States 
 
632 See e.g. Meyer, Reinhart and Trebesch (n 168). 
633 See e.g. ‘Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco)’, article 1. Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in 
International Affairs: international law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1998). 
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are judicially held to their contractual commitments is both economically  sound, and a 
politically and philosophically coherent policy standpoint in most modern democracies.  
The fact that creditor protection mechanisms fit within a broader narrative of transnational 
law as a tool for furthering the rule of law634 helps to explain why courts and tribunals have 
subscribed to creditor protection as a policy. Beyond the functioning of the sovereign debt 
market, creditor protection enables courts to ensure that, even for sovereigns, contracta sunt 
indeed servanda. 
Finally, and controversially, attachment to the rule of law can legitimate the behaviour of 
holdouts, painting them less as ‘vultures’ profiting from a sovereign’s distress but as 
guardians of the good functioning of the sovereign debt market635.  
3.4.1.3 Creditor Protection as an Incentive towards Good Governance 
As will be exposed infra, the main weakness of the creditor protection model is that it makes 
necessary debt restructurings more difficult for all parties involved. While, in general, this 
is a source of inefficiency, it can be argued that, difficult debt restructurings incentivise 
debtors towards good governance.  
This argument purports that, if debt restructurings are easy for sovereigns, there is a risk of 
moral hazard, as governments could over-borrow or over-spend and restructure with ease 
when debts become unsustainable636. If one subscribes to this model of state behaviour, 
increasing the costs of debt restructurings will deter sovereigns from irresponsible economic 
behaviour and therefore ultimately reduce the likelihood of sovereign debt crises. This, again, 
benefits both creditors and the sovereign’s population. 
 
634 See e.g. ‘Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco)’, article 1. Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in 
International Affairs: international law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1998). 
635 See in this sense Fisch and Gentile (n 73); Cohen (n 74). 
636 In that sense see Fisch and Gentile (n 73); Cohen (n 74); Choi, Gulati and Posner (n 114); Choi and Posner 
(n 91). 
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3.4.1.4 Creditor Protection as a way to promote legal certainty 
Creditor protection improves legal certainty at several levels. First, by removing sovereign 
bonds from the debtor’s regulatory reach, they ensure that the legal framework supporting 
said bonds will not be altered in times of crisis637.  
Second, at the individual level, the relationship between sovereigns and their creditors is 
more predictable within the creditor protection model. Because the rights of creditors under 
this first model are systematically enforced by courts, and because jurisdictions 
systematically recognised their competence, there are little doubts on the interpretation of 
most norms. 
Moreover, while there are doubts regarding the normativity of certain of the norms 
underlying the anti-holdout model, the norms forming the creditor protection model are, on 
average, broadly considered to be normative and their interpretation is generally agreed upon. 
3.4.2 The Weaknesses of the Creditor Protection Model 
3.4.2.1 Collective Action Issues during Bond Restructuring 
The main weakness of the creditor protection model is that judicially empowering 
bondholders leads to inefficiencies during debt restructurings.  
Fundamentally, bonded sovereign debt restructurings face collective action problems in that 
the interests of each individual creditor are at odds with the interest of the creditor-base as a 
collective638. To put it simply, while each creditor can maximise its utility by refusing a 
haircut on its debt instrument, if all creditors do so, the debtor ultimately defaults thus 
leading to greater losses for all parties involved639.  
Moreover, during a restructuring, any holdout increases the haircut necessary for a debtor to 
return to debt sustainability, thus increasing the costs of restructurings for the other 
stakeholders.  
 
637 See, in general, Choi, Gulati and Posner (n 114). 
638 Gelpern, ‘How Collective Action Is Changing Sovereign Debt Cover Story’ (n 302); Dellas and Niepelt (n 
297). 
639 Gelpern, ‘How Collective Action Is Changing Sovereign Debt Cover Story’ (n 302); Dellas and Niepelt (n 
297). 
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As pointed out supra, this had not been an issue during the syndicated era of sovereign 
lending. First, lenders were incentivised towards helping sovereigns to reduce unsustainable 
debt burdens, as this would lead to future benefits. Second, the rules of syndication ensured 
that once a qualified majority of banks agreed to a restructuring deal, all banks would be 
bound by the agreement. Post-Brady plan, with bonds becoming the main instrument for 
sovereign indebtedness, this equilibrium was shattered. Contractually, any creditor could 
hold out and some actors had no incentives to ensure that the sovereign could return to debt 
sustainability.  
This led to two inter-related problems:  
First, holdouts have been able to disrupt restructuring processes by relying on the efficient 
remedies granted to creditors. This has led to more uncertainty during restructuring 
processes640, and overall increased costs for the sovereign and the rest of its creditor base.   
Second, efficient legal remedies, as they increase the likelihood of full repayment on 
sovereign bonds, economically incentivise holding out. The most notable example of this 
relationship is vulture fund litigation, efficient judicial remedies are essential to the arbitrage 
strategy of vulture funds. These remedies thus encourage these funds to purchase distressed 
debt and holdout during restructuring. 
The combination of those two issues has meant that under the creditor protection model, 
more creditors are encouraged to holdout and that when they do so the costs to the sovereign 
and the rest of the creditor-base are greater. 
3.4.2.2 Limits to Regulatory Tools Available to Sovereigns for Managing Debt Crises 
A second issue regarding the creditor protection model is that shielding sovereign debt from 
the regulatory reach of the debtor inherently limits the variety of tools available to the latter 
to manage debt crises.   
Fundamentally, choice-of-law clauses, currency clauses, and a narrow reading of the 
necessity defence, prevent sovereign debtors from using their legislative or regulatory 
powers to facilitate their restructuring processes. In particular, borrowing in a foreign 
 
640 In particular when litigation was directed at regulatory measures taken to facilitate the debt workout or has 
relied on the pari passu clause. 
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currency prevents the debtor from being able to devalue its money in order to meet payment 
obligations. This effect is compounded when the sovereign’s own currency, due to fears 
linked to its financial situation, loses value, forcing the borrower to purchase increasingly 
expensive foreign monies to face payment obligations641. 
Similarly, choice-of-law clauses prevent debtors from deploying legislative strategies to 
facilitate debt restructurings. As recently shown by Greece with its retroactive introduction 
of a CAC, such a solution not only speeds up a restructuring process but might also be desired 
by a vast majority of the sovereign’s creditors642.  
Finally, in international law, the narrow reading of the necessity defence prevents sovereigns 
from breaching their investment treaty obligations in the face of mounting economic 
pressure. Again, such a narrow reading, while it ex ante reassures creditors, limits the variety 
of strategies available to a sovereign when dealing with a sovereign debt crisis. 
This weakness of the creditor protection model should essentially be read as a trade-off. A 
State can borrow in its own currency and under its own laws, but if it is perceived as risky 
by market actors, it will do so at a potentially prohibitive premium. The irony of this trade-
off is that, as a rule, the States able to borrow using contractual instruments that they can 
regulatorily alter are those who are the least likely to need such intervention. A contrario, 
the States most likely to need all the available tools for managing a sovereign debt crisis 
often need to recourse to foreign-law and foreign-currency borrowing to fund themselves. 
3.4.2.3 Inefficient Restructurings, the Human Rights Costs of Debt Crises and Backlash 
against Global Liberal Institutions 
Inefficient debt restructurings, such as those caused by holdout litigation, are not only 
problematic from an economic standpoint but also have political and social ramifications.  
First, sovereign debt restructurings have well-documented negative effects on sovereign’s 
ability to fulfil their duties pertaining to their population’s social and political rights643. Thus, 
 
641 Flandreau and Sussman (n 114). 
642 See Iversen (n 164). 
643 Lumina, ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other Related International 
Financial Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Mission to Argentina)’ (n 6); Lumina, ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the Effects of 
Foreign Debt and Other Related International Financial Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of All 
Human Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Mission to Greece )’ (n 6); Sovereign Debt 
and Human Rights (n 70). 
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ensuring that sovereigns return to debt sustainability as smoothly as possible is not only 
economically efficient, but also limits the negative consequences of a debt crisis on a 
sovereign’s population. 
As such, when the creditor protection model, combined with bonded sovereign debt, 
encouraged holdouts and lengthened restructuring processes, the population of usually 
economically fragile States pays the price of inefficiency. This, understandably, fuelled anti-
capitalist or anti-debt movements, both within the global civil society, and resulted in the 
election by debtors of far-left or far-right parties, as exemplified by Greece’s election of 
Syriza, and the rise of the Golden Dawn party during its financial crisis644. 
Within this specific context, vulture fund litigation has fuelled anti-liberal rhetoric, both by 
debtor States governments and the broader public. The use of courts for arbitrage by those 
specialised hedge funds, as well as the fact that their profits emerged from speculations over 
a sovereign in economic distress has regularly sparked outrage. In particular, Elliott and 
NML’s reliance on domestic courts during the sister-funds decade-long sparring with 
Argentina enflamed the rhetoric of the Kirchner governments, leading it to characterise all 
holdouts as vultures and to vow not to accept any unfavourable decision from a US court645. 
Such a refusal to comply with a competent court’s decision, cannot help but threaten the rule 
of law at the international level.  
Against that background. holdout litigation was cast as the prototypical example of a global 
financial system gone mad and designed to serve the interest of the few over those of the 
many. The fact that vulture funds were the financial tools of billionaires hardly escaped the 
attention of the international press and helped fuel the backlash646. 
  
 
644 See e.g. Sofia Vasilopoulou and Daphne Halikiopoulou, ‘The Rise of the Golden Dawn in the Context of 
the Greek Crisis’ in Sofia Vasilopoulou and Daphne Halikiopoulou (eds), The Golden Dawn’s ‘Nationalist 
Solution’: Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Greece (Palgrave Macmillan US 2015) 
<https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137535917_2> accessed 27 March 2019. For an “insider” take on the question 
see Varoufakis (n 96). 
645 NML Capital, LTD., et al. v The Republic of Argentina (n 28); Porzecanski (n 164). 
646 See e.g. Renae Merle, ‘How One Hedge Fund Made $2 Billion from Argentina’s Economic Collapse’ The 
Washington Post (29 March 2016) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2016/03/29/how-
one-hedge-fund-made-2-billion-from-argentinas-economic-collapse/>; Greg Palast, ‘How Barack Obama 
Could End the Argentina Debt Crisis’ The Guardian (7 August 2014) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/economics-blog/2014/aug/07/argentina-debt-crisis-barack-obama-
paul-singer-vulture-funds> accessed 19 February 2020. 
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4. The Anti-holdout model  
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted the functioning of the creditor protection model and the 
role it played in the development of the collective action issues which plagued sovereign 
debt restructurings in the 1990s and 2000s. In the face of these issues, a realignment of the 
regulatory framework on sovereign debt was needed. The sum of the changes which 
occurred as a result can be understood as the anti-holdout model.  
At the heart of the anti-holdout model is the idea that, to be efficient, the law on sovereign 
debt ought to enable States to restructure unsustainable debts. As previously exposed, 
prompt and efficient sovereign debt restructurings are wealth-maximising since they enable 
a faster return of the sovereign to capital markets. More importantly, efficient debt 
restructurings limit the negative aspects of a sovereign debt crisis on the debtor’s finances, 
and therefore on its ability to fulfil the needs of its population647. 
This chapter 4 will first focus on the key components of the anti-holdout model, relying on 
domestic law examples to illustrate their functioning. Then, it will focus on their 
implementation in international law. The last section will be centred on the advantages and 
disadvantages of the anti-holdout model.  
4.2 A General Theory of the Anti-holdout model 
If the creditor protection model can be understood as a judicial way of creating credible 
commitment, the anti-holdout model is better summarised as a regulatory method to 
 
647 On the impact of debt restructurings and high debt burdens on a sovereign’s population see Lumina, 
Sovereign Debt and Human Rights (n 6); Lumina, ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign 
Debt and Other Related International Financial Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of All Human 
Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Mission to Argentina)’ (n 6); Lumina, ‘Report of 
the Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other Related International Financial Obligations 
of States on the Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Mission to Greece )’ (n 6). See also Olivier De Schutter, Sovereign Debt and the Right to Food (Oxford 
University Press 2018) 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198810445.001.0001/oso-9780198810445-
chapter-11> accessed 7 February 2020; Tim Jones, Sovereign Debt and the Right to Health (Oxford University 
Press 2018) <http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198810445.001.0001/oso-
9780198810445-chapter-12> accessed 7 February 2020; Gail Hurley, Sovereign Debt and the Right to 
Development (Oxford University Press 2018) 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198810445.001.0001/oso-9780198810445-
chapter-14> accessed 7 February 2020. 
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incentivise creditors towards accepting reasonable debt restructuring offers648. The anti-
holdout model has three essential components: majority decision making 649  during 
restructurings, a limitation of the remedies available to creditors, and the re-allocation of 
funds to facilitate the debtor’s return to debt sustainability. 
Overall, the anti-holdout model has two main effects on the creditor-debtor relationship. 
First, the costs of restructurings are shared by the entirety of the creditor base, and not just 
by the creditors having agreed to a restructuring offer. Second, as contesting restructuring 
processes is increasingly more difficult, debt restructurings are more certain, faster, and thus 
less costly650.  
In addition, the fact that restructurings have to be majoritarily agreed both fosters 
negotiations between creditors and debtors651 and strengthens the virtuous path-dependency 
between debtors and their larger creditors. The latter, being the largest bondholders, they 
effectively own the controlling share of a restructuring sovereign’s bonds and benefit from 
its return to debt sustainability. 
These effects do not mean that the anti-holdout model is a panacea for sovereign debt. As 
will be shown in the last section of this third chapter, the anti-holdout model provides little 
incentives for States to restructure their debts as early as they should. Moreover, its effects 
disproportionately affect small bondholders, and its implementation gives rise to risks of 
further fragmentation in the law on sovereign debt.  
Before delving into a more in depth analysis of the components of the anti-holdout model, 
the change in the actors responsible for law-making between both models ought to be 
 
648 A key question regarding the restructuring model is the definition of what constitutes a “reasonable” 
restructuring offer. Economically, a reasonable restructuring offer could be understood as a restructuring offer 
which provides sovereign with sufficient relief to return to debt sustainability while limiting as much as 
possible adverse effects on creditors. The problem with such an understanding of a reasonable debt 
restructuring is that it is often difficult to know ex ante, if a suggested haircut will be too small or too large. 
For the purpose of the restructuring model, this thesis understands a reasonable restructuring offer as one that 
is acceptable by a majority of a sovereign’s creditors.  
649 As opposed to restructurings on an ‘each-creditor for itself’ basis, as was the case under the creditor 
protection model. 
650 See e.g. Cephas Lumina, Curbing ‘Vulture Fund’ Litigation (Oxford University Press 2018) 504–505 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198810445.001.0001/oso-9780198810445-
chapter-27> accessed 7 February 2020; William W Bratton and G Mitu Gulati, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
and the Best Interest of Creditors’ (Social Science Research Network 2010) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 387880 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=387880> accessed 6 November 2015; John Coffee and William Klein, 
‘Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations’ 
(1991) 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1207. 
651 As finding a solution agreeable to a majority of creditors requires negotiating with the latter. See Matthias 
Goldmann, ‘Putting Your Faith in Good Faith: A Principled Strategy for Smoother Sovereign Debt Workouts’ 
(2016) 41 Yale Journal of international law 117. 
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mentioned. Essentially, the creditor protection model had been implemented in a relatively 
de-centralised manner, either by private parties, via contract drafting, or by courts and 
tribunals652.  
Within the anti-holdout model, the drivers of legal innovation are overwhelmingly 
governments, international organisations such as UNCTAD653 and the UNGA654, or other 
public agencies such as the IMF655 or ESM656. The inefficiencies examined supra can be 
read as a failure by market actors and judges to adapt sovereign debt regulation to the post-
Brady bond market. This, logically, warranted top-down involvement in sovereign debt 
regulation.  
The reasons behind this market failure are currently uncertain. Interviews with the lawyers 
drafting sovereign debt contract have yielded several possible explanations for the lack of 
change in sovereign debt’s contractual design: inertia, risk aversion, or simply high 
transaction costs657.  
Explaining why judges failed to adapt to the modern bond market when deciding on 
sovereign debt is more difficult. Moreover, the absence of qualitative research on the topic 
renders any such exercise purely speculative. It might be that judges, when deciding on 
sovereign debt restructurings, chose to make their decisions fit within the broader regulatory 
paradigm on sovereign debt. Thus, when the regulation on sovereign debt was tilted towards 
creditor protection, judges decided in a creditor protection fashion. When it is geared towards 
restructuring, they favour easier restructurings. While such a reading of events favours a 
vision of the judge as the impartial ‘mouth of the law’ rather than an actual law-maker, it has 
a fairly tautological quality in a legal environment where judicial law-making plays a central 
role. Alternatively, one could read this failure of judicial adaptation as fitting within the 
narrative that the law is reactive to social changes. Under that reading, when the ‘real life’ 
conditions of sovereign lending were altered, there was a lag during which the regulatory 
 
652 While changes in the law of immunities were undoubtedly the result of government intervention, the 
application of said law of immunities to sovereign debt was the result of judicial interpretation. Similarly, the 
characterisation of sovereign bonds as investments was a product of judicial interpretation, so was the rateable 
interpretation payment of the pari passu clause, etc. For an overview of the public sector involvement in 
Greece’s restructuring see notably Philip R Wood, ‘How the Greek Debt Reorganisation of 2012 Changed the 
Rules of Sovereign Insolvency’ (2013) 14 Business Law International 3. 
653 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (n 21). 
654 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Resolution 69/319: Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Processes’ (n 22). 
655 International Monetary Fund (n 13). 
656 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (Brussels) 2012. 
657 On this question see Gulati and Scott (n 75); Weidemaier, Scott and Gulati (n 75). 
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paradigm remained unchanged. The anti-holdout model can thus be read as the law ‘catching 
up’ with the real world.  
Regardless of its causes however, it is undeniable that this failure to adapt to the new bond 
market by the lawmakers for sovereign debt had to be remedied and that the logical entities 
for doing so were the aforementioned public entities. 
4.2.1 Majority Decision-Making during Restructuring 
4.2.1.1 Majority Decision Making: Overview 
The first component of the anti-holdout model is majoritarian debt restructurings. 
Acceptance of the restructuring proposal under the anti-holdout model is not decided by each 
creditor for themselves, but by a majority or qualified majority of creditors, binding the 
minority to their decisions658. 
Majoritarian debt restructurings provide several advantages. First, because a minority of 
bondholders is bound by the decision of the majority, the possibilities for holdout litigation 
are limited659. This, logically, fosters certainty as the results of the restructuring negotiation 
cannot be challenged. 
Second, majoritarian restructurings incentivise sovereigns and their creditors towards 
negotiated solutions to sovereign debt crises660. If support by a qualified majority of creditors 
is required for a debt restructuring to go forward, States have to negotiate with their creditors 
in order to garner sufficient support for their restructuring offer to be accepted661. Moreover, 
these negotiations also strengthen the legitimacy of the restructuring process662. Indeed, 
under the previous system for debt restructurings States have on occasion contented 
 
658 Majoritarian debt restructuring was already one of they components of the SDRM system pushed forward 
by the IMF see Krueger (n 76). 
659 This, inherently, is the logic behind the insertion of collective action clauses.  
660 See Goldmann, ‘Putting Your Faith in Good Faith: A Principled Strategy for Smoother Sovereign Debt 
Workouts’ (n 651). 
661 ibid 131. 
662 Such legitimacy would stem from the participatory nature of the negotiation process as well as its perceived 
democracy. On issues of legitimacy within the current “non-system” of sovereign debt workouts see Odette 
Lienau, ‘The Challenge of Legitimacy in Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ (2016) 57 Harvard international law 
Journal 151. See also Terence Halliday, ‘Legitimacy, Technology, and Leverage:  The Building Blocks of 
Insolvency Architecture in the Decade Past and the Decade Ahead’ (2007) 32 Brooklyn Journal of international 
law <https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol32/iss3/13>. 
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themselves with providing their creditors with ‘take it or leave it’ offers, threatening not to 
pay any creditors who refused to take the haircut on their bonds663.  
It should be noted that the majority here is not understood as being calculated on a per virem 
basis, but on a bond-by-bond basis. The fact that, under the anti-holdout model, majorities 
are estimated on such a basis further enhances the likelihood of prompt and efficient 
restructurings. Essentially, in any given restructuring scenario it is likely that the bulk of a 
sovereign’s bonded debt is held by large financial institutions664  with vulture fund and 
individual holdings being comparatively marginal.  As was pointed out during this thesis’ 
analysis of the syndicated loan market, large financial institutions benefit from a fast return 
of the sovereign to debt sustainability as said return provides them with future benefits. 
When those large creditors are banking institutions, regulatory capital adequacy 
requirements enable them to withstand the costs engendered by a haircut on their sovereign 
debt holdings665, ensuring that said institutions will not be threatened by sovereign failure. 
This further ensures that they will agree to reasonable restructuring offers. Moreover, larger 
creditors can purchase credit default swaps (CDS) on their sovereign bonds666. Sovereign 
CDS enable their buyer to obtain payment from the seller to off-set the default risks attached 
to the bonds of a sovereign. In practice this means that institutional investors 667  have 
 
663 See e.g. Argentina’s first offers to its creditors during its 2000s crisis discussed in Miller and Thomas, 
‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ (n 73) 1492. 
664 IMF, ‘Sovereign Investor Base Dataset for Emerging Markets’ (n 3). 
665 Within the EU, capital adequacy requirements are implemented via directive. See ‘Directive 2013/36/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions 
and the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, Amending Directive 2002/87/EC 
and Repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC Text with EEA Relevance’ <https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013L0036>; Katarzyna Sum, ‘Basel III: 
Assessment of the Guidelines for Regulatory Reform’ in Katarzyna Sum (ed), Post-Crisis Banking Regulation 
in the European Union: Opportunities and Threats (Springer International Publishing 2016) 
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41378-5_2> accessed 26 September 2019; Mark Petersen and Janine 
Mukuddem-Peterson, Basel III Liquidity Regulation and Its Implications. 
666 Credit default swaps are financial derivatives in which a “seller of protection (…) agrees to pay the buyer 
of protection (…) an amount if during an agreed period a prescribed credit event occurs (…) in relation to an 
greed reference obligation of a reference entity.” Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance (n 253) 
433. To put it simply a credit derivative is a financial instrument whose function is to provide it buyer a quasi-
insurance or guarantee if during an agreed period of time the obligations of an agreed issuer are subject to a 
downgrade in credit-worthiness, an event of default and/or a restructuring. There are differences between a 
CDS and an insurance or a guarantee. Notably, as opposed to guarantees, CDSs apply to events beyond mere 
non payment. As opposed to both guarantees and insurance contract, the holder of a CDS need not be the holder 
of the reference transaction and there is no automatic subrogation of the protection seller to the protection buyer 
once the transaction has been settled. ibid 434. 
667 The Over the Counter (OTC) credit derivatives market is largely regulated under ISDA master agreement. 
The ISDA master agreement is a standard agreement covering derivatives trading (except repos and 
stocklending), as well as the netting and the set-off linked to derivatives transactions. Participation to 
transactions under the ISDA Master Agreement are typically limited to entities demonstrating that they possess 
the financial ability to withstand the losses that derivative trading can lead to. Ths fundamentally excludes most 
retail investors from the OTC derivatives market. On the ISDA master agreement see Wood, Law and Practice 
of International Finance (n 253) 440–442. 
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financial tools available to off-set the costs of debt restructurings, thus further incentivising 
them to collaborate with the debtor668. 
4.2.2.2 Majority Decision Making in Sovereign Debt Contracts: Collective Action Clauses 
Collective action clauses (or CACs) are contractual clauses allowing for modifying payment 
terms (either the amount or the maturity of the bond) across several bond issuances via a 
vote by bondholders, usually requiring a qualifying majority669. The scope of CACs varies, 
ranging from encompassing a single bond issue, aggregating several of them670, or binding 
the entirety of the bondholders of a sovereign671. Their introduction in sovereign bonds 
predates the model shift to restructuring protection, with the first clauses of this type in US 
bonds being introduced as early as 1997 in Kazakh bonds672. 
However, following vulture fund litigation CACs became widespread, with the US 
treasury673, the IMF674 and the European Stability Mechanism675 pushing for their insertion 
in all bonds676. Moreover, CACs have been a central element of the Greek restructuring 
 
668 Following the Greek financial crisis notably, purchase of sovereign CDS on southern European debtors has 
dramatically risen, seemingly indicating a desire by financial institutions to hedge their positions on bonds 
emitted by those sovereigns. See IMF, ‘Global Financial Stability Report, Chapter 2: A New Look at the Role 
of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps’ <https://www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/IMF/imported-flagship-
issues/external/pubs/ft/GFSR/2013/01/pdf/_c2pdf.ashx+&cd=4&hl=fr&ct=clnk&gl=uk>. 
669 Bratton and Gulati (n 650); Buchheit, ‘Restructuring a Nation’s Debt Capital Markets’ (n 79). 
670 Gelpern, ‘How Collective Action Is Changing Sovereign Debt Cover Story’ (n 302); Liu and others (n 90); 
Leland Goss, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring Made Easy Special Focus: Debt Capital Markets in Association 
with the ICMA’ (2013) 32 International Financial Law Review 62. Technically, collective action clauses can 
be divided in four main types: majority action clauses, which enable a majority of bondholder to alter 
contractual dispositions, collective representation clause, which establish a representative forum for debtor-
creditor cooperation, sharing clauses share proceeds obtained from the debtor amongst creditors and 
acceleration clauses requiring a minimum creditor support for payment acceleration in case of default. 
Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (n 5) 111. When this thesis refers to CACs 
it only focuses on majority action clauses since they have been the most discussed type of clause, both in the 
legal scholarship on sovereign debt and in the public sector. Moreover, it seems that market practice similarly 
has opted for this type of CAC. ibid 111–112. For an early scholarly writing in favour of using CACs see John 
Taylor, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A US Perspective. Speech at the Conference “Sovereign Debt 
Workouts: Hopes and Hazards”. Institute for International Economics’ 
<https://www.piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/sovereign-debt-restructuring-us-perspective>. 
671 Anna Gelpern, Ben Heller and Brat Setser, ‘Count the Limbs. Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses in 
Sovereign Bonds’, Too Little Too Late: The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises (Columbia University 
Press 2016). 
672 Megliani, Sovereign Debt (n 50) 59. Prior to this push, CACs had been a usual feature of English law bonds. 
Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (n 5) 111. 
673 Mark Sobel, ‘Strengthening Collective Action Clauses: Catalysing Change—the Back Story’ (2016) 11 
Capital Markets Law Journal 3. 
674 International Monetary Fund, ‘Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action 
Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ [2014] IMF Policy Paper 
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/090214.pdf>. 
675 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (Brussels). 
676 Prior to this push, CACs had been a usual feature of English law bonds. Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects 
of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (n 5) 111. 
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process, with large creditors requiring their introduction in Greek domestic bonds before 
accepting any restructuring offer from the Hellenic State677. 
The ICMA has issued a standardised version of the CAC678, allowing for three different 
voting techniques. The standard clause provides norms regarding the convening and conduct 
of a meeting of bondholders in order to allow a vote. It also gives guidance regarding the 
production of written resolutions by bondholders for the same purpose.  Under the standard 
drafting, a restructuring of a single bond issue can be achieved by a “a Single Series 
Extraordinary Resolution or a Single Series Written Resolution”679 of the bondholders.  
The ICMA standard clause defines a Single Series Extraordinary Resolution as: 
“a resolution passed at a meeting of Noteholders duly convened and held in accordance 
with the procedures prescribed by the Issuer and the [Fiscal Agent/Trustee/other 
bondholder representative] pursuant to paragraph (a) (Convening Meetings of 
Noteholders; Conduct of Meetings of Noteholders; Written Resolutions) by a majority of:  
A. in the case of a Reserved Matter680, at least 75 per cent. of the aggregate principal 
amount of the outstanding Notes; or  
B. in the case of a matter other than a Reserved Matter, more than 50 per cent. of 
the aggregate principal amount of the outstanding Notes.”681 
It defines a Single Series Written Resolution as “a resolution in writing signed or 
confirmed in writing by or on behalf of the holders of:  
 
677 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18); Boudreau (n 90); Buchheit, ‘Restructuring a Nation’s Debt Capital 
Markets’ (n 79). 
678 International Capital Market Association, ‘Standard Aggregated Collective Action Clauses (“CACS”) for 
the Terms and Condictions of Sovereign Notes’ <https://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-
Practice/Primary-Markets/primary-market-topics/collective-action-clauses/>. The ICMA is a self-regulatory 
organisation tasked with providing financial actors, (especially European ones) with standardised contractual 
provisions in order to improve the overall efficiency of financial market. Ramanna Vishwanath and 
Chandrasekhar Krishnamurti, Investment Management: A Modern Guide to Security Analysis and Stock 
Selection (Springer Science & Business Media 2009) 43. 
679 International Capital Market Association (n 678). 
680 Reserved matter is understood inter alia  ¸as any changes to the payment conditions of the bond (payment, 
interest rates, principal, maturity, currency), a change on the condition of the vote by bondholders, a change of 
governing law or competent jurisdiction regarding the bonds, a debt swap or debt conversion, a change to the 
definition of Reserved Matter, or the issuance of securities or guarantees by the debtor.  
681 International Capital Market Association (n 678). 
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A. in the case of a Reserved Matter, at least 75 per cent. of the aggregate principal 
amount of the outstanding Notes; or  
B. in the case of a matter other than a Reserved Matter more than 50 per cent. of the 
aggregate principal amount of the outstanding Notes. 
Any Single Series Written Resolution may be contained in one document or several 
documents in the same form, each signed or confirmed in writing by or on behalf of one 
or more Noteholders.”682. 
Thus, payment conditions on a single bond issue can be modified either by obtaining a 
written agreement by 75% of the bondholders 683  or by convening a meeting of the 
bondholders during which a vote is issued.  
For a restructuring across several issues, the ICMA model clause offers two voting models: 
Single-limb voting and double-limb voting. Under the first option, modifications to a 
Reserved Matter across several bond issues requires either obtaining a two-thirds majority 
of votes across all bonds, organising separate meetings of bondholders for each bond issue 
or, obtaining a written agreement from 75% of the bondholders684.  
Finally, several bond issues can be restructured, under the standardised ICMA CAC via a 
Multiple Series Two Limb Extraordinary Resolution. A Multiple Series Two Limb 
Extraordinary Resolution means: 
“a resolution considered at separate meetings of the holders of each affected series of 
Debt Securities Capable of Aggregation (…) which is passed by a majority of:  
A. at least 662 /3 per cent. of the aggregate principal amount of the 
outstanding debt securities of affected series of Debt Securities Capable 
of Aggregation (taken in aggregate); and  
 
682 ibid. 
683 Under the clause, the votes are computed by bond and not by bondhoder. In other words, the rule for CAC 
sis one bond = one vote, and not one man = one vote. It should however be noted that certain bonds can be 
excluded from the count if they are held by the debtor or an entity controlled by the debtor, in order to avoid 
conflict of interest.  
684 International Capital Market Association (n 678). 
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B. more than 50 per cent. of the aggregate principal amount of the 
outstanding debt securities in each affected series of Debt Securities 
Capable of Aggregation (taken individually).”685 
Several bond issues can similarly via a "Multiple Series Two Limb Written Resolution"686. 
Under the two limbs voting system a double majority of bondholders need to be reached: a 
two thirds majority within each bond issue as well as a simple majority across all issues687. 
CACs are one of the central features of the contemporary regulatory model on sovereign 
debt688. Their insertion in the vast majority of sovereign bonds effectively implements 
majoritarian debt restructuring at the contractual level. Under the contractual regime 
inaugurated by CACs, the only way for a bondholder to refuse a modification to their bonds 
is to acquire a controlling share in bond issues covered by a same collective action clause, a 
task which, while not impossible, can be extremely costly given the sums involved689. 
4.2.2 Limiting the Remedies Available to Creditors 
4.2.2.1 Limiting the Remedies Available to Creditors: Overview 
The second component of the creditor protection model is a limitation of the remedies 
available to creditors. This limitation has taken three different forms, in direct contrast to the 
components of the creditor protection model: 
First, access to courts and tribunals for creditors has been curbed. This limits the likelihood 
of creditors obtaining efficient remedies and limits the uncertainties tied to enforcement 
attempts against restructuring sovereigns. Second, exceptions to State’s obligations 
regarding sovereign debt have been carved. This, not only limits creditors’ ability to obtain 
payment, but also enables sovereign debtors to deploy regulatory tools to facilitate their debt 
 
685 ibid. 
686 It means the aggregation of votes for “each resolution in writing (with a separate resolution in writing or 
multiple separate resolutions in writing distributed to the holders of each affected series (…) which, when 
taken together, has been signed or confirmed in writing by or on behalf of the holders of: (A) at least 662 /3 
per cent. of the aggregate principal amount of the outstanding debt securities of all the affected series of Debt 
Securities Capable of Aggregation (taken in aggregate); and (B) more than 50 per cent. of the aggregate 
principal amount of the outstanding debt securities in each affected series of Debt Securities Capable of 
Aggregation (taken individually). ibid. 
687 Gelpern, Heller and Setser (n 11). 
688 On the importance of CACs see Weidemaier and Gulati (n 11); Stolper and Dougherty (n 11). 
689 This issue is further compounded when several bond issues are covered by a same CAC.  
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restructurings. Finally, the efficiency of the remedies granted to creditors has been limited. 
This similarly reduces the disruptive effects of successful enforcement attempts by creditors. 
In addition to those effects, the limitation of remedies available acts as an incentive against 
holding out on reasonable restructuring offer. With the obtention of efficient remedies for 
creditors less likely, reliance on courts and tribunals as a way for economic actors to obtain 
payment, is rendered increasingly uncertain. The same applies to the likely pay-off for 
litigation since the means available to coerce a State towards repaying have been curbed690. 
To use an imperfect analogy, if one understands that holdout litigation is a gamble by 
creditors to obtain full payment, the limitation of available remedies lowers the odds of 
winning without lowering the downsides. The equilibrium in this situation is that creditors 
are incentivised against holding out and relying on litigation. These incentives, as will be 
seen, are more efficient against vulture funds since their investing strategy is expressly based 
on the likelihood of obtaining a favourable outcome through judicial means. 
CACs play a central role in limiting creditor’s access to courts. As previously explained, as 
the activation of collective action clauses change the content of the contractual obligations 
owed by the sovereign, any action for breach based on the original contractual conditions is 
impossible. However, CACs, while undeniably effective in limiting holdout litigation are 
not a universal solution. First, it is theoretically possible for a creditor to obtain a controlling 
share of bonds covered by a same CAC, thus enabling them to retain their ability to sue691. 
Moreover, prior to a CACs’ activation, or if a vote fails, creditors retain the ability to litigate 
against the debtor. Finally, while the share of bonds featuring CACs is rising there remains 
series lacking the now standard clause, thus litigation on these bonds remains possible692.  
Therefore, a series of other domestic legislation, contractual innovations and interpretations 
have been put forward to limit the availability of judicial remedies to creditors of distressed 
sovereigns. The following sections will focus on three of these: the rank of payment drafting, 
 
690 The limitation of remedies available to creditors means that the average likely amount of money potentially 
obtainable via litigation is smaller. 
691 Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (n 5) 111. 
692 For a broader overview of the limits on the current contractual model for sovereign debt restructuring see 
notably Richard Gitlin and Brent House, ‘Contractual and Voluntary Approaches to Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring - There Is Still More to Do’, Too Little, Too Late. The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises. 
M. Guzman, J. Ocampo, J. Stiglitz (eds) (Columbia University Press 2016); James A Haley, ‘Sovereign Debt 
Restucturing. A Coasean Perpsective’, Too Little, Too Late. The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises. M. 
Guzman, J. Ocampo, J. Stiglitz (eds) (Columbia University Press 2016). 
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and interpretation, of the pari passu clause, the Belgian Anti-Vulture Fund Act and 
dispositions limiting the ability of creditors to attach a sovereign’s assets. 
4.2.2.2 Alternative Readings of the pari passu clause 
The rank of payment interpretation of the pari passu clause reads the clause as requiring 
creditors to not create any other debt instrument ranking senior to those containing the 
clause693. In practice, it prevents the creation by the State of secured debt694, or the emission 
of other types of senior debt by a sovereign695. 
The US New-York Southern District Court in the import-export bank of China v. Grenada696 
case features such a reading of the clause.  The case concerned four loan agreements between 
the ex-imp. Bank and the Republic of Grenada for a total over $20 million697. Grenada had 
issued a memorandum stating that it would not pay any non-restructured debt and made 
substantial payments on its external debt, but not on the four loans in question698. The District 
Court ruled that given the fact that Grenada had not taken any legislative actions to ensure 
the subordination of the loan agreements, the pari passu clause was not breached699. There 
were differences between the Ex-Imp case and the Elliot and NML decisions. First, the 
wording of the pari passu clause in Grenada’s credit instruments was more restrictive than 
the one in the NML case700. Second, as opposed to Argentina, Grenada had not legislated 
regarding payment to holdouts701.  
From a strict legalistic perspective, the difference in the behaviour of Argentina and Grenada 
does not seem to be a decisive factor for justifying such a decision. The Argentinean bonds 
 
693 Zamour (n 74). 
694 The emission of secured debt is now a rarity within the sovereign debt market. However, it used to be 
common in the early XXth century for States to guarantee bonds by attaching specific revenue streams to their 
repayments. Lee Buchheit, following archival research on the pari passu clause mentions in particular a Greek 
bond secured against the payments of a specific tobacco tax. Such practice fell into disuse as, in the era of 
absolute jurisdictional immunities, attaching the assets used by the State to secure the debt was impossible. 
Buchheit and Pam (n 14). 
695 On the distinction between rateable payment and rank of payment interpretations of the clause see Rodrigo 
Olivares-Caminal, ‘Rank Pari Passu or Not to Rank Pari Passu: That Is the Question in Sovereign Bonds after 
the Latest Episode of the Argentine Saga’ (2009) 15 Law and Business Review of the Americas 745; Zamour 
(n 74). 
696  Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada (n 28). For a broader commentary on the 
significance of the Ex-Imp case see Joseph Cotterill, ‘Sovereign Pari Passu and the Litigators of the Lost Cause’ 
(2014) 9 Capital Markets Law Journal 18. 
697 Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada (n 22) para 1-2. 
698 Ibid. 
699Ibid para 6. 
700 NML Capital, LTD., et al. v The Republic of Argentina (n 22), pp 6-8. 
701 ibid; Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada (n 22) para 1-2. 
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at cause in NML were issued under US law702. Thus, law-making by Argentina could not 
have had an impact upon the ranking of the bonds, or the obligation of Argentina regarding 
its bondholders. There is therefore little difference between enacting a “Lock Law”703 and 
issuing a memorandum having the same effect. Rather than factual differences being the 
determining factor for the disparity between the NML and Em-Imp decisions, it seems should 
thus be read as adopting a more restrictive reading of the clause.  
In addition to this alternative judicial interpretation, international institutions advocated for 
an improved drafting of the clause, limiting its disruptive effects 704 . Thus, the ICMA 
standard pari passu clause now reads: 
“The Notes are the direct, unconditional and unsecured obligations of the Issuer and 
rank and will rank pari passu, without preference among themselves, with all other 
unsecured External Indebtedness of the Issuer, from time to time outstanding, provided, 
however, that the Issuer shall have no obligation to effect equal or rateable payment(s) 
at any time with respect to any such other External Indebtedness and, in particular, shall 
have no obligation to pay other External Indebtedness at the same time or as a condition 
of paying sums due on the Notes and vice versa”705. 
Similarly, the IMF’s Executive Board endorsed in 2014 the inclusion of a similar “enhanced 
pari passu provision” within sovereign bonds706.  
Given the adverse effects that the rank of payment interpretation of the clause had on 
restructuring processes, and given its potential efficiency in coercing most sovereigns 
towards repayment, it is undeniable that this narrowing of the clause should be read as a 
 
702 NML Capital, LTD., et al. v The Republic of Argentina (n 22) pp 6-8. 
703 See e.g. Ley  26017 -Deuda Publica, Bonos - Disposiciones adicionales 2005 (Boletín Oficial) 1, 26; 
Decreto 1735/2007 Establécense los alcances, términos y condiciones del proceso de reestructuración de la 
deuda del Estado Nacional instrumentada en los bonos cuyo pago fue objeto de diferimiento según lo dispuesto 
por el Artículo 59 de la Ley No 25.827, mediante una operación de canje nacional e internacional. Suplemento 
de Prospecto, aplicable a la oferta internacional. Procedimiento Operativo para la República Argentina. Valor 
nominal máximo de los bonos que serán emitidos, Bonos Internacionales de la República Argentina y Bonos 
de la República Argentina. Modelo de Convenio de Fideicomiso. (n 372). There is however a difference 
between the Ex-Imp memorandum and the Lock Law. Grenada, in its memorandum promised to pay the 
restructured debt first, and then, if possible, the holdout, in a fashion similar to Peru’s in the Elliott case, while 
Argentina in the Lock Law plainly refused payment to holdouts. Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China 
v. Grenada (n 28); Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion (n 28); NML Capital, LTD., et al. v The Republic 
of Argentina (n 28). 
704 It appears that in English law, a similar rank of payment interpretation of the clause has been adopted. See 
Lachlan Burn, ‘Pari Passu Clauses: English Law after NML v Argentina’ (2014) 9 Capital Markets Law Journal 
2; Kupelyants (n 53) 299. 
705 International Capital Markets Association (n 12). 
706 International Monetary Fund (n 13). 
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limitation of creditors’ remedies. In the contemporary sovereign debt market, the likelihood 
that a State will create senior categories of debt by assigning securities or ear-marking 
revenue flows for a specific bond are slim707. Therefore, the rank of payment version of the 
clause renders it pointless in the current setting. 
An alternate, but equally restrictive position on the clause has been pushed forward by the 
Brussels’ Court of appeal in Republic of Nicaragua vs. LNC Investment LLC and Euroclear 
Bank SA708. The Case opposed LNC and the Republic of Nicaragua, the former pursuing 
execution of a judgment granted in 1999 by a US court providing compensation for a former 
Nicaraguan default709. While the lower Belgian court followed the Elliott interpretation, the 
Brussels court of appeal reversed its previous jurisprudence. In its second foray within the 
debate on pari passu, the court refused to allow LNC, to prevent Euroclear from transferring 
payment on restructured Nicaraguan bonds, in stark contract to its previous Elliott 
decision710. It held that an injunction against the clearing house could not be granted since 
Euroclear was not complicit in the payment of interest in violation of the pari passu clause711. 
In other words, according to the court, a mere breach of the clause by Peru is not sufficient 
for determining whether Euroclear can be coerced into stopping payment from flowing, 
rather, what matters is Euroclear’s behaviour in concreto712.  
As with the rank of payment interpretation of the clause, such a reading, anchoring itself on 
the notion of privity of contract and third-party complicity, effectively limits the ability of 
creditors to disrupt sovereign debt restructurings by relying on the clause.  
Finally, a fourth potential interpretation of the clause was advanced in the 2012 NML 
decision713. As exposed in the first part of this thesis, the remedy granted to NML by the 
district court and the court of Appeal for the violation of the pari passu clause fits within the 
creditor protection model. It seems however that the court, in its interpretation of the clause 
itself echoes the concerns behind the anti-holdout model. To recall, the roots of the case lie 
in the Argentinean restructuring of the early 2000's and the adoption by Argentina of the 
2005 Lock Law714. Argentina pleaded that the pari passu clause as integrated in its bonds 
 
707 See notably the analysis in Buchheit and Pam (n 14). 
708 Republic of Nicaragua v LNC Investment LLC (n 398). 
709 ibid. 
710 Elliott Assocs., L.P. (n 323). 
711 Republic of Nicaragua v LNC Investment LLC (n 398). 
712 ibid. 
713 NML Capital, LTD., et al. v The Republic of Argentina (n 28). 
714 ibid pp 6-8. 
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only applied to cases of de lege subordination715, while NML capital argued that it also 
encompassed de facto subordination, such as the one created by the Lock Law716. 
The Court of Appeal decided that: 
“the combination of Argentina’s executive declarations and legislative enactments have 
ensured that plaintiffs’ beneficial interests do not remain direct, unconditional, 
unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic and that any claims that may 
arise from the Republic’s restructured debt do have priority in Argentinian courts over 
claims arising out of the Republic’s unstructured debt.”717. 
Thus under the NML reading, the clause has been breached not because Argentina failed to 
provide the fund with rateable payment. Rather, Argentina’s behaviour in litis and out of 
courts made clear that it intended to subordinate NML’s debt, triggering the clause. 
Strikingly, this standard of behaviour is less constraining upon the debtor as the rateable 
interpretation of the clause laid out in Elliott718. 
In addition to this narrower interpretation of the clause, the Court of Appeal in NML also 
takes in consideration the effects of its ruling on the sovereign debt market. The Court of 
Appeal underlines, regarding the potential effects of the remedy granted to NML for the 
violation of the clause: 
“99% of the aggregate value of New York-law bonds issued since January 2005, 
including [the Exchange Bonds]. Only 5 of 211 issuances under New York law during 
that period did not include collective action clauses, and all of those issuances came from 
a single nation, Jamaica. Moreover, none of the bonds issued by Greece, Portugal or 
Spain – nations identified by Argentina as the next in line for restructuring – are governed 
by New York Law.”719 
 
715 NML Capital, LTD., et al. v The Republic of Argentina (n 22), p. 16. 
716ibid.. 
717 ibid p 20. 
718 ibid; Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion (n 22). On this question see Zamour (n 42). 
719 NML Capital, LTD., et al. v The Republic of Argentina (n 22) p 8. 
The Anti-holdout model  147 
The Court of Appeal, in other words, justifies its decision to grant NML extraordinary 
remedies by arguing that given the current state of bond drafting, protecting creditors in such 
a way does not lead to collective action issues720.  
It is useful to read NML as a transitional case between both models. The Court of Appeal for, 
as per the anti-holdout model, that granting creditors exorbitant remedies in the modern bond 
market is inefficient. However, given what the court sees as the extraordinary circumstances 
of the case, and given that bond drafting had evolved since Elliott, the Court decided to 
protect NML against Argentina’s behaviour by requiring rateable payment.  
Despite the concerns expressed in NML, it seems undeniable that the general trend regarding 
the pari passu clause is towards a limitation of creditors’ remedies designed to limit their 
detrimental effects on restructuring processes. 
4.2.2.3 The Belgian Anti-Vulture Fund Act 
The second piece of domestic law limiting the remedies available to creditors examined in 
this thesis is the Belgian “Anti-Vulture Fund Act”721. The Belgian act, ratione materiae, has 
a limited scope, it applies solely to vulture funds, defined in the act as creditors active on the 
secondary market, and seeking to obtain an illegitimate gain through the purchase of 
sovereign credit instruments722.  
The characterisation of as an illegitimate gain for the purpose of the act requires a two-tiered 
test. First, the difference between the price of the credit instrument held by the debtor and 
its nominative value, or the amount the creditor seeks to obtain, must be ‘manifestly 
disproportionate’723. Second, in addition, the transaction must fulfil at least two of the 
conditions enumerated in the act724. 
 
720 Zamour (n 74). 
721 Loi du 12 juillet 2015 relative à la lutte contre les activités des fonds vautours. For a broader analysis of the 
act see Lucas Wozny, ‘National Anti-Vulture Funds Legislation: Belgium’s Turn Survey: The New Activists 
and Corporate Governance: Notes’ (2017) 2017 Columbia Business Law Review 697; Alexandre Belle, ‘La 
Loi Belge Anti-Fonds Vautours Au Sein Du Droit International Sur La Dette Souveraine : Le Droit National 
Comme Outil de Signalement et de Gestion de Risques de Défaut’ (2019) 2018 Revue Belge de Droit 
International / Belgian Review of international law 152. 
722 Loi du 12 juillet 2015 relative à la lutte contre les activités des fonds vautours. 
723 ibid. 
724 (1)The debtor must be defaulting or clause to default at the time of the purchase of the debt titles. (2) The 
creditor is incorporated in a tax haven. (3) The creditor has systematically used legal proceedings against the 
sovereign debtor in order to obtain payment on its debt titles. (4) The debtor is undergoing a restructuring 
process and the creditor has refused to take part in said process. (5) The creditor has abused of the debtor’s 
weakness to negotiate a disproportionate settlement agreement. (6) Payment of the sums asked by the creditor 
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If a creditor is characterised as a vulture fund for the purpose of the act, then the amount 
obtainable either in payment, or in execution, before Belgian tribunals is capped at the 
market value of its credit titles at the moment of their purchase725.  
The Belgian anti-vulture act is unique as it is, at today’s, date the sole piece of legislation 
seeking to prevent vulture funds from benefitting of secondary market purchases. Its 
functioning is inspired by the abuse of rights doctrine and the “lésion qualifiée”726 theory – 
the acceptance that a disproportion between two obligations can lead to the rescission of a 
contract727. The first of these legal constructions features heavily within the international law 
elements of the restructuring protection model, as exposed infra. 
From a comparative law perspective, the act uses notion close to the common law champerty 
defence, analysed in chapter 3728. The purpose of the Belgian act is, as the champerty defence, 
to prevent creditors to use civil courts as a way to profit from speculation729. The Belgian 
act, according to the travaux préparatoires pursues a double objective by focusing on vulture 
funds. The first is to prevent the acquisition of “immoral gains” using Belgian courts and 
tribunals730. The second, more relevant purpose, is to strike against the disruption caused by 
vulture funds within the sovereign debt market731. 
The Belgian Anti-Vulture Fund Act, fundamentally, is designed as an incentive against 
vulture fund litigation732. It caps the amount that can be obtained through Belgian courts and 
 
would have an unfavourable impact on the public finances of the State debtor and is susceptible to compromise 
the socio-economic development of its population. ibid; Wozny (n 721); Belle (n 721). 
725 Loi du 12 juillet 2015 relative à la lutte contre les activités des fonds vautours. 
726 ibid; ‘Proposition de Loi Relative à La Lutte Contre Les Activités Des Fonds Vautours, Doc. Parl., Ch. 
Repr., 19 Juin 2015, N°54-1057/003’ 
<http://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/flwb&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/flwb/flwb
n.cfm?lang=F&legislat=54&dossierID=1057>. 
727 The lésion qualifiée theory does not stem directly from the civil code but is a judicial innovation. In Belgian 
law see Cour de Cassation (Belgique) arret du 10 Septembre 1971 (1972) 1 Pasicrisie 28. For an overview of 
the theory’s role in contract law see notably Catherine Goux, ‘L’erreur, le dol et la lésion qualifiée: analyse et 
comparaisons’ <https://researchportal.unamur.be/en/publications/lerreur-le-dol-et-la-l%C3%A9sion-
qualifi%C3%A9e-analyse-et-comparaisons> accessed 20 February 2020. 
728 RD Cox, ‘Champerty as We Know It’ (1982) 13 Memphis State University Law Review 139. 
729 ibid; ‘Proposition de Loi Relative à La Lutte Contre Les Activités Des Fonds Vautours, Doc. Parl., Ch. 
Repr., 19 Juin 2015, N°54-1057/003’ (n 726). 
730 ‘Proposition de Loi Relative à La Lutte Contre Les Activités Des Fonds Vautours, Doc. Parl., Ch. Repr., 19 
Juin 2015, N°54-1057/003’ (n 726). 
731 It should be noted here that vulture funds used the Belgian courts and tribunals on multiple occasion. First 
by seeking to attach payment flowing through Euroclear, seated in Bruxelles by using the pari passu clause, as 
exposed supra; second by seeking unsuccessfully to enforce court decision on the accounts of the Argentinean 
embassy in Bruxelles. Elliott Assocs., L.P. (n 323); Republic of Nicaragua v LNC Investment LLC (n 398); 
République d’Argentine c. NML Capital LTD (n 407); ‘Proposition de Loi Relative à La Lutte Contre Les 
Activités Des Fonds Vautours, Doc. Parl., Ch. Repr., 19 Juin 2015, N°54-1057/003’ (n 726). 
732 In that context, the anti-vulture fund act only seeks to disincentivise one specific category of holdouts, 
vulture funds. Because the amount used by the act is the price of the bonds paid by the bondholder, it is unlikely 
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tribunals to the market value of the bonds733. As vulture funds act as arbitrageurs, profiting 
from the difference between the market value of the bonds and their legal value734, the act 
shuts down their profit window, making it impossible for a vulture funds to raise profits by 
relying Belgian courts and tribunals. 
4.2.2.4 Legislation reinforcing Sovereign Immunities 
A final way via which domestic lawmakers have limited the remedies available to creditors 
has been to further reduce the potential pool of attachable assets a litigating creditor could 
seize. In 2010, the United Kingdom enacted the Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act735. 
The aim of the act is to prevent enforcement on the funds directed to aid for the development 
of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. Belgium had enacted similar legislation in 2008736.  
Similarly, France enacted an anti-vulture fund legislation pursuing the same objective, 
although with a wider scope of application than the Belgian and UK act. The 2016 French 
act on “transparency, fight against corruption and modernisation of economic life” 737 
focuses in its article 60 on vulture fund litigation. 
The French act prevents the attachment of sovereign assets, regardless of their nature, by a 
State’s creditor if three conditions are fulfilled: 
1. The sovereign debtor features on the list of beneficiaries for aid to development 
drawn by the OECD. 
2. The creditor obtained its debt title when the debtor was either in default or had 
emitted a restructuring proposal. 
 
that retails investors, would fall under its scope of application, unless they have purchased their bonds at a 
steep discount on the secondary market.  
733 In practice however, the effects of the act being limited to lawsuits brought to Belgium, its broader effects 
on the sovereign debt market are bound to be limited. On the potential effects of the act and its role within the 
current legal landscape on sovereign debt see Belle (n 721). 
734 On the two values of sovereign bonds see CIBC bank and Trust Company (Cayman) v. Banco Central do 
Brasil, Banco Central do Brasil S.A., and Citibank N.A. (n 190); Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before 
International Courts and Tribunals (n 1) 304. On vulture funds as arbitrageurs see Belle (n 548). On vulture 
funds trading strategy in general see Jonathan I Blackman and Rahul Mukhi, ‘Evolution of Modern Sovereign 
Debt Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna, The’ (2010) 73 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 47; Fisch and Gentile (n 73). 
735 Debt Relief (Developping Countries) Act 2010. 
736 Loi visant à empêcher la saisie ou la cession des fonds publics destinés à la coopération internationale, 
notamment par la technique des fonds vautours, article 60. 
737 Ibid 
The Anti-holdout model  150 
3. The debtor’s default or restructuring has occurred less than 48 months prior to a 
creditor’s attempt to attach the sovereign’s assets738. 
The main difference between the French act and the UK and Belgian act is that in France’s 
case, the entirety of a sovereign’s assets is shielded from attachment. In the other acts, only 
the funds directed towards aid for development are protected. However, the French act 
requires a default or restructuring proposal to have occurred when the others do not.  
Apart from these differences, the three acts pursue the same objective: preventing the assets 
of particularly vulnerable debtors to be attached by creditors. By preventing attachment of 
sovereign’s assets, domestic lawmakers can disincentivise holding out. As exposed in 
chapter 3, one of the main reasons why holdout creditors had to rely on the pari passu clause 
to obtain payment on their bonds lied in the difficulty to find attachable assets belonging to 
a sovereign. Limiting said overall pool of asset, should  further discourage creditors from 
refusing to participate in a restructuring process.  
In addition, focusing on States relying on aid for development and granting them specific 
protection makes sense as these State need access to these funds to return to financial 
stability. Hence, shielding the funds of economically distressed States from attachment helps 
in ensuring that said States will be able to meet their contractual obligations to most creditors 
and therefore be able to return to capital markets. Moreover, the protection of the assets of 
particularly vulnerable debtors protects their population as it is most likely to suffer during 
the restructuring process. 
This protection of particularly vulnerable debtors has parallels in international law, in 
particular the move apparent in the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia decisions towards 
limiting war reparations if they prevent a State from fulfilling its obligations under 
International Human Rights739. The logic here appears similar in that special protection is 
granted to economically vulnerable States and their population to guarantee that the 
 
738 LOI n° 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la 
modernisation de la vie économique. 
739 Final Award, Ethiopia’s Damage Claim (2009) XXVI Rep Int Arbitr Awards 631 (Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims 
Commission); d’Argent (n 60); Pierre D’Argent, ‘La Commission des réclamations Erythrée/Ethiopie : suite 
et fin’ (2009) 55 Annuaire Français de Droit International 279; Michael J Matheson, ‘Damage Awards of the 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, The’ (2010) 9 Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 1. 
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sovereign’s responsibility does not prevent it from protecting the human rights of its 
population740. 
Finally, in addition to preventing creditors from attaching funds linked to aid for 
development, Belgium, in reaction to the Elliott case has also legislated to prevent creditors 
from blocking payments flowing through Euroclear741. While Euroclear is not sovereign, 
and therefore the modifications of the 1999 Euroclear act cannot be read as a strengthening 
of sovereign immunities sensu stricto, the purpose of shielding payment flowing through the 
clearing house is similar to the one of the dispositions mentioned above. 
4.2.3 The Provision of Funds to facilitate the Debtor’s Return to Debt 
Sustainability 
4.2.3.1 The Provision of Funds to the Debtor: Overview 
So far, the legal dispositions analysed in this section focused on deterring holdout 
enforcement, either by a curbing of creditor’s ability to disrupt the restructuring process or 
by focusing on the process via which States and their creditors can reach an agreement. The 
last key component of the anti-holdout model is the development of legal tools enabling the 
State to obtain the liquidities necessary to ensure its return to debt sustainability. 
Ensuring that the sovereign can return to debt sustainability as swiftly as possible during 
times of crisis makes sense as doing so encourages creditors to accept a restructuring 
proposal given that it reduces the likelihood of the sovereign ultimately defaulting. Moreover, 
again, it limits the impact of restructurings and defaults on the debtor’s population. Most of 
the domestic law measures designed to facilitate the obtention of haircuts have already been 
examined within this chapter and thus, will only be briefly mentioned only so far as they 
enable the State to obtain additional liquidities. The international law aspects of this 
component, as with other components is analysed in the following section. 
 
740 Similar principles seem to have been followed regarding the German World War I and World War II debt, 
as well as for Congo’s debt. For an overview of the question see Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before 
International Courts and Tribunals (n 2) 148–153.  
741 Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (n 5) 94; ‘Loi Du 28 Avril 1999 Visant 
à Transposer La Directive 98/26/CE Du 19 Mai 1998 Concernant Le Caractère Définitif Du Règlement Dans 
Les Systèmes de Paiement et de Règlement Des Opérations Sur Titres.’ 
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4.2.3.2 The role of Domestic Law in re-allocating Funds to the Debtor  
As previously exposed, the main purpose of Collective Action Clauses is to prevent holdouts 
by binding large swaths of a State’s creditors to a same restructuring plan via a vote. In that 
regard, CACs not only implement majoritarian decision making during sovereign debt 
restructurings, but also facilitates the obtention of a haircut by the sovereign.  Logically, if 
holders of bonds issued with a Collective Action Clause cannot holdout, States benefit of 
the haircut on their sovereign bonds when, without the clause they would have to pay this 
particular class of creditors in full. As such, this enables sovereigns to free up more 
liquidities during a restructuring process without requiring larger cutbacks on repayment for 
all creditors, thus avoiding future market punishment or a refusal by a majority of creditors.  
In other words, CACs let sovereigns reduce payment to creditors who otherwise would have 
been paid in full without needing to further negotiate, or further reduce repayment to 
creditors who have already accepted a restructuring offer. As CACs, the aforementioned 
reinforcement of immunities for particularly vulnerable sovereigns further protect their 
access to liquidities as it prevents foreign creditors to seize funds that the debtor could use 
in order to bring itself back to debt sustainability. 
4.3 The Anti-holdout model in international law 
4.3.1 Introduction 
In the absence of a multilateral system dealing with sovereign debt restructuring, 
understanding how international law has moved towards the anti holdout model requires 
focusing on a broad array of sources. In treaty law, there appears to be a movement towards 
the exclusion of sovereign debt from the scope of application ratione materiae of BITs. 
International soft law, namely the UNCTAD principles on sovereign lending and 
borrowing 742  and the UNGA resolution on basic principles for sovereign debt 
restructuring743 have pushed forward for the application of the general principle of good faith, 
and the abuse of rights doctrine to sovereign debt disputes. Said principles seem to have been 
 
742 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (n 21). 
743 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Resolution 69/319: Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Processes’ (n 22). 
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applied in the case law of the ECtHR744 and the ECJ745. Lastly, the international norms 
regarding the bail-out of States facing sovereign debt crises have been broadened following 
the Greek crisis. 
As previously, this thesis will treat each component of the anti-holdout model separately. In 
particular, it argues that the use of good faith and the abuse of rights doctrine bring 
majoritarian decision making before international courts. Similarly, the explicit exclusion of 
sovereign debt from BITs and other IIAs, the Poštová decision, and a broader reading of the 
necessity defence limit the remedies available to creditors. Finally, changes in the 
international law on bailouts has served as a way to further increase the access of heavily 
indebted sovereigns to the liquidities they need to fulfil their immediate payment obligations. 
4.3.2 Good Faith and the Abuse of Rights Doctrine as Implementing 
Majoritarian Decision-Making at the International Level 
The use of good faith and the abuse of rights doctrine in international litigation on sovereign 
debt has been pushed forward by the UNCTAD’s principles on sovereign debt 
restructuring746 and the recent UN General Assembly resolution on sovereign debt747. In 
order to understand their potential for sovereign debt litigation, one must first determine the 
normativity of those principles, either as part of the soft law instruments which enshrine 
them or in general international law. 
4.3.2.1 The Normativity of the UNCTAD Principles and the UNGA Resolution 
In 2012, UNCTAD adopted the principles on promoting responsible sovereign lending and 
borrowing748.  Their drafting began in 2009, in the wake of the financial crisis in order to 
facilitate coordination between creditors and debtor-States by establishing a set of common 
principles and practices related to sovereign debt749. The idea was to rely on a common 
 
744 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18). 
745 Alessandro Accorinti and others v. European Central Bank (n 19). 
746 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (n 16) 3–5. 
747 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Resolution 69/319: Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Processes’ (n 22); Goldmann, ‘Putting Your Faith in Good Faith: A Principled Strategy for Smoother Sovereign 
Debt Workouts’ (n 651). 
748 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (n 16) 3-5. 
749 ibid; Carlos Espósito, Yuefen Li and Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, ‘Introduction’ in Carlos Espósito, Yuefen Li 
and Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky (eds), Sovereign Financing and international law (Oxford University Press 2013) 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674374.001.0001/acprof-
9780199674374-chapter-1> accessed 3 October 2016, 3. 
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international soft law instrument to fill the international legal void, and smooth out the 
discrepancies in the domestic law approaches, regarding sovereign indebtedness750.  
The principles were drafted by an expert group involving leading authorities in law and 
economics, private investors, and NGOs. It also involved the Bretton Woods institutions as 
well as representatives from the Paris Club as observers751.  
UNCTAD identifies seven principles governing the behaviour of lenders:  
• Agency (the recognition that the debtor-State is responsible for their population’s 
interest);  
• Informed decisions (the responsibility to provide information to the debtor);  
• Due authorization;  
• Responsible credit decision;  
• Project financing;  
• International cooperation (duty to comply with UN sanctions)  
• Debt restructurings (duty to restructure in good faith if the debtor is manifestly unable 
to service its debts)752. 
For borrowers the principles are:  
• Agency;  
• Binding Agreements (the fact that a sovereign debt contract is a binding agreement);  
• Transparency;  
• Disclosure and Publication;  
• Project Financing;  
• Adequate management and monitoring 
• Avoiding incidences of over borrowing 
• Restructuring (if a restructuring is unavoidable, it should be effectuated in a prompt 
efficient and fair manner)753. 
Similarly, the UN General Assembly adopted a series of 9 basic principles: 
Notably, principle 1 states: 
“A Sovereign State has the right, in the exercise of its discretion, to design its 
macroeconomic policy, including restructuring its sovereign debt, which should not be 
 
750 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (n 16) 3-5. 
751 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (n 16) 3-4. 
752 ibid. 
753 ibid. 
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frustrated or impeded by any abusive measures. Restructuring should be done as the last 
resort and preserving at the outset creditors' rights.”754 
 Principle 2 adds: 
“Good faith by both the sovereign debtor and all its creditors would entail their 
engagement in constructive sovereign debt restructuring workout negotiations and other 
stages of the process with the aim of a prompt and durable re-establishment of debt 
sustainability and debt servicing, as well as achieving the support of a critical mass of 
creditors through a constructive dialogue regarding the restructuring terms”755 
The resolution, in its principles 3 and 4 also establishes a duty of transparency and 
impartiality for all actors involved. It imposes a duty of equitable treatment on the State 
debtor, underlining that: 
“Creditors have the right to receive the same proportionate treatment in accordance with 
their credit and its characteristics. No creditors or creditor groups should be excluded 
ex ante from the sovereign debt restructuring process.”756 
Principle 7 underlines the importance of legitimacy and the respect of the rule of law during 
restructuring processes. The resolution also reaffirms the right of States to their sovereign 
immunities in its principle 6. 
Principle 8 establishes a principle of sustainability of sovereign debt restructurings, meaning 
that:  
“sovereign debt restructuring workouts [should be] completed in a timely and efficient 
manner and lead to a stable debt situation in the debtor State, preserving at the outset 
creditors’ rights while promoting sustained and inclusive economic growth and 
sustainable development, minimizing economic and social costs, warranting the stability 
of the international financial system and respecting human rights.”757 
 
754 United Nations General Assembly (n 17) principle 1. 
755 ibid principle 2. 
756 ibid principle 5. 
757 ibid principle 8. 
The Anti-holdout model  156 
Finally, the resolution underlines the majoritarian nature of sovereign debt restructurings, 
underlining that: 
“sovereign debt restructuring agreements that are approved by a qualified majority of 
the creditors of a State are not to be affected, jeopardized or otherwise impeded by other 
States or a non-representative minority of creditors, who must respect the decisions 
adopted by the majority of the creditors. States should be encouraged to include collective 
action clauses in their sovereign debt to be issued”758. 
The Resolution was adopted by 136 votes to 6, and 41 abstentions759. On average, creditor 
States either voted against (notably the United Kingdom and the United States), or 
abstained760. 
As their mere adoption by UNCTAD and the UNGA does not automatically lead to their 
normativity, there are two possible sources for their mandatory nature. First, the resolution 
and the basic principles could codify norms that are already normative761 . Second, the 
adoption of these texts by both international organisations could create new customary 
international law762. 
The argument that the UNGA resolution and the UNCTAD principles can create new 
customary norms is problematic for two reasons763. Custom, to arise, as per the ICJ case-law 
needs a combination of two elements: State practice and opinio iuris cive necessitatis764. The 
 
758 ibid principle 9. 
759  ‘General Assembly Sixty-Ninth Session (Official Records) 102nd Plenary Meeting’ 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/PV.102> 9. 
760 ibid. 
761  On this question see Goldmann (n 617) 119-120. See also generally Matthias Goldmann, ‘On the 
Comparative Foundations of Principles in international law’ in Carlos Espósito, Yuefen Li and Juan Pablo 
Bohoslavsky (eds), Sovereign Financing and international law (Oxford University Press 2013) 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674374.001.0001/acprof-
9780199674374-chapter-6> accessed 6 October 2016; Howse (n 29). 
762 Howse (n 31). 
763 The arguments infra focus purely on the normative impact of the UNCTAD principles and the UNGA 
resolution. Beyond those two soft law instruments it is undeniable that, in general, international soft law, and 
in particular UNGA resolutions can create new customary international law. See e.g. Marko Divac Öberg, ‘The 
Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the 
ICJ’ (2005) 16 European Journal of international law 879; Stephen M Schwebel, ‘The Effect of Resolutions of 
the U.N. General Assembly on Customary international law’ (1979) 73 Proceedings of the ASIL Annual 
Meeting 301; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory opinion [1971] ICJ Rep 16 
(International Court of Justice). However, this thesis argue that these two specific instances of soft law have 
not done so.  
764  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark, Federal Republic of 
Germany v. Netherlands (n 377) para 77; Crawford and Brownlie (n 384) 23; Jan Klabbers, international law 
(2nd Edition edition, Cambridge University Press 2013) 28–32. 
The Anti-holdout model  157 
International Court of Justice, notably in its Nicaragua 765  and its Nuclear Weapons766 
decisions, seems to consider that votes in favour of a general assembly resolution can, in 
certain circumstances, constitute the evidence of an opinio iuris767. In order for it to be the 
case, one must either show that the votes in favour of the resolution were cast by States 
believing in the normative content of the resolution, or that the resolution is framed in a 
normative manner768, this, arguably could be the case here.  
However, even if one agrees that the two soft law instruments prove a favourable opinio 
iuris, identifying a general and constant State practice on sovereign lending and borrowing 
is more problematic. The vast majority of creditors since the 1970s have been private entities 
whose practice cannot create new customary norms769. Moreover, when sovereigns have 
been involved in restructuring a debtor’s sovereign debt, the solutions deployed have been 
varied, usually implemented on an ad hoc basis, and generally driven more by the “desire to 
develop pragmatic solutions for concrete problems”770 rather than the creation of general 
norms771. 
However, certain dispositions of both texts can be deemed to codify already existing norms 
of international law, in particular those referring to good faith772. 
 
765  Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United-States) 
(merits) (1986) 1986 ICJ Rep 14 (ICJ) 100-101, 106-108, cited notably by Alain Pellet, ‘La Formation Du 
Droit International Dans Le Cadre Des Nations Unies’ (1995) 6 European Journal of international law 401, 
416.  
766 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (advisory opinion) (1996) 1996 ICJ Rep 226 (ICJ) para 
71. 
767 Pellet (n 773); Blaine Sloan, ‘General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later)’ (1988) 58 
British Yearbook of international law 39. 
768 Pellet (n 734) 406; Sloan (n 736); Waibel, ‘Out of Thin Air?’ (n 25) 90. 
769 Waibel, ‘Out of Thin Air?’ (n 25) 90. 
770 ibid 91. 
771 Ibid. 
772 In this sense see Antonis Bredimas, Anastasios Gourgourinis and Georges Pavlidis, The Legal Contours of 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring under the UNCTAD Principles: Antagonism and Convergence between 
Standards of Domestic Insolvency Law and International Investment Protection Law (Oxford University Press 
2013) <http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674374.001.0001/acprof-
9780199674374-chapter-7> accessed 20 February 2020; United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (n 16), preamble. 
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4.3.2.2 Good Faith and the Abuse of Rights Doctrine in General international law 
Good faith is usually understood as a general principle of international law, as defined by 
article 38 of the ICJ statute773. The abuse of rights doctrine seems to be generally understood 
as a subset of the obligation to act in good faith774. 
As defined by Oppenheim, general principles of international law refer to “the general 
principles of municipal jurisprudence, insofar as they are applicable to relations of 
States”775. This echoes the idea, expressed in article 38, that the legal principles of law 
recognized by the “civilized nations” are per se sources of international law 776 . Thus 
understood, general principles, as featured in article 38 are legal norms shared by most 
domestic legal orders, and applicable to the management of international relations777.  
Good faith, and the abuse of rights doctrine are well recognised within domestic law, 
whether civil or common. Good faith, features in articles 1134 of the French Civil Code778, 
242 of the German Civil Code779, article 5 (3) of the Swiss Constitution780 or article 1-201 
of the US UCC781. While English common law does not seem to require a general duty of 
good faith, it recognises separate distinct obligations which are usually classified under the 
good faith umbrella-term in other legal regimes782. Thus, the recognition of good faith as a 
general principle of international law is hardly surprising. 
 
773 Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945; Steven Reinhold, ‘Good Faith in international law’ (2013) 
2 UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 40; Markus Kotzur, ‘Good Faith (Bona Fide)’, Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public international law (2009) 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1412?rskey=fhLubm&result=1&prd=EPIL>; Malcolm N Shaw, international law (8 edition, Cambridge 
University Press 2017) 77. 
774 The relationship between the two principles is heavily debated in the international legal scholarship. While 
most authors argue that the abuse of rights doctrine is a sub-category or a corollary of the good faith principle 
containing different obligations than good faith in general some authors have argued that the two notions are 
for all intents and purposes equivalent. Goldmann, ‘Putting Your Faith in Good Faith: A Principled Strategy 
for Smoother Sovereign Debt Workouts’ (n 617); Robert Kolb, ‘Principles as Sources of international law 
(With Special Reference to Good Faith)’ (2006) 53 Netherlands international law Review 1, 463; Fisheries 
Case (United-Kingdom v Norway) (1951) 1951 ICJ Rep 116 (ICJ) 141-142.  
775 L Oppenheim, RY Jennings and Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s international law. Vol.1: Peace (9th ed, 
Longman 1992) para 12; cited in Crawford and Brownlie (n 384) 35. 
776 Statute of the International Court of Justice, article 38; Crawford and Brownlie (n 384) 35. 
777 Ibid; Kolb (n 744) 3-4. 
778 Code Civil (France) version consolidée au 1 mars 2019, article 1134. 
779 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch s 242. 
780 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999 s 5. 
781 Uniform Commercial Code ss 1–201; Reinhold (n 743) 42-44; See also Bernardo Cremades, ‘Good Faith 
in International Arbitration’ (2012) 27 American University international law Review 
<https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol27/iss4/4>. 
782 Notably the principle of promissory estoppel. It should however be noted that Lord Mansfield noted in a 
1766 case that good faith is “"the governing principle... applicable to all contracts and dealings”. Carter v 
Boehm [1766] 97 ER (KB) 1162 ; Reinhold (n 743 ) 43. 
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While originally a civil law praetorian innovation, the abuse of rights doctrine finds 
equivalent within common law systems783. The abuse of rights principle’s normativity, in 
that context has been generally been understood as deriving from the normativity of good 
faith. It can also be argued that it stems from its existence in civil law and the law of socialist 
States, as well as of these similar common law principles784.  
In international law, both good faith and the abuse of rights doctrine feature in the case-law 
of the ICJ785 and the PCIJ786, and numerous other International Courts and Tribunals787. 
While the normativity of good faith and the abuse of rights doctrine in international law 
seems well established, the exact content of these dispositions appears less defined.  
Regarding good faith the content of the norm varies in international law. Good faith, notably, 
plays a central role regarding negotiations to solve disputes amicably788. It plays a key role 
in the VCLT, in particular regarding the applicability of treaty provisions post-signature but 
prior to their entry into force789. Good faith is also generally understood as a key principle 
of treaty interpretation790.  
 
783 For a discussion of common law application see in general Michael Byers, ‘Abuse of Rights: An Old 
Principle, a New Age’ (2002) 47 McGill Law Journal 489; Anna di Robilant, ‘Abuse of Rights: The Continental 
Drug and the Common Law’ (Social Science Research Network 2014) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2457018 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2457018> accessed 20 October 2016; Alexandre Kiss, ‘Abuse of Rights’, 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public international law (Oxford University Press 2006) 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1371>; BO Iluyomade, 
‘Scope and Content of a Complaint of Abuse of Right in international law’ (1975) 16 Harvard international 
law Journal 47. 
784 Kiss (n 791); Byers (n 791); Pierre-Emmanuel Moyse, ‘L’Abus de Droit: L’Antenorme - Partie 1’ (2011) 
57 McGill Law Journal 859; Nikolaos Politis, ‘Le Problème Des Limitations de La Souveraineté et La Théorie 
de l’abus Des Droits Dans Les Rapports Internationaux’, Recueil des cours, Collected Courses (Académie de 
Droit International de la Haye/Hague Academy of international law), vol 6 (Brill | Nijhoff 1925); Iluyomade 
(n 791). 
785 See e.g. Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v France) [1974] ICJ Rep 457 (International Court of Justice) 
para 49; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (2010) 2010 ICJ Rep 14 (ICJ) para 145; Case 
concerning the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v United States of 
America) [1952] ICJ Reprorts 1952 176 (ICJ) p 212; cited notably in Reinhold (n 743); Iluyomade (n 753). 
786 Case concerning the Factory at Chorzow (claim for indemnity) (merits) (n 379) p 15. 
787 See inter allia Trail smelter case (United States, Canada) (1941) III Rep Int Arbitr Awards 1905; United 
States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, India and ors v United States [2001] WTO 
Appelate Body WT/DS58/AB/RW. 
788 Reinhold (n 773) 56. 
789  ‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex) (Vienna)’ s 38 
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf>, article 26; 
See also Case concerning certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia  (merits) (n 477) para 123; for a 
similar take in EU law see Opel Austria GmbH v Council of the European Union [1997] CJEU T-115-94, para 
89. 
790 ‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex) (Vienna)’ (n 759) s 31, article 31. On this question 
see  Eric De Brabandere and Isabelle Van Damme, Good Faith in Treaty Interpretation (Oxford University 
Press 2015) <http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739791.001.0001/acprof-
9780198739791-chapter-3> accessed 7 March 2019. 
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Generally, the ICJ seems to read good faith not as having a content of its own, but rather as 
a qualifier for the content and the exercise of other legal rights and obligations. Therefore, 
the rights derived from good faith and the abuse of rights doctrine are generally characterised 
as ‘interstitial’791.  
In international investment law, good faith has mostly been employed by arbitral tribunals 
in the context of litigation including FET clauses. It has, inter alia, been used as a way to 
protect investor’s legitimate expectations792. Alternatively, it has been used by States as a 
mean to dismiss claims brought by investors acting in mala fide793. 
Traditionally, the abuse of rights doctrine has been read as containing three different 
obligations:  
- The prohibition, for a State, to exercise its rights in such a way as to hinder another 
State from enjoying its own rights794. 
- The prohibition for a State to exercise its rights for an end which they were not 
intended for795 
- The prohibition of the arbitrary exercise of a right, causing injury to another party796 
A common ground between good faith and the abuse of rights doctrine is that they seek to 
create a limit to the way in which usually recognised international rights can be exercised by 
their holders797. They are, in other words, a limit to an individualistic use of rights, placed in 
 
791  Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v Honduras) (Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility) (1988) 1998 ICJ Rep 69 (ICJ) para 60; Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) (n 755) 
para 49; Sanja Dajic, ‘Mapping the Good Faith Principle in International Investment Arbitration" Assessment 
of Its Substantive and Procedural Value’ (2012) 46 Zbornik Radova 207. See also Vaughan Lowe, The Politics 
of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation Changing? (Oxford University Press 2001) 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199244027.001.0001/acprof-
9780199244027-chapter-11> accessed 6 March 2019; Andreas R Ziegler and Jorun Baumgartner, ‘Good Faith 
as a General Principle of (International) Law’ in Andrew D Mitchell, M Sornarajah and Tania Voon (eds), 
Good Faith and International Economic Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739791.001.0001/acprof-
9780198739791-chapter-2> accessed 1 September 2016, 15. 
792 Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic (n 507) para 231 et s.; Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, 
S.A. (Award)v. The United Mexican States (n 506) para 70 et s. See discussions in Paparinskis (n 510); Dajic 
(n 761). 
793 See e.g. Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian, & Ellen Baca v The United Mexican States [1999] NAFTA ARB 
(AF)/97/2; Dajic (n 761) 228. On this question see also Stephan W Schill and Heather L Bray, Good Faith 
Limitations on Protected Investments and Corporate Structuring (Oxford University Press 2015) 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739791.001.0001/acprof-
9780198739791-chapter-5> accessed 7 March 2019. 
794 Reinhold (n 743) 49. 
795 ibid. 
796 Ibid 
797 Ziegler and Baumgartner (n 761) 11-12; Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International 
Community (The Clarendon press 1933) 286. 
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the interest of a collectivity798. Understood as such, good faith and the abuse of right doctrine 
requires courts and tribunals to balance the interests of the party exercising its own rights 
with the damage caused to others by the exercise of said right799. To quote the famous US-
Shrimp Case:  
“One application of [good faith], the application widely known as the doctrine 
of abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a state’s rights and enjoins that 
whenever the assertion of a right ‘impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty 
obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably’.”800 
The Appellate Body, in that case, used the concept of reasonableness to create a limit on the 
exercise of rights by sovereigns when those rights “impinge on the field covered by a treaty 
obligation”801. In other words, if by exercising its rights, a State threatens the rights of others 
one must determine if the State has exercised its right in a reasonable fashion802.  
As previously mentioned, the idea that the exercise by State of their discretionary rights is 
limited by general principles of International law is heavily debated in the international legal 
scholarship.  
Notably, the idea that a limit could be put on the exercise of rights by sovereigns seems to 
run against the Lotus principle803. Indeed, if International law enables States to do anything 
it does not prohibit804, the international liability of a State should not logically be invoked 
when States exercise rights they hold805.  Similarly, good faith and the abuse of rights, 
especially linked with the concept of reasonableness and the idea that there is a “fonction 
 
798 Duncan Kennedy and Marie-Claire Belleau, ‘François Gény Aux États-Unis’, François Gény: mythes et 
réalités 1899-1999, Centenaire de Méthode d’interprétation et sources en droit privé positif - essai critique C. 
Thomasset, J. Vanderlinden, P. Jestaz (eds) (Les éditions Yvon Blais 2000); di Robilant (n 783). 
799 See Kennedy and Belleau (n 798); di Robilant (n 783). 
800 United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, India and ors v United States 
(n 787). 
801 ibid para 158. 
802 For an overview of the use of good faith within the WTO framework see Helge Elisabeth Zeitler, ‘“Good 
Faith” in the WTO Jurisprudence – Necessary Balancing Element or an Open Door to Judicial Activism?’ 
(2005) 8 Journal of International Economic Law 721. Beyond US-Shrimp, good faith is also used in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System as requiring parties to use dispute settlement in good faith. Peter Van Den Bossche, 
The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge University Press - MUA) 267–268 
<https://www.dawsonera.com/abstract/9780511670671> accessed 20 January 2015. See e.g. US-FSC (WTO 
Appelate Body report); Argentina - Poultry Anti Dumping Duties (2003) (WTO Appelate body).  
803 The Case of the SS Lotus (1927) Series A-n10 Publ Perm Court Int Justice 3 (PCIJ). 
804 ibid; Armin von Bogdandy and Markus Rau, ‘The Lotus’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public international 
law (OUP 2006); Reinhold (n 781). 
805 Robert Kolb, ‘La Règle Résiduelle de Liberté En Droit International Public (“Tout Ce Qui n’est Pas Interdit 
Est Permis”) : Aspects Théoriques’ (2001) 34 Revue Belge de Droit International / Belgian Review of 
international law 100; Reinhold (n 743) 57-58. 
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sociale des droits”806, seem closely linked to natural law or at least a view of international 
law as a systematically coherent legal order807. 
While these criticisms of good faith and the abuse of rights doctrine are sound from a 
theoretical point of view, it seems that, in practice, the normativity of both norms is well 
established. Their use by well-established international adjudicative bodies appears to 
constitute a sufficient indication that international courts and tribunals might rely on both 
principles when adjudicating disputes on sovereign debt, regardless of the theorical 
objections against these norms. 
4.3.2.3 Applying Good Faith and the Abuse of Rights Doctrine to Sovereign Debt 
While the content of the obligations flowing from the general principle of good faith is 
debated in international law, the legal scholarship on sovereign debt, and  the soft law 
instrument mentioned above, have highlighted several potential applications of the 
principles to debt restructurings. 
If we focus on mentions of good faith in the UNCTAD principles and the UNGA resolution, 
the principles requires creditors to: “behave in good faith and with cooperative spirit to reach 
a consensual rearrangement of those obligations”808 when a State is manifestly unable to 
service its debts.  
Principle 7 adds that in that case, “Creditors should seek a speedy and orderly resolution to 
the problem”809. Similarly, the UNGA resolution encourages creditors and debtors to behave 
in good faith as it would entail the prompt and efficient resolution of sovereign debt crises810. 
The resolution also notes in its first principle that sovereign debt restructuring process should 
not be impended by any abusive measures by creditors811. 
 
 
806 This particular conception of the abuse of rights doctrine traces back to Louis Josserand, De l’esprit Des 
Droits et de Leur Relativité: Théorie Dite de l’abus Des Droits (Dalloz 1927).  
807 di Robilant (n 753) 713. 
808 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (n 16) principle 7. 
809 ibid. 
810 United Nations General Assembly (n 17), principle 2. 
811 ibid. 
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One can divide the good faith principle, as understood in these two soft law instruments in 
three separate obligations: 
First, good faith could provide the source for an obligation on the part of both debtors and 
creditors to restructure sovereign debt when a State’s indebtedness becomes unsustainable. 
Principle 7 of the UNCTAD principles clearly expresses a duty to restructure in good faith 
when the sovereign debtor is manifestly unable to fulfil its contractual obligations812. The 
UNGA resolution hints at a similar understanding of the notion, but applies it to both parties 
of the sovereign debt transaction813.  
Second, good faith could form the basis of an obligation for both States and their creditors 
to negotiate during restructuring processes814. Again here, the idea expressed by UNCTAD 
that creditors should seek a speedy solution to sovereign debt crises hints at an obligation 
negotiate with the debtor in order to reach restructuring agreements 815 . Similarly, the 
reciprocal nature of the good faith obligation featured in the UNGA resolution implies that 
both States and their creditors should seek solutions to sovereign debt crises 816 , thus 
implying a need for negotiation to reach such agreements817. 
Finally, good faith and the abuse of rights doctrine could provide a prohibition for creditors 
to disrupt sovereign debt restructuring processes 818 . Notably the UNGA resolution 
underlines that creditors cannot disrupt restructuring processes through abusive measures819. 
Applied to sovereign debt, good faith and the abuse of rights doctrine have several 
advantages. First, as general principles, they are already normative. This allows them to be 
applied in sovereign debt cases without requiring international law-making which would be 
opposed by creditor States820. Said opposition, famously, prevented the adoption of an IMF 
plan to create a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism rooted in international law821. 
 
812 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (n 16) principle 7. 
813 United Nations General Assembly (n 17) principle 2. 
814 Goldmann, ‘Good Faith and Transparency in Sovereign Debt Workouts (Paper Prepared for the Second 
Session of the UNCTAD Working Group on a Debt Workout Mechanism)’ (n 54) 10. 
815 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (n 16) principle 7. 
816 United Nations General Assembly (n 17) principle 2. 
817 In this sense see Goldmann, ‘Putting Your Faith in Good Faith: A Principled Strategy for Smoother 
Sovereign Debt Workouts’ (n 617) 130-131. 
818 Goldmann, ‘Good Faith and Transparency in Sovereign Debt Workouts (Paper Prepared for the Second 
Session of the UNCTAD Working Group on a Debt Workout Mechanism)’ (n 54) 12. 
819 United Nations General Assembly (n 17) principle 1. 
820  Goldmann, ‘Putting Your Faith in Good Faith: A Principled Strategy for Smoother Sovereign Debt 
Workouts’ (n 617) 140. 
821 For an overview of the criticisms of the IMF SDRM proposal see Olivares-Caminal, Legal Aspects of 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring (n 5) 160–167. 
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Therefore, by relying on general principles whose normativity is already broadly accepted, 
UNCTAD and the General Assembly can ensure that at least part of the content of their soft 
law instruments could find application de lege lata. 
Second, as general principles, good faith and the abuse of rights doctrine find their source in 
domestic law. Far from merely cementing the normativity of good faith at the international 
level, the recognition of similar principles by domestic jurisdictions plays a key role in the 
application of obligations arising from good faith to sovereign debt litigation822. As already 
noted, the bulk of litigation, when it comes to sovereign debt, occurs at the domestic level. 
As good faith transcends the boundaries of international law it can potentially be applied 
before domestic jurisdictions823. As such, good faith obligations and the abuse of rights 
doctrine have the potential to be used by international courts and tribunals as well as 
domestic courts as a way to limit the remedies available to creditors. However, the effect of 
good faith is not merely to limit the remedies available to creditors. It encourages both parties 
in the debt transaction to negotiate sovereign debt restructurings. As such good faith 
strengthens, de iure, collective decision making. 
 
822  Goldmann, ‘Putting Your Faith in Good Faith: A Principled Strategy for Smoother Sovereign Debt 
Workouts’ (n 617) 140. 
823
 This use of general principles as a way to bridge the gap between international and domestic law when it 
comes to sovereign debt litigation is a central element of the “incremental approach” to sovereign debt 
restructuring described by Bohoslavky and Goldmann. The incremental approach to sovereign debt 
restructuring is centred on the idea that debt sustainability is a “principle of public international law”, 
understood by the authors as an axiomatic principle, that should guide the interpretation of other international 
norms. The argument of the authors relies on the idea that legal developments regarding sovereign debt since 
the 1950s, have led to the recognition by international actors that debt sustainability, as a principle, is 
recognised as a goal by a broad range of International Organisations. The authors base their arguments, inter 
alia, on the practice of International Organisations such as the Paris Club and the IMF during the second half 
of the 20th century, and more recently on the recognition of debt sustainability in the UNCTAD principles and 
the UNGA resolutions. Bohoslavsky and Goldmann (n 80).While this thesis agrees with the idea that, in facts, 
international practice has evolved towards the protection of debt sustainability, the claim that these actions 
have led to the elevation of debt sustainability as a key principle of international law, systematizing the 
international regulation of sovereign debt seems contestable. In particular, the use by the authors of Paris club 
practice to evidence the fact that debt sustainability would have reached such a status seems questionable for 
two reasons. First, Paris club negotiations only concern bilateral debts, therefore excluding most of the current 
source of sovereign indebtedness. Second, Paris club negotiations are conducted on a case-by-case basis, which 
seems to indicate that the sovereign taking part to said negotiations do so without the intent of developing new 
international legal norms. In addition, the reticence of creditor States towards the adoption of the UNCTAD 
principles and the UNGA resolution casts a doubt on whether or not one can characterise debts sustainability 
as an axiomatic principle of law. James A Haley, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Good Faith or Self-Interest?’ 
<https://www.cigionline.org/publications/sovereign-debt-restructuring-good-faith-or-self-interest> accessed 7 
March 2019; Daphne Josselin, ‘Regime Interplay in Public-Private Governance: Taking Stock of the 
Relationship between the Paris Club and Private Creditors between 1982 and 2005’ (2009) 15 Global 
Governance 521; Vourc’h (n 57).  
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In addition to this pre-established normativity, good-faith-like reasoning has been used in 
two recent cases by the ECtHR and the ECJ to introduce majoritarian decision making in the 
international law on sovereign debt. 
4.3.2.4 Quasi-Good Faith Obligations in the International Case-Law on Sovereign Debt 
In the already mentioned Mamatas case824, the European Court of Human Rights had to rule 
on the legality of the retroactive insertion by Greece of a collective action clause in Greek 
domestic bonds, during its 2012 restructuring process825. The applicants, a large number of 
individual holders of Greek nationals, holders of domestic bonds emitted by the Hellenic 
Republic alleged that said retroactive introductions breached, inter alia, article 1 of the 1st 
protocol to the ECHR826.  
Several issues ought to be highlighted regarding the background of the case. First, the retrofit 
CAC had been presented as a key feature of the Greek restructuring process and was 
expressly required by Greece’s largest creditors827. Second, the applicants, because they 
were small holders, had not been invited to the negotiations regarding the Greek 
restructuring process828. Lastly, the Hellenic Republic’s government had promised small 
investors that their bonds would not be affected by the restructuring process829. However, 
following the retroactive introduction of the CAC, the applicants faced a haircut on their 
bonds, despite refusing Greece’s restructuring offer830, as the restructuring plan had been 
approved by 91% of its creditors831. 
The proportionality test applied by the ECHR in Mamatas recalls the logic of the good faith 
principle or the abuse of rights doctrine832. The courts’ reasoning is centred on three main 
axis. 
 
824 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18). 
825 Iversen (n 164). 
826 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 13) para 8–25. 
827 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 13) para 116; On the Greek restructuring process, and in particular the 
introduction of the retrofit CAC see Boudreau (n 49); Lee C Buchheit and G Mitu Gulati, ‘How to Restructure 
Greek Debt’ (Social Science Research Network 2010) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1603304 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1603304> accessed 19 August 2016. 
828 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 13) para 12. 
829 ibid. 
830 The refusal of the applicants to participate in the restructuring process is meaningless once the CAC had 
been inserted in their bonds and once the required majorities had been reached.  
831 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 13) para 20. 
832 It should be noted that the Court, in its analysis of the Mamatas case does not apply the abuse of rights 
disposition featured in article 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
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First, the Court focuses on the market value of the bonds at the time of the Greek 
restructuring. As said value was low, compared to the facial value of the bonds, the Court 
concludes that it seemed likely, at the time, that Greece would not be able to fulfil its 
contractual obligations833. In other words, the low value of the bonds is used by the court as 
an indication that the transaction in which the applicants were involved entailed a significant 
risk.  
Second, the Court underlined that, while CACs did not feature in Greek domestic bonds, at 
the time of the restructuring, they were standard most international bond issues, and had 
been made mandatory by the for all Eurozone external debts834. Similarly, the Court noted 
that the retrofit CACs had been asked by Greece’s largest creditors for the restructuring to 
proceed835.  
The Court then highlighted the risk inherent to all financial transactions, in particular those 
on sovereign debt. Then, drawing from the Accorinti836 case exposed infra, it underlined that 
the applicants, in Mamatas837, cannot have be characterised as “prudent and circumspect”838 
investors. Thus, they could not prevail themselves from having “legitimate expectations”839 
to be repaid.  
Indeed, according to the Strasbourg Court, Greek bondholders, at the time of the 
restructuring knew, or ought to have known, of Greece’s difficult financial position840. Thus, 
a prudent and circumspect investor should have, given Greece’s circumstances, liquidated 
its position on Greek bonds. Failure to do so preventing them from having “legitimate 
expectations” to be repaid in full given Greece’s financial health841.  As such, the haircut 
caused by the retroactive introduction of a CAC in Greek bonds was deemed proportionate842. 
Several elements of the Court’s reasoning in Mamatas need to be highlighted. First, the 
Court ties the proportionality of Greece’s actions during its restructuring process to the 
legitimate expectations of creditors of obtaining repayment.  
 
833 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 13) para 112. 
834 ibid; Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (Brussels) article 12. 
835 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 13) para 116. 
836 Alessandro Accorinti and others v. European Central Bank (n 19). 
837 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 13) 118. 
838 ibid. 
839 ibid; Alessandro Accorinti and others v. European Central Bank (n 14) para 76. 
840 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 13) para 117-118. 
841 ibid. 
842 ibid. 
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Second, whether creditor’s expectations are legitimate is dependent on three factors. First, 
the market value of the bonds, used as an indicator of the riskiness of the transaction. Second, 
the behaviour of the majority of creditors, i.e. whether most creditors accepted the 
restructuring offer or the retroactive insertion of the CAC. As with CACs, the majority here 
seems to be counted on a bond-by-bond basis. Third, the behaviour of the applicants in 
concreto, i.e. whether they liquidated their position when the situation appeared risky.  
A similar line of reasoning features in Accorinti v ECB. The Accorinti case was introduced 
by small holders of Greek debt, however those were contesting the exclusion of the European 
Central Bank from the Greek restructuring process843, and not the restructuring per se. The 
applicants argued that the exclusion of Greek bonds held by ECB from the restructuring 
process breached the EU law principle of legal certainty. They also contended that the 
exclusion of the bank breached the international law principle stating that creditors of a 
sovereign should be treated equally844. 
The applicants, inter alia, pleaded that their legitimate expectations had been breached by 
central bank as it concluded a separate exchange agreement with Greece, refused to 
participate in the Greek restructuring process, made Greek bonds eligible as collateral via a 
buy-back scheme only opened to other central banks 845 . These facts, according to the 
claimants, lead to a on their bonds since the private sector had to shoulder on its own to costs 
of the Greek restructuring846.  
The applicants underlines that their legitimate expectations been breached since ECB, 
through its president, had reassured holders of Greek bonds that the Bank would be part of 
a voluntary exchange. ECB had also allegedly promised that the Hellenic Republic would 
not default, that any restructuring of the Greek debt would be voluntary, that no reduction of 
the nominal value of the bonds could be imposed, and that if restructuring should occur, the 
Greek bonds would not be accepted as collateral by ECB847. The applicants claimed that, 
having relied on those assertions from Frankfurt, they incurred a loss on their holdings848.  
 
843 Alessandro Accorinti and others v. European Central Bank (n 19). 
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According to the ECJ case-law, three conditions must be fulfilled for legitimate expectation 
against an EU authority to exist: 
1) “precise, unconditional and consistent assurances originating from authorised and 
reliable sources must have been given to the person concerned by the EU 
authorities”849 
2) “those assurances must be such as to give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part 
of the person to whom they are addressed”850 
3) “the assurances given must be consistent with the applicable rules”851 
 
Applying these principles to the Accorinti case, the court noted that: 
“[W]here a prudent and circumspect economic operator is able to foresee the adoption 
of an EU measure likely to affect his interests, he cannot rely on that principle if the 
measure is adopted. Nor can economic operators have a legitimate expectation that an 
existing situation which is capable of being altered by the EU institutions in the exercise 
of their discretion will be maintained, especially in an area such as monetary policy, the 
subject-matter of which is constantly being adjusted according to variations in the 
economic situation”852. 
Moreover, the Court added obiter dicta, that the purchase of sovereign debt is, per se, 
entailing a risk of loss on one’s investment since it is subject to the “hazardous 
movements”853 of capital markets. Regarding Greek bonds in particular, the Court pointed 
that, “[i]n the light of the economic situation of the Hellenic Republic and the uncertainties 
concerning it at the time, the investors concerned cannot claim to have acted as prudent and 
circumspect economic operators”854. This is especially the case given that some applicants 
purchased some of their securities when the Greek crisis was at its peak855.  
Given these facts, holders of Greek bonds “were supposed to be aware of the highly unstable 
economic situation that determined the fluctuation of the value of the Greek bonds which 
 
849 ibid para 73. 
850 ibid, para 75. 
851 ibid. 
852 ibid para 82. The ECJ similarly highlighted that ECB’s declarations could not have led to legitimate 
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they had acquired and also the appreciable risk of at least a selective default by the Hellenic 
Republic”.  
Building from these reasons the ECJ thus ruled: 
 “[A] prudent and circumspect economic operator […] could not have ruled out the risk 
of a restructuring of the Greek public debt, given the differing views prevailing in that 
regard within the euro area Member States and the other bodies involved”856. 
The common thread between the Mamatas and Accorinti decisions is that both European 
Courts use the notion of legitimate expectations to limit the rights of creditors during 
restructuring processes. They hold that prudent and circumspect creditors should either 
liquidate their holdings of sovereign bonds if a restructuring is imminent, or accept the idea 
that they will suffer a loss.  
This reasoning echoes the general principle of good faith, in particular its application as a 
reasonableness test. The key question raised by both these decisions lies in the determination 
of what constitutes a “prudent and circumspect investor”857. The criteria advanced by both 
jurisdictions rely on two distinct elements: first, the market value of the bonds they hold, 
second, the acceptance by a majority of actors of the measures implemented during the 
restructuring.  
Regarding the first criteria, the logic of both courts is to use the market value of the bonds 
of a State as a proxy for default risk858. Quite logically, as implied by the European courts, 
if a State’s default appears to be imminent, creditors not willing to assume the risk linked to 
said default sell, causing the market value of the bonds to plummet. Taking into account the 
price of the bond in the reasonableness test itself859, introduces majority decision-making 
within appraisal by the courts of the necessity of restructuring process. The price of 
sovereign bonds plummeting is literally an indication of investors “voting with their feet” 
on the ability of a sovereign to repay its debt.  
Similarly, the fact that both courts consider the acceptance by investors of the restructuring 
measures is a second way of introducing collective decision-making elements in their 
 
856 ibid. 
857 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18); Alessandro Accorinti and others v. European Central Bank (n 19). 
858 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18); Alessandro Accorinti and others v. European Central Bank (n 19). 
859 And not to compute compensation, whether when assessing the lawfulness of an expropriation or at the 
quantum stage. 
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reasoning860. It enables them to ensure that most creditors are in favour of the restructuring 
measures pursued by the State.  
4.3.3 Limiting Creditors’ Remedies in international law 
In addition to the potential use of good faith and the abuse of rights doctrine, international 
law has moved towards limiting the remedies available to creditors in two main areas. First, 
there is a trend in International Investment Law towards the exclusion of sovereign bonds 
from ISDS instruments. Second, there has been a push for a broader reading of the necessity 
defence, both in International Soft Law and in the case-law on economic necessity. 
4.3.3.1 The Exclusion of Sovereign Debt from ISDS 
As exposed in the third chapter of this thesis, the characterisation of sovereign debt as an 
investment for the purpose of International Investment law861 is one of the key components 
in implementing the creditor protection model.  
In response to said characterisation three movements within treaty drafting have occurred. 
First, the EU integrated trade-and-investment treaty drafting practice features specific 
dispositions on sovereign debt862 . Second, there is an increase in the number of BITs 
explicitly excluding sovereign debt instruments from their scope of application ratione 
materiae. Finally, a recent arbitral decision declined to characterise sovereign bonds as 
investments under the meaning of article 25 of the ICSID convention863. 
Regarding EU treaty drafting, CETA has included specific provisions on sovereign debt. 
Annex 8-B article 2 reads: 
“No claim that a restructuring of debt of a Party breaches an obligation under Sections 
C and D may be submitted, or if already submitted continue, under Section F if the 
restructuring is a negotiated restructuring at the time of submission, or becomes a 
 
860 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18); Alessandro Accorinti and others v. European Central Bank (n 19). 
861 Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic (n 17); Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic 
(n 17); Giovanni Alemanni and Others v. The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility) 
(n 17). 
862 ‘Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the One Part, and the European Union 
and Its Member States, of the Other Part, 14 September 2016 (Brussels)’ article 12. 
863 Poštová banka, a.s. and Istrokapital SE v. Hellenic Republic (Award) (n 17). 
The Anti-holdout model  171 
negotiated restructuring after such submission, except for a claim that the restructuring 
violates Article 8.6 or 8.7.”864 
Article 3 adds: 
“Notwithstanding Article 8.22.1(b) and subject to paragraph 2, an investor of a Party 
may not submit a claim under Section F that a restructuring of debt of a Party breaches 
an obligation under Sections C and D (other than Article 8.6 or 8.7)7 unless 270 days 
have elapsed from the date of submission by the claimant of the written request for 
consultations pursuant to Article 8.19.”865 
In other words, CETA excludes any claims on sovereign debt once a negotiated restructuring 
has been agreed upon866. This exclusion should apply to either a restructuring via collective 
action clauses or a traditional debt swaps where a critical mass of creditors has been reached. 
In addition, CETA also instigates a 270 days freeze on litigation after a potential litigant 
places a request for consultation in the context of CETA dispute settlement867. 
Such a mechanism, while currently unique in international law has been advocated by the 
IMF 868  as a way to solve the collective action issues arising during sovereign debt 
restructurings. The stay on proceedings introduced in CETA serves two purposes. The first 
is to shield restructuring processes from holdout enforcement via the CETA dispute 
resolution mechanism. The second is to strengthen collective decision making by providing 
States and their creditors with a window to negotiate without risks of interruption by 
 
864 ‘Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the One Part, and the European Union 
and Its Member States, of the Other Part, 14 September 2016 (Brussels)’ (n 862). It should be noted that 
NAFTA explicitly excludes sovereign debt from its definition of investment. On this question see notably 
Kevin P Gallagher, ‘The New Vulture Culture: Sovereign Debt Restructuring and International Investment 
Rules’, The Clash of Globalizations: Essays on the Political Economy of Trade and Development Policy. K. 
Gallagher (eds.) (Anthem Press 2013); Kevin P Gallagher, ‘Financial Crises and International Investment 
Agreements: The Case of Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ (2012) 3 Global Policy 362. 
865 ‘Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the One Part, and the European Union 
and Its Member States, of the Other Part, 14 September 2016 (Brussels)’ (n 862). 
866 The Treaty defines negotiated restructuring as “restructuring or rescheduling of debt of a Party that has 
been effected through (a) a modification or amendment of debt instruments, as provided for under their terms, 
including their governing law, or (b) a debt exchange or other similar process in which the holders of no less 
than 75 per cent of the aggregate principal amount of the outstanding debt subject to restructuring have 
consented to such debt exchange or other process”. Ibid. However, litigation over negotiated restructurings is 
still available for breach of the most-favoured-nation or the national treatment clause. Ibid. It should also be 
noted that the US has followed a similar approach in a number of its BITs see: Kevin P Gallagher, ‘Financial 
Crises and International Investment Agreements: The Case of Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ (2012) 3 Global 
Policy 362. 
867 ‘Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the One Part, and the European Union 
and Its Member States, of the Other Part, 14 September 2016 (Brussels)’ (n 831) annex 8-b. 
868 Krueger (n 41) 11. 
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holdouts. Against that background, the stay on proceedings implemented in CETA 
implements both the first and second component of the anti-holdout model. 
In a similar fashion, it seems that newly concluded BITs have an increased tendency to 
exclude sovereign debt restructuring from their scope of application. Overall, a total of 
approximately 56 treaties currently in force explicitly exclude sovereign debt. While the 
overall share of treaties doing so is small, the ‘sovereign debt exception’ seems to have 
become more common in the recent year has shown in the graph hereunder869.  
 
This increase in the exclusion of sovereign debt from newly concluded treaties is both the 
result of an increase in the total number of sovereign debt exceptions since 2011, and a 
decrease in the overall number of treaties concluded. In other words, while less and less BITs 
are concluded, an increasingly large number of them explicitly excludes sovereign bond 
from their scope of application. 
As with the CETA exception, the exclusion of sovereign debt from BITs can be analysed as 
a way to shield restructuring processes from holdout enforcement via investment tribunals. 
Explicitly excluding sovereign debt from BITs ensures that even if sovereign bonds are 
characterised as investments under the meaning of article 25 of the ICSID convention, an 
 
869 The data for this chart is sourced from the Investment Policy Hub by UNCTAD, the treaties considered are 
all treaties still in force. The treaties included are both bilateral investment treaties sensu stricto and the other 
treaties including investment provision. Finally, some treaties while not excluding sovereign debt in the 
definition of investment include sovereign debt in a list of areas for reservations, they have been included in 
this list. Notably this seems to be the practice of the government of Canada. For a list of the treaties included, 
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arbitral tribunal could not have the competence, ratione materiae, to rule on sovereign debt 
restructuring processes. 
Regarding article 25 of the ICSID convention the Poştovâ tribunal ruled obiter dictum that 
sovereign bonds cannot be characterised as investments as defined by the Convention870. 
The case involved two claimants, a Slovak bank, Poştovâ banka and one of the banks 
shareholders, a European Public Limited Liability Company consolidated under Cypriot law 
named Istrokapital. Both argued that some of the measures implemented during the Greek 
restructuring were violating the Greece-Slovakia and the Greece-Cyprus BITs871.  
On the characterisation of bonds as investments872, the arbitral tribunal noted that the mere 
holding of sovereign bonds, remote from another economic venture, does not qualify as a 
contribution to the host’s State development873. The idea advanced by the tribunal is that the 
funds raised by the bonds only provide for the budgetary needs of the debtor and do not lead 
to “economically productive activities”874.  The arbitral tribunal also stated that the risk 
created by the holding of sovereign bonds does not constitute an investment or operational 
risk875, but rather should be understood as a mere commercial risk. This line of reasoning 
held even when the sovereign retroactively legislated to incorporate collective action clauses 
in the bonds876. 
So far, the Poštová decision appears to be an outlier within the ICSID case-law on sovereign 
debt877. Nevertheless, the decision to exclude sovereign bonds from ICSID’s competence, 
ratione materiae, would, if it were to be picked up in subsequent arbitral practice, lead to a 
stark limitation of the international remedies available to creditors.  
 
870 Poštová banka, a.s. and Istrokapital SE v. Hellenic Republic (Award) (n 17). 
871 For a comment on the Poştovâ decision and its place within the current investment case-law on sovereign 
debt see Kei Nakajima, ‘Parallel Universes of Investment Protection? A Divergent Finding on the Definition 
of Investment in the Icsid Arbitration on Greek Sovereign Debts’ (2016) 15 The Law &amp; Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals 472; Dimitrios V Skiadas, ‘Portfolio Investments in an EU Country under 
Crisis: Lessons from the ICSID Decision on the Case “Poštová Banka, a.s. and Istrokapital SE vs. The Hellenic 
Republic” - the Greek PSI Case’ (2016) 3 International Journal of Diplomacy and Economy 167. 
872 The Poştovâ tribunal also ruled that the Greek bonds were not covered by the definition of investment in 
the Greek-Slovakian BIT, as opposed to the Argentinian bonds in the Italy-Argentina treaty. Similalry the 
tribunal ruled that the holding of shares in one of Greece’s creditors did not give rise to ICSID competence. 
873 Poštová banka, a.s. and Istrokapital SE v. Hellenic Republic (Award) (n 12) 360-371; Cazala (n 265). 
874 Poštová banka, a.s. and Istrokapital SE v. Hellenic Republic (Award) (n 12) para 363; Cazala (n 265). 
875 Poštová banka, a.s. and Istrokapital SE v. Hellenic Republic (Award) (n 12) para 363. 
876 Boudreau (n 49); Poštová banka, a.s. and Istrokapital SE v. Hellenic Republic (Award) (n 12) para 368-369. 
877 Nakajima (n 871) 489. Noting, moreover, that the Postova tribunal does not engage in its decision with the 
rulings of its predecessor on sovereign debt and article 25 of the ICSID convention.  
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At today’s date, the Poštová decision, combined with a growing body of IIAs explicitly 
excluding sovereign debt renders the obtention of such remedies more uncertain for creditors. 
By itself, and given the costs linked to investment arbitration, this increased uncertainty 
should incentivise creditors against litigating sovereign debt at the international level. 
4.3.3.2 A Broader Interpretation of the Necessity Defence 
Another development in the international law on sovereign debt pushed forward by 
UNCTAD and the UN General Assembly, as well as legal scholars on sovereign debt, 
focuses on necessity as a circumstance excluding State responsibility878.  
The issue regarding necessity as a defence for State restructuring their debt is that the 
traditional reading of the norm is too restrictive to allow its effective use in an economic 
context879. Notably, in order to be able to invoke necessity, States have to demonstrate that 
they are acting to protect one of their essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; 
that breaching their international obligations is the only way to do so; that they have not 
contributed to the situation leading to the breach of international law; the obligation breached 
is not one of ius cogens880.  
Thus, it would extremely difficult for a debtor State to prove that it has not contributed to 
the situation leading to the invocation of the necessity defence and that it doesn’t have 
another solution than breaching international law to solve its debt crisis881. Finally, some 
authors underline that were a State of necessity to be employed to cover restructuring 
measures, the obligation of the debtor would only be suspended for the duration of the 
imminent peril. Thus, the debtor would still be bound to procure compensation to the victims 
 
878 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Resolution 69/319: Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Processes’ (n 21); UNCTAD, ‘Guidelines on Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing (Draft Version)’ 
<http://www.unctad.info/upload/Debt%20Portal/RSLB%20Guidelines/RSLB%20Guidelines%2025%20Aug
%202014.pdf>; Reinisch and Binder (n 28); ‘Argentinean State Bonds - Defense of Necessity in Relationship 
between State and Private Debtors’ (2007) 101 American Journal of international law 857. 
879 ‘Argentinean State Bonds - Defense of Necessity in Relationship between State and Private Debtors’ (n 
878); Reinisch and Binder (n 30); Waibel, ‘Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration’ (n 29). 
880 international law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,  
with Commentaries’ (n 519) 80; Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (n 
523) para 49; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(Advisory Opinion) (n 523) para 140. For a more detailed expose of these conditions see supra. 
881 See e.g. the very restrictive interpretation of the necessity defence applied in Enron Corporation and 
Ponderossa Assets L.P. v Argentine Republic (Award) (n 551); LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., 
and LG&E International, Inc .v. Argentine Republic (Decision on liability) (n 543); Waibel, ‘Two Worlds of 
Necessity in ICSID Arbitration’ (n 29); CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina (Award) 
(n 517). 
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of the breach882, again this is of little help for a debtor seeking to reduce its debt burden in 
the long term. 
Against that background, the UNCTAD principles, as well as the UNGA resolution seem to 
call for a broadening of the necessity defence in sovereign debt cases883. 
Principle 9, notably, endorses the idea that the debtor’s obligations do not resume after the 
situation justifying necessity has ended, as highlighted by the wording “can prevent the 
borrower’s full repayment”884. In addition, according to Howse885, the principles do not 
require a non-participation of the sovereign in the occurrence of the event leading to 
necessity886. 
However, if principle 9 broadens de lege ferenda the necessity defence in sovereign debt 
cases, it seems, de lege lata that the customary standard remains unchanged. As rightfully 
pointed out by Waibel887, the UNCTAD principles remain a soft law instrument that cannot 
by itself modify customary international law. Moreover, as highlighted earlier the voting 
patterns regarding the UNGA resolution and lack of sufficient practice seem to warrant the 
exclusion of the development of a new customary norm.  
In addition to the customary necessity standard, specific necessity clauses are also inserted 
in Bilateral Investment Treaties. As highlighted in chapter 2, litigation before investment 
tribunals focused on the interpretation of article XI of the US-Argentina BIT reading:  
“This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for 
the maintenance of public order, the fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the 
 
882 Waibel, ‘Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration’ (n 23) 643. 
883 UNCTAD (n 849) principle 9. 
884
 A contrario, according to Waibel, the principle distinguishes between “the recognition of a state of 
economic necessity (the third sentence of Principle 9) and the availability of necessity as a legal defence (the 
fourth sentence of Principle 9)”. Therefore, while principle 9 recognises that, economically, necessity might 
entail restructuring measures, legally, the UNCTAD principles do not attempt to modify the ambit of the 
necessity defence.” Waibel, ‘Out of Thin Air?’ (n 25) 103-105. 
885 Howse (n 25) 387. 
886 The implications of principle 9 mention: “A sovereign’s inability to continue normal debt servicing is 
typically caused by acute financial distress. Sometimes the sovereign will have been the author of its own 
difficulties (for example, by pursuing imprudent macroeconomic policies); occasionally a sovereign 
predicament will have been abetted by reckless creditor behaviour. In other cases the crisis may have been 
precipitated by events beyond the sovereign’s control (natural disasters or a general deterioration in 
international markets).” UNCTAD (n 849) principle 9; Howse (n 25) 387. 
887 Waibel, ‘Out of Thin Air?’ (n 25) 87-99. 
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maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the Protection of its own 
essential security interests.”888  
While most arbitral tribunals opted for a narrow interpretation of the necessity standard889, 
the Continental Casualty tribunal opted for a broader reading of the clause890. Instead of 
interpreting article XI of the US-Argentina BIT in light of the customary standard of 
necessity, the arbitral tribunal opted for a reading of necessity referencing the WTO 
Appellate body case-law891.  
The case involved a US based investment firm which held a large stake in an Argentinean 
insurance company. Following the Argentinean crisis, and in particular the South-American 
republic’s decision to de-dollarize the Argentinean peso, the assets of the aforementioned 
insurance company plummeted in value, prompting it to sue892. The US firm alleged that the 
measures imposed by Argentina during the crisis violated several dispositions of the US-
Argentina BIT, while Argentina argued, inter alia, that its liability was excluded by article 
XI of the BIT893. 
The Continental Casualty tribunal abandoned the ‘only way’ criteria required by the 
customary reading of necessity in favour of a balance-of-interests test. The tribunal justifies 
this departure from earlier arbitral case-law by highlighting textual similarities between 
article XI of the BIT and XX of the GATT. It decided that the necessity of a measure should 
be determined through “a process of weighing and balancing of factors” which usually 
includes the assessment of the following three factors: the relative importance of interests 
or values furthered by the challenged measures, the contribution of the measure to the 
 
888  Treaty between the United-States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investment (Buenos Aires) artice XI. 
889 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina (Award) (n 517); LG&E Energy Corp., 
LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc .v. Argentine Republic (Decision on liability) (n 543); 
Enron Corporation and Ponderossa Assets L.P. v Argentine Republic (Award) (n 551); Reinisch and Binder 
(n 30); Reinisch, ‘Necessity in Investment Arbitration’ (n 555). 
890 Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic (n 591). 
891 See e.g. Korea — Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef [2001] WTO Appelate 
Body DS 161; Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic (n 591). 
892 Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic (n 556) 37-66. For an overview of the factual 
background on the case, and an overall comment see notably Manu Misra, ‘The Necessity Defense & 
Continental Casualty: Importation of WTO Principles at the ICSID’ (2015) 2 McGill Journal of Dispute 
Resolution 129. 
893 Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic (n 556) 70. 
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realization of the ends pursued by it and the restrictive impact of the measure on 
international commerce”894. 
Regarding Argentina, the tribunal underlined that:  
“within the economic and financial situation of Argentina towards the end of 2001, the 
Measures at issue (…) were in part inevitable, or unavoidable, in part indispensable and 
in any case material or decisive in order to react positively to the crisis, to prevent the 
complete break-down of the financial system, the implosion of the economy and the 
growing threat to the fabric of Argentinean society and generally to assist in overcoming 
the crisis. In the Tribunal’s view, there was undoubtedly ‘a genuine relationship of end 
and means in this respect.’”895 
Examining whether Argentina could have opted for less restrictive measures in order to solve 
its financial issues, the tribunal underlined that: 
 “it is not its mandate to pass judgment upon Argentina’s economic policy during 2001- 
2002, nor to censure Argentina’s sovereign choices as an independent state”896. 
Finally, regarding the argument that Argentina had contributed to the development of its 
financial crises, the tribunal similarly underlined that:  
“States are basically free to adopt economic and monetary policies of their choice; and 
this Tribunal is not subjecting past economic policies to any judicial, administrative or 
political review.”897 
There are two key elements in the Continental Casualty reading of the necessity clause in 
the US-Argentina BIT.  
First, the ‘balance of interests’ approach followed by the arbitral tribunal allows sovereigns 
to escape the rigid framework of the customary necessity standard. It allows the tribunal to 
take into account the interests of the debtor State and its population when deciding whether 
the BIT breaches were necessary. Second, regarding the “less restrictive measures” and the 
 
894 ibid para 194, citing notably Korea — Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (n 
891) para 164. 
895 Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic (n 556)  para 197. 
896 ibid para 199. 
897 ibid para 224. 
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“non-contribution” arguments, relying on article XX of the GATT and the WTO case-law 
allow for the creation of regulatory room for manoeuvre for a debtor involved in a 
restructuring process898. In addition, it allows the arbitral tribunal to avoid having to second 
guess complex macro-economic decisions of the debtor899.  
Said interpretation of necessity is debated in the Investment arbitration case-law and 
scholarship900. Notably, there are doubts regarding the suitability of interpreting investment 
law dispositions in light of a trad agreement as both regimes pursue wildly different aims901.  
The common thread between necessity in the UNCTAD principles and the UNGA resolution 
and the continental casualty reading of the necessity defence, is that such an interpretation 
of necessity de facto limits the efficiency of the remedies available to creditors. As most 
sovereign debt crises occur in times of difficult economic circumstances, such interpretations 
effectively limit the likelihood that a sovereign’s responsibility will be triggered for 
measures it has implemented during a restructuring process. 
4.3.4 The Provision of Funds to the Debtor: Bail-outs by 
International Organisations 
A final aspect of the anti-holdout model in international law can be found in the increased 
involvement of international institutions in the prevention and resolution of sovereign debt 
crises, through the provision of bailouts to overindebted sovereigns. This section will mostly 
focus on two institutions: the IMF, especially regarding the creation of a systemic risk 
exception in its rules on loan conditionality and the European Stability Mechanism. 
 
898 Andrew Mitchell and Caroline Henckels, ‘Variations on a Theme: Comparing the Concept of “Necessity” 
in International Investment Law and WTO Law’ (2013) 14 Chicago Journal of international law 145–146 
<https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol14/iss1/5>. 
899 Ibid. See also LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc .v. Argentine 
Republic (Decision on liability) (n 543). 
900Contra ibid; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina (Award) (n 517); Enron 
Corporation and Ponderossa Assets L.P. v Argentine Republic (Award) (n 551). See also Mitchell and 
Henckels (n 898) 148–151; Jose Alvarez and Tegan Brink, ‘Revisiting the Necessity Defense: Continental 
Casualty v Argentina’, Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2010-2011. Karl P Sauvant, ed. 
(Oxford University Press 2012); Celine Levesque, ‘The Inclusion of GATT Article XX Exceptions in IIAs: A 
Potentially Risky Policy’ (ResearchGate) 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/297174751_The_inclusion_of_GATT_Article_XX_exceptions_in
_IIAs_A_potentially_risky_policy> accessed 2 April 2019. 
901 Alvarez and Brink (n 900) 319; Misra (n 892) 139; Levesque (n 900). 
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4.3.4.1 The Increased Role of the IMF in Bailing-out Overindebted States 
Prior to 2010, lending by the IMF was subjected to proof of the recipient’s debt sustainability. 
Article V of the IMF’s article of Agreement stipulated: 
“The Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its general resources, including policies on 
stand-by or similar arrangements, and may adopt special policies for special balance of 
payments problems, that will assist members to solve their balance of payments problems 
in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Agreement and that will establish 
adequate safeguards for the temporary use of the general resources of the Fund.”902 
The traditional reading of this disposition is that it prevents the IMF from lending available 
to States whose debt is unsustainable903. The IMF, defined sustainability as “whether a 
country’s debt can be serviced without an unrealistically large future correction in the 
balance of income and expenditure”904 .  
This definition requires the solvency of the debtor905, calculated through its debt-to-GDP 
ratio, but also takes into account liquidity constraints and the cost of financing. This last 
condition can prove problematic as the cost of financing tends to rise when its debt-to-GDP 
ratio and its liquidities are insufficient, making it more difficult to borrow from capital 
markets in order to repay already existing debt906. 
The logic behind tying bail-outs to debt sustainability is that, given the limited funding of 
the IMF, the fund ought to only make resources available to sovereigns if it is confident that 
the recipient will be able to reimburse the loan it has received907. If a sovereign’s debt is 
unsustainable, i.e. if its debt to GDP ratio is such that its sovereign debt crisis is not caused 
by a lack of liquidities but by insolvency, then bailing out the debtor only serves to delay its 
inevitable default. This would lead to the Fund wasting resources that could have been better 
used by another State. 
 
902 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (Bretton Woods) 1944, article V. 
903 Anne Krueger and Sean Hagan, ‘Sovereign Workouts: An IMF Perspective’ (2005) 6 Chicago Journal of 
international law 203, 206-207. 
904 IMF, ‘Assessing Sustainability’ <https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sus/2002/eng/052802.pdf>, 3. 
905 Whether the recipient’s future balance can accommodate its debts Wyplosz (n 88) 3-4. 
906 For an in-depth analysis of said borrowing conditions see ibid. 
907 Krueger and Hagan (n 874) 207. 
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The bail-out norms on debt sustainability have undergone radical changes following the 
Greek and Eurozone crises. For Greece, IMF lending began in 2010, and, overall, the fund 
lent over €30 billion, or 27% of the total bail-out extended by the Troika908. The issue 
regarding the Greek bail-out was that, in 2010, there were heavy doubts, expressed by the 
IMF’s staff itself that the Greek debt was sustainable909.  
However, as Greece’s situation, and the potential effects of a Greek default were deemed 
exceptional, the fund opted to adapt its conditionality framework to limit the impact of a 
Hellenic default on global markets. It was understood at the time that a Greek default could 
have spill-over effects on the banking system of the Eurozone, leading to a broader financial 
crisis. Moreover, a default by Greece could have negatively affected the status of the Euro 
as a global currency, leading to destabilising effects for the other members of the currency 
union910. 
As a result, the IMF chose to alter its ad hoc lending policy, accepting to lend to Greece even 
though its debt was not sustainable “with a high probability”911. This exception in the fund’s 
lending policy remained in place after the Eurozone crisis. Thus, at today’s date, lending by 
the IMF is available for any State, even those with unsustainable debts, if their default can 
trigger a systemic shock to global financial systems912.  
The principal effect of this easing in the IMF’s lending conditions is that it is now easier for 
large sovereign debtors913 to access IMF lending in times of crisis as the sustainable nature 
of their debt will not be taken into consideration. This facilitates said State’s access to 
liquidities enabling them to return to debt sustainability in an easier fashion. 
4.3.4.2 The Creation of the European Stability Mechanism 
As with the IMF, the EU normative framework on bailouts was altered following the Greek 
and Eurozone crises. Traditionally, article 125 of the TFEU had been read as preventing 
 
908 Susan Schadler, ‘Unsustainable Debt and the Political Economy of Lending: Constraining the IMF’s Role 
in Sovereign Debt Crises’ <https://www.cigionline.org/publications/unsustainable-debt-and-political-
economy-lending-constraining-imfs-role-sovereign-debt> accessed 18 February 2019, 7-9. 
909 ibid. 
910 For an overview of the systemic risk created by a Greek debt default see in general: Niccolò Battistini, 
Marco Pagano and Saverio Simonelli, ‘Systemic Risk, Sovereign Yields and Bank Exposures in the Euro Crisis’ 
(2014) 29 Economic Policy 203; ibid; Black and others (n 9). 
911 Schadler (n 908) 9–10. 
912 Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch and G Mitu Gulati, ‘The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy’ 
(Social Science Research Network 2013) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2144932 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2144932> accessed 16 August 2016. 
913 As those are more likely to trigger a systemic shock in case of failure. 
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bailouts of EU member States by EU institutions914 or other members of the Union.915 
Following the Greek crisis, and the risk of contagion it posed to broader financial markets 
the Troika opted to bail Greece out, under strict austerity conditions, in apparent violation 
of article 125916. 
In addition from bailing Greece out, the Member States decided, in 2010 to establish two ad 
hoc institution to deal with the broader Eurozone crisis: the European Financial Stability 
Mechanism and the European Financial Stability Facility917. Both institutions, tasked with 
bailing out members of the European Union, were backed by funds from Eurozone members 
and authorised to borrow from capital markets to gather the sums necessary for their 
mission918.  
The EFSM can be defined as: 
as “an intergovernmental agreement to provide financial assistance of up to EUR 60 
billion subject to strong conditionality in the context of a joint EU and IMF support which 
will be on terms and conditions similar to those imposed by the IMF”919 
The EFSF, a contrario, is: 
 
914  For a discussion on the EU response to the Greek crisis see: Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, ‘The EU 
Architecture to Avert a Sovereign Debt Crisis’ (2012) 2011 OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 167; 
Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, ‘Sovereign Debt Defaults: Paradigms and Challenges’ (2010) 11 Journal of 
Banking Regulation 91; Etienne de Lhoneux and Christos A Vassilopoulos, ‘The ESM Treaty and the European 
Law: A Necessary Coexistence’ in Etienne de Lhoneux and Christos A Vassilopoulos (eds), The European 
Stability Mechanism Before the Court of Justice of the European Union: Comments on the Pringle Case 
(Springer International Publishing 2014) <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01478-4_4> accessed 7 March 
2019; Paul Craig, ‘Pringle : Legal Reasoning, Text, Purpose and Teleology’ (2013) 20 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 3. 
915 Article 125 reads: “The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, 
regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any 
Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A 
Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or 
other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, 
without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.” Consolidated 
version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon) 2007 (12012E/TXT) article 125. 
916 de Lhoneux and Vassilopoulos (n 885) 43. There were other EU dispositions which could arguably have 
been breached by the implementation of the ESM treaty, especially in regard to the competence ratione 
materiae of the EU institutions to create such a framework. For an analysis of those potential challenges see 
ibid. 37-68. 
917 de Lhoneux and Vassilopoulos (n 885) 1-8. See also Olivares-Caminal, ‘The EU Architecture to Avert a 
Sovereign Debt Crisis’ (n 885). 
918 Marcello Minenna and Dario Aversa, ‘A Revised European Stability Mechanism to Realize Risk Sharing 
on Public Debts at Market Conditions and Realign Economic Cycles in the Euro Area’ (2019) 48 Economic 
Notes 12118; de Lhoneux and Vassilopoulos (n 885) 2-3. 
919 Olivares-Caminal, ‘The EU Architecture to Avert a Sovereign Debt Crisis’ (n 885) 5. 
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“a temporary credit-enhanced SPV with minimal capitalization created to raise funds 
from the capital markets on its investment grade rating and provide financial assistance 
to distressed [Euro-area Member States] at lower interest rates than those available to 
the latter”920 
Therefore, the function of the EFSM was to act as an institution bailing out members of the 
European Union, in collaboration with the IMF and on similar conditions921. The EFSF, on 
the other hand was a Special Purpose Vehicle whose task was to provide relief to Members 
of the Eurozone by raising money from capital markets922.  
Both ad hoc institutions were replaced in 2012 by the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM)923. The ESM, established by treaty, is an organisation tasked with the bailing out of 
Members of the Eurozone, in liaison with ECB and the IMF924. The funds used the by ESM 
to fulfil its functions are drawn both from contributions by Members of the Eurozone and by 
the ESM itself, as the organisation has the ability to borrow from private entities925.  
In order to authorise the creation of the ESM, the TFEU required the introduction of an 
article 136 (3) reading: 
“the Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to 
be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole.”926 
The conformity of the creation of the ESM with existing EU law was challenged before the 
European Court of Justice927. Claimants argued that the creation of the ESM through treaty 
by Member States was ultra vires as the regulation of the monetary policy of the Euro-Area 
 
920 ibid 17. 
921 ibid 5. 
922 ibid 5. 
923 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (Brussels); Olivares-Caminal, ‘The EU Architecture 
to Avert a Sovereign Debt Crisis’ (n 885) 13. On the creation of ESM see also Minenna and Aversa (n 889); 
de Lhoneux and Vassilopoulos (n 885). 
924 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (Brussels), recital 8. 
925 ibid; Minenna and Aversa (n 918); Olivares-Caminal, ‘The EU Architecture to Avert a Sovereign Debt 
Crisis’ (n 914); Riegner (n 6) 136. 
926 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon) article 136; de 
Lhoneux and Vassilopoulos (n 885) 45; Craig (n 885) 4. 
927 See Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland and Others Court of Justice of the European Union C‑370/12, 
Digit Rep Court Rep - Gen; Comments in: Craig (n 885); Etienne de Lhoneux and Christos A Vassilopoulos, 
‘The Pringle Judgment and Future Perspectives’ in Etienne de Lhoneux and Christos A Vassilopoulos (eds), 
The European Stability Mechanism Before the Court of Justice of the European Union: Comments on the 
Pringle Case (Springer International Publishing 2014) <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01478-4_5> 
accessed 7 March 2019. 
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is an exclusive competence of the EU itself928. In addition, claimants postulated that the 
establishment of the ESM contravened to article 125 of the TFEU, mentioned supra.  
Regarding the first point, the CJEU underlined that the establishment of the ESM was not a 
matter of monetary policy but rather should be read as relating to economic policy sensu lato, 
on which the EU does not enjoy exclusive competence929.  
Regarding the TFEU’s no-bailout clause, the Court of Justice underlined that the text of 
article 125 does not prohibit all kind of financial assistance by the EU or its Member States 
to other Member States930. Focusing on the object and purpose of article 125, the ECJ 
concluded that the actual aim of the article was to “prohibit the EU and Member States from 
granting financial assistance as a result of which the incentive of the recipient Member State 
to conduct a sound budgetary policy is diminished”931. 
In other words, according to the Court, article 125 enables the EU and its Member States to 
extend financial assistance to a Member of the Union as long as said assistance cannot be 
read by the Court as encouraging the recipient towards running budget deficits that would 
otherwise have been sanctioned by capital markets.  
Against that background, the Court ruled that the establishment ESM did not breach the 
obligation contained within article 125 as it did not make the Mechanism “liable for the 
commitments of the Member States”932. It seems therefore that as long as the ESM did not 
act as guarantor to the Eurozone Member States933, its creation did not breach what had 
previously been read as a no-bailout clause within the Treaty.  
The creation of the ESM and the Pringle decision clearly indicates a move in international 
law towards facilitating bailouts of systemically important heavily indebted sovereigns. This 
array of international assistance to over-indebted debtor limits the likelihood of default once 
 
928 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland and Others. (n 898) para 68; de Lhoneux and Vassilopoulos (n 
898) 38-40; Craig (n 885) 5-6. 
929 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland and Others. (n 898) 68; de Lhoneux and Vassilopoulos (n 898) 
38-40; Craig (n 885) 6. 
930 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland and Others. (n 898) para 135-136; de Lhoneux and Vassilopoulos 
(n 898) 52; Craig (n 885) 7-8. 
931 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland and Others. (n 898) para 136. 
932 ibid para 146. 
933 Craig (n 885) 8. 
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a restructuring has been agreed to and should thus lead to a broader acceptance of 
restructuring offers by creditors, as the default risk of sovereigns is lowered. 
4.4 The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Anti-holdout model 
After having reviewed the essential components of the anti-holdout model, and their 
implementation in international law, the third part of this thesis will now focus on addressing 
the strengths and weaknesses of this new regulatory model. 
Overall, the main strengths of the anti-holdout model lie in the fact that it limits the costs of 
debt restructurings for most stakeholders, and encourages negotiations between States and 
their creditors, thus enhancing the legitimacy of the restructuring process as a whole.  
For these reasons, the anti-holdout model appears to be more suited to the current contractual 
structure of sovereign debt. These improvements over the creditor protection model however, 
do not signify that there are no weaknesses in the way sovereign debt currently works. 
Notably, the current system for restructuring State debt heavily favours large institutional 
investors over retail holders of bonds, and the legal avenues via which the anti-holdout model 
has been implemented creates a risk of fragmentation of the law on sovereign debt. Finally, 
the current regulatory model does not encourage States to restructure their debts as early as 
possible. 
4.4.1 The Strengths of the Anti-holdout model 
4.4.1.1 A Faster Return to Debt Sustainability 
The main strength of the anti-holdout model is that it facilitates sovereign debt restructurings. 
This shortens the average time needed to bring a sovereign back to debt sustainability and 
limiting the costs of restructuring processes for all parties involved. 
This facilitation of sovereign debt restructurings is done via three main tools within the 
model. First, majority decision-making enables restructurings to proceed once a majority of 
creditors agree over a restructuring proposal. As the majority of debt titles are usually held 
by large institutional investors, who have an interest in seeing the debtor return to debt 
sustainability934, majority decision-making creates a positive feedback loop between the 
 
934 See IMF, ‘Sovereign Investor Base Dataset for Emerging Markets’ (n 3). 
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creditors who have an interest in seeing the sovereign succeed in its restructuring and their 
debtor935. This holds true whether majority decision-making is implemented via the use of a 
CAC or via the use of good faith and the abuse of rights doctrine. 
Beyond majoritarian decision making, the current model further facilitates sovereign debt 
restructurings by impeding attempts of holdout creditors to litigate over sovereign debt. 
These incentives against litigation, and these limits to the abilities of creditors to enforce 
their rights, limit the likelihood of enforcement attempts disrupting an agreed restructuring 
proposal. Moreover, with judicial enforcement of sovereign debt being more difficult, 
would-be holdouts are incentivised towards accepting a reasonable restructuring proposal, 
rather than seeking full payment before courts and tribunals.  
Litigation over sovereign debt is disincentivised via several measures, both in domestic and 
international law. CACs prevent holdout litigation on the contractual rights arising from 
sovereign bonds 936 . Good faith and the abuse of rights doctrine, further disincentivise 
litigation by increasing the likelihood that international courts and tribunals will rule in 
favour of a sovereign whose restructuring proposal has been accepted by most creditors937. 
Similarly, a broader interpretation of the necessity defence, as advocated in soft law938, and 
applied in Continental Casualty939, increases the likelihood that a State in dire economic 
circumstances will be absolved of its international responsibility.   
Disincentivising holdouts also depends upon limiting the availability of fora available for 
creditors. Notably, the current trend in IIAs towards the exclusion of sovereign debt litigation, 
and the narrower interpretation of article 25 of the ICSID convention put forwards in 
Poštová940, may prevent holdout creditors from litigating sovereign debt before investment 
tribunals.  
A final incentive against litigation can be found in the limitation of remedies available to 
creditors. Notably, the new drafting of the pari passu941 clause and the rank of payment 
 
935 Buchheit and Reisner (n 256); Fisch and Gentile (n 73) 1059. 
936 International Monetary Fund (n 13); International Capital Market Association (n 678). 
937 E.g. Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18); Alessandro Accorinti and others v. European Central Bank (n 19). 
938  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (n 16) principle 9; ‘United Nations General 
Assembly, Sixty-Eitgh Session, Resolution towards the  Establishment of a Multilateral Legal Framework for 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes , A/RES/68/304’ 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/304>, principle 1.  
939 Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic (n 591). 
940 Montanaro (n 453). 
941 International Monetary Fund (n 13). 
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interpretation of the clause942 prevent holdouts from obtaining rateable payment as a remedy. 
Similarly, anti-vulture fund legislation943 and a strengthening of sovereigns’ immunities of 
execution944 limit the ability of holdouts to obtain payment via domestic courts. 
Beyond disincentivising litigation, the anti-holdout model improves the rapidity of sovereign 
debt restructurings by enabling debtors to better access the funds needed to maintain their 
liquidity. This is done either by diminishing sovereign’s indebtedness, as majority decision-
making lets a State obtain a haircut on all their bonds, or by providing sovereigns with funds 
via international institutions. 
4.4.1.2 Increased Legitimacy of Restructuring Processes 
The second strength of the anti-holdout model is that it increases the legitimacy of the 
decision reached during the debt workout.  
The anti-holdout model incentivises both States and their creditors towards reaching amiable 
solutions to sovereign debt crises. For the sovereign, given that decisions to restructure 
benefit from majority agreements945, negotiating with creditors is a quasi-necessary step to 
ensure that restructuring proposals will reach sufficient support to trigger a CAC, or lead to 
the conclusion that holdouts are acting in bad faith946. 
Moreover, the good faith principles, when apply to sovereign debt arguably leads to a 
judicially enforceable obligation by the sovereign to negotiate with its creditors. This could 
mean that a State failing to do so may become the target of litigation by disgruntled creditors. 
 
942 Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada (n 28); Zamour (n 74). 
943 Loi du 12 juillet 2015 relative à la lutte contre les activités des fonds vautours. 
944 Debt Relief (Developping Countries) Act 2010; ‘Loi Du 28 Avril 1999 Visant à Transposer La Directive 
98/26/CE Du 19 Mai 1998 Concernant Le Caractère Définitif Du Règlement Dans Les Systèmes de Paiement 
et de Règlement Des Opérations Sur Titres.’ (n 741); LOI n° 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la 
transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économique; Loi visant à empêcher 
la saisie ou la cession des fonds publics destinés à la coopération internationale, notamment par la technique 
des fonds vautours. 
945 As reaching an agreement with the majority of the creditor base shelters the result of the negotiation from 
holdout enforcement. See also Goldmann, ‘Putting Your Faith in Good Faith: A Principled Strategy for 
Smoother Sovereign Debt Workouts’ (n 651) 130–131. 
946 ibid 130. 
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In addition, under the CETA agreement, a stay on enforcement is in place during 
negotiations947, providing State and their creditors with a window during which they can 
peacefully negotiate. 
These negotiations further the legitimacy of debt restructurings as they ensure that solutions 
to sovereign debt crises are acceptable for most creditors and that creditors have been 
involved in the decision-making process.  
Finally, majority-decision making shrouds sovereign debt restructurings with a democratic 
appearance. While votes in CACs, and majorities for the purpose of good faith and the abuse 
of rights doctrine, are not quantified on a per virem basis, it is undeniable that majority 
decision making appears more democratic than unilateral ‘take-it or leave-it’ offers by the 
debtor.  
This increase in legitimacy contributes towards rendering restructuring offers more 
acceptable to the creditor base, and to the debtor’s population. As a result, it is likely that 
compliance with the decisions reached during the restructuring will increase, both for 
creditors and the sovereign debtor. 
4.4.1.3 Management of sovereign defaults and restructuring risks 
The final strength of the anti-holdout model is that it spreads the costs (and therefore the 
risks) of sovereign debt restructurings across the entirety of a State’s creditor-base and not 
only towards the creditors likely to accept a haircut. 
In effect this furthers the risk management aspects of the bond market, the main driving force 
behind the Brady plan which lead to its creation948. To recall, the main advantage of bonds 
over syndicated loans is that a secondary market enables a broader class of investor to gain 
exposure to the risks of sovereign indebtedness. Thus, when sovereigns fail on their bonds, 
they are less likely to take with them critically important financial institutions, as their 
default risk is spread across various creditor classes. 
However, successful holdout creditors unbalance some of the risk distributing effects of the 
bond market. Indeed, these creditors can avoid the losses caused by sovereign debt 
 
947 ‘Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the One Part, and the European Union 
and Its Member States, of the Other Part, 14 September 2016 (Brussels)’ (n 832) annex 8-b. 
948 Monteagudo (n 8); Ghosal and Miller (n 158); Dellas and Niepelt (n 297). 
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restructuring by obtaining payment on the full value of their bonds. This means, in effect, 
that the costs of sovereign debt restructurings were only born by the creditor classes who 
accept debt restructuring, i.e. large financial institutions.  
The anti-holdout model, because it seeks to prevent holdout enforcement and enables 
majority restructuring, spreads restructuring costs back to the entirety of a sovereign’s 
creditor base. This means that, for most creditors, the costs of bringing the sovereign back 
to debt sustainability are lower, and thus restructuring more acceptable. Correlatively, the 
spread of restructuring costs also leads to a reduced exposure of important financial 
institutions to sovereign debt failures, thus strengthening the stability of the global financial 
system as a whole. This stabilising effect is furthered by the provision of bail-outs 
specifically designed to prevent sovereign failure from triggering systemic crises. 
4.4.2 The Weaknesses of the Anti-holdout model 
4.4.2.1 Fragmentation as a product of legal innovation 
Fragmentation is a classic trope of international law 949 . It refers to the risk of legal 
contradictions created by the rise of specialised international legal regimes 950 . As 
international law specialises, both from a substantive and from a dispute settlement 
perspective, the likelihood that alike situations are not treated alike rises. From a substantive 
point of view fragmentation occurs when a same situation can be treated differently by two 
different legal regimes. This creates the need for conflict of law norms in international law951. 
From a dispute settlement perspective, the risk is that specialised fora might interpret 
international law in different ways952. 
 
949 It should be noted that fragmentation, in the realm of sovereign debt law is not only apparent at the 
legislative level but also stems from decentralised contract drafting. Gulati and Gelpern in particular note 
divergences in the drafting of CACs and pari passu clauses in New-York. See Mitu Gulati and Anna Gelpern, 
‘Innovation After the Revolution: Foreign Sovereign Bond Contracts Since 2003’ (2009) 4 Capital Markets 
Law Journal 85. 
950 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘international law Commission: 58th Session. Report of the Study Group of the ILC: 
Fragmentation of international law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
international law.’ <http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l682.pdf>. 
951 C Wilfred Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’ (1953) 30 British Year Book of international law 
401; Koskenniemi (n 959). 
952 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The ICJ, the ECJ, and the Integrity of international law’ (2003) 52 The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1; Olivier Delas and others, Les juridictions internationales : complémentarité ou 
concurrence ? (Emile Bruylant 2005). See also Riegner (n 6). 
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Sovereign debt restructurings, as a phenomenon, fall under the scope of a broad array of 
legal orders and under the potential jurisdiction of a number of international and domestic 
courts.  
Notably, sovereign debt is subject to the contract law chosen in the bonds, usually New-
York or English law953, or alternatively the domestic law of the issuer954. Additionally, 
sovereign bonds could be subject to domestic legislation, such as legislation reinforcing 
sovereign immunities or the Belgian anti-vulture fund act 955 . The characterisation of 
sovereign debt as an investment leads to the applicability of International Investment law956. 
However, an expropriatory measure could similarly fall under the Human Rights Law957, 
customary international law, or European Law958. 
From a dispute settlement perspective, different courts and tribunals have interpreted the law 
on sovereign debt in notoriously contradictory fashion.  
The anti-holdout model, given that its implementation required both regulatory action by 
public entities and reversal of well-established case-law, further raises the likelihood of 
fragmentation. This thesis identifies two critical areas where risks of fragmentation are 
particularly high: the competence of arbitral tribunals on sovereign debt, and the adoption of 
new domestic law. 
Regarding the competence of investment tribunals, risks of fragmentation arise from the 
interaction between the decentralised nature of the ICSID system and the internationality of 
the bond market. Reducing the likelihood that investment tribunals are competent for 
sovereign debt disputes either requires arbitral tribunals to interpret article 25 of the ICSID 
convention à la Poštová, or changes in BIT drafting959.  
 
953 Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch (n 4) 142. 
954 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18); Alessandro Accorinti and others v. European Central Bank (n 19). 
955 Debt Relief (Developping Countries) Act 2010; Loi visant à empêcher la saisie ou la cession des fonds 
publics destinés à la coopération internationale, notamment par la technique des fonds vautours; Loi du 12 
juillet 2015 relative à la lutte contre les activités des fonds vautours; LOI n° 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 
relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économique. 
956 Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic (n 17); Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic 
(n 17); Giovanni Alemanni and Others v. The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility) 
(n 17); Waibel, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box’ (n 81). 
957 De Dreux-Brézé c. France (n 419); Thivet v. France (n 419); Malysh and others v Russia (n 419); Mamatas 
et autres v. Greece (n 18). 
958 Alessandro Accorinti and others v. European Central Bank (n 19); Stefan Fahnenbrock et. al. C Hellenische 
Republic (n 307). 
959  On this question see Nakajima (n 871); Gallagher, ‘Financial Crises and International Investment 
Agreements’ (n 866). 
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Regardless of the avenue the anti-holdout model opts for, the law on sovereign debt risks 
entering a twilight zone during which States and investors cannot, in advance, know whether 
investment litigation on sovereign debt is likely. 
Moreover, altering the drafting of BITs results in increasingly multiple drafting of ‘sovereign 
debt clauses’ in BITs. For example, at today’s date, while some treaties explicitly include or 
explicitly exclude sovereign debt960, others merely include: “obligations, private or public 
titles or any other right to performances or services having economic value, including 
capitalized revenues”961 or similarly “bonds, debentures, loans and other forms of debt, 
including rights derived therefrom” 962. 
In the current state of the case-law, it is uncertain whether the mere inclusion of debt 
instrument or bonds in the non-exhaustive list of investment covers sovereign bonds, or 
rather is designed as only applies to corporate bonds. It is particularly unclear given that 
some treaties precise that the bonds or debentures included in the definition of investment 
are those “of an enterprise”963. 
In addition to such drafting, some treaties include a catch-all provision reading “any right of 
economic nature conferred under law or contract, as well as any license and concession 
granted in compliance with the applicable provisions applicable to the concerned economic 
activities, including the prospection, cultivation, extraction and exploitation of natural 
resources”964 or “claims to money which has been used to create an economic value or. 
claims to any performance having an economic value”965. 
 
960 For a BIT explicitly including sovereign debt see e.g. ‘Agreement between Japan and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, Signed in Jeddah 2013.’ Including in their definition 
of investment bonds, debentures, loans and other forms of debt, including rights derived therefrom as well as 
securities issued by the government of a Contracting Party”. 
961  Treaty between the United-States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investment (Buenos Aires). 
962 ‘Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Uzbekistan for the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection 
of Investment, Signed in Tashkent 2008.’ 
963 ‘Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of Burkina Faso for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments 2015.’ 
964 ‘Agreement between Italy and Argentine Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investment (Signed 
in Buenos Aires) 1990’; Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic (n 17); Giovanni Alemanni and Others v. 
The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (n 17); Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others 
v. Argentine Republic (n 17). 
965 ‘Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Democratic Socialistic Republic of Sri Lanka 
Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 2000.’ 
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It should be noted that this catch-all provision can be included either in BITs  broadly 
mentioning debt instruments in their definition of investment966, or in those only mentioning 
the debt instruments of enterprises967. Here again, the interpretation of such treaties remains 
open.  This multiplicity of drafting does not be appear to be diminished when analysing the 
BITs of a single State. For example, Japan’s BITs include both explicit exclusions of 
sovereign debt 968 , explicit inclusions of it 969 , treaties featuring the catch-all provision 
without mentioning bonds as an investment 970  and treaties mentioning bonds as an 
investment but without catch-all provisions971. Similarly, while US BITs typically tend to 
exclude sovereign debt, Gallagher underlines that the US-Korea BIT does not explicitly 
exclude it972.  
The problem with this multiplicity of drafting becomes more apparent when it is combined 
with the internationality of the bond market. BITs ratione personae apply to the nationals of 
the sovereign signatories to the Treaty973. Bonds, however, can usually circulate across 
borders due to their transferability. Ergo, one issuer could first issue bonds in the US, under 
American law, but these bonds could be bought by an Italian National. At the domestic law 
level, this is not an issue, the law selected in the bonds, and the jurisdiction chosen by the 
bond, will apply without regard to the nationality of its holder. However, when litigation 
stems from BITs, creditors can litigate based on their nationality, putting the debtor in a 
position where it is nearly impossible to know in advance if international litigation is 
likely974. 
 
966 ‘Agreement between Italy and Argentine Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investment (Signed 
in Buenos Aires) 1990’ (n 964); Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic (n 17); Giovanni Alemanni and 
Others v. The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (n 17); Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. 
and others v. Argentine Republic (n 17). 
967 ‘Agreement between the Government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Government of Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Kingstown (2010)’. 
968 ‘Agreement between Japan and the State of Israel for the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of 
Invsement, Signed in Tokyo 2017.’ 
969 ‘Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Uzbekistan for the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection 
of Investment, Signed in Tashkent 2008.’ (n 962). 
970 ‘Agreement between Japan and the Arab Republic of Egypt Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment, Signed in Tokyo 1977.’ 
971 ‘Agreement between the Governement of the Republic of Korea and the Government of Japan for the 
Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investment, Signed in Seoul 2002.’ 
972 Gallagher, ‘Financial Crises and International Investment Agreements’ (n 864). 
973 Engela C Schlemmer, ‘Investment, Investor, Nationality, and Shareholders’ [2008] The Oxford Handbook 
of International Investment Law 
<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199231386.001.0001/
oxfordhb-9780199231386-e-2> accessed 17 April 2019. 
974 On this question see notably: Gallagher, ‘Financial Crises and International Investment Agreements’ (n 
864). 
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The same issue arises when the anti-holdout model is implemented via domestic legislation. 
As highlighted supra, several domestic lawmakers took it upon themselves to implement 
domestic solutions to the collective action issues explored in this thesis. Notably, both 
Belgium975 and the UK976 reinforced the immunity of execution of economically distressed 
sovereigns, and both France977 and Belgium978 implemented legislation designed to limit 
vulture fund litigation.  
As domestic pieces of legislation, the applicability of the aforementioned acts is limited 
ratione loci. These acts only apply to sovereign debt litigation occurring before the domestic 
courts of the sovereigns enacting them.  
This limited applicability severely limits the practical usefulness of such laws, especially the 
French and Belgian anti-vulture fund dispositions. Indeed, since sovereign bonds, 
contractually tend to elect American and English courts for dispute settlement, litigation on 
sovereign debt usually occurs before said courts979.  
Here again, the problems lie with the internationality of the bond market and the seeming 
ubiquity with which holdout creditors seem able to search for attachable assets 980 . 
Fundamentally, unless legislation changes in the United-States or the United-Kingdom, 
domestic changes in litigation are unlikely to have a practical impact on holdout creditors 
and sovereign debt litigation as a whole.  
4.4.2.2 Retail Investors and the Anti-holdout model 
Retail investors are an understudied category of debt holders when it comes to understanding 
the contemporary law on sovereign debt. Individual holders of bonds are not only a growing 
part of the creditor base, with a recent IMF dataset indicating that they hold roughly 25% of 
all sovereign’s external debt981, but are also a growing category of litigants. Notably, during 
the Argentine restructuring process, individual Italian holders of bonds sued Argentina 
 
975 Loi visant à empêcher la saisie ou la cession des fonds publics destinés à la coopération internationale, 
notamment par la technique des fonds vautours. 
976 Debt Relief (Developping Countries) Act 2010. 
977 LOI n° 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la 
modernisation de la vie économique. 
978 Loi du 12 juillet 2015 relative à la lutte contre les activités des fonds vautours. 
979 Belle (n 721). 
980 Muir Watt (n 340). 
981 IMF, ‘Sovereign Investor Base Dataset for Emerging Markets’ (n 3). 
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before ICSID tribunals 982 . Likewise, individuals sued Greece before domestic German 
tribunals983, the European Court of Justice984, and the European Court of Human Rights985.  
Against that background, focusing on the effects of the anti-holdout model on small 
bondholders makes sense for two reasons.  
First, retail investors, are a particularly vulnerable category of debt holders. Thus, 
understanding the effects of a restructuring on their financial health matters from a consumer 
protection perspective.  
Second, and more fundamentally, while vulture fund litigation is a seemingly disappearing 
phenomenon, litigation by retail investors is a growing phenomenon. As litigation disrupts 
restructuring processes, incentivising retail investors against litigating is logical as it would 
promote more efficient restructuring processes. In order to understand why the anti-holdout 
model fails retail investors, one has to understand why they differ from vulture funds. 
Vulture funds, as understood in this thesis, are arbitrageurs. They purchase sovereign bonds 
at their market value on the secondary bond market, and then realise them at a second, higher 
value, their judicial value, in a courthouse986.  
The restructuring protection model works as a tool to disincentivise vulture funds because it 
makes this financial gamble unrealisable. Before domestic court, CACs prevent holdout 
enforcement 987 , and the enhanced pari passu prevents vulture funds from effectively 
coercing States into repaying vulture funds. With the domestic avenue for litigation closed, 
one could expect vulture funds to move towards international litigation. However, 
international litigation, as an avenue for dispute settlement is more uncertain988. In addition, 
arbitral tribunals are extremely expensive means of dispute settlement as opposed to 
domestic courts989. This, effectively, closes the window for arbitrage. 
 
982 Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic (n 17); Giovanni Alemanni and Others v. The Argentine Republic 
(Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (n 17). 
983 Stephan Fahnenbrock et al v Hellenische Republic [2015] Court of Justice of the European Union C‑226/13, 
C‑245/13, C‑247/13, C‑578/13. 
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Retail investors operate following a different investing strategy. They purchase bonds as a 
savings device990. Litigation, for retail investors therefore performs a different economic 
function than it does for vulture funds. For vulture funds, litigation is a calculated investing 
strategy. For individuals, however, litigation is a way to potentially mitigate the costs of a 
debt restructuring.  
In addition, as opposed to more sophisticated investors, individual holders of bonds have 
more to lose following a haircut. First, if studies conducted on shareholding hold true in the 
bond market991, the position of retail investors tends to be more concentrated. This means 
that a loss on an individual’s bonds will, comparatively, be more painful, the same loss for 
a bank or a pension fund. Retail investors are also unable to hedge their losses by accessing 
the derivatives market, as they lack the capital required for the purchase over-the-counter 
derivatives trading992. 
Moreover, as mentioned before, individuals are not economically incentivised to participate 
in the restructuring process. As opposed to institutional investors, they do not have a long-
term relationship with the debtor and will therefore not benefit from its return to capital 
markets.  
The fact that individuals suffer comparatively more losses than their more sophisticated 
counterparts is problematic in the restructuring protection model as majority decision-
making means that smaller holders cannot prevent a loss on their bonds993. This problem is 
compounded by the fact that retail investors, or their representatives, are usually not invited 
to the restructuring negotiations, preventing them from impacting the final decision994.  
 The fact that the creditors who have incentives towards restructuring hold the decision-
making power during the restructuring process is a positive development as it speeds up the 
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restructuring process. The problem is that it also results in an amalgamation both vulture 
funds and retail investors under the holdout ‘moniker’, to the detriment of smaller holders.  
The perfect example of this amalgamation can be found in the reasoning of the ECtHR in 
the Mamatas case995. The ECtHR in Mamatas relied on the notion of reasonableness to 
dismiss the claimants’ assertion that their property rights had been violated. The court, in its 
reasoning notes the price at which Greek bonds were trading at the time of the restructuring, 
the market’s acceptance of CACs and the fact that the applicants decided to hold on to their 
bonds rather than liquidating them. It then uses these findings to argue that the claimants had 
not acted as “prudent and circumspect investors”, and therefore could not claim that their 
property rights had been unlawfully limited by Greece996.  
The problem with the Court’s reasoning is not that it opted to sanction the retrofit CACs, as 
this measure was necessary to ensure the success of the Greek restructuring process. Rather, 
the decision by the Strasbourg Court to analyse the behaviour of retail investors under the 
same standard as sophisticated players within the sovereign debt market seems questionable.  
The ECtHR, as the ECJ in Accorinti997, underline that the claimants,  should have been aware 
of the risk linked to the holding of Greek bonds given the price at which they were trading, 
and given the fact that even in 2009,Greece’s debt to GDP ratio was high. 
The argument that investors should have been aware, that the purchase of Greek bonds 
entailed significant risk seems artificial. The yield on 10-year Greek bonds in 2009, 
according to data gathered by the Bank of Greece oscillated between 4.52% in August, and 
5.87% in March998. German 10-year bonds that same year yielded between 3.02% in March 
and 3.47% in June, according to data gathered by the St Louis Federal Reserve999. As a 
 
995 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 18). 
996 Mamatas et autres v. Greece (n 13) para 54. 
997 Alessandro Accorinti and others v. European Central Bank (n 14) para 82. 
998 Comparing the Greek and German securities for that year makes more sense than comparing Greek bonds 
and 3 month US Treasuries, usually used as a benchmark for risk as it allows to minimise any differences 
linked to an exchange risk, indeed, in 2009, both Greece and Germany borrowed in Euro. Using German bonds 
as a benchmark for risk for Euro-denominated government securities can be justified by the fact that Germany 
is traditionally considered the safest borrower of the Eurozone. The figure quoted here are from 
https://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Statistics/rates_markets/titloieldimosiou/titloieldimosiou.aspx?Year=
2009 
999 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IRLTLT01DEM156N; Heather D Gibson, Stephen G Hall and George S 
Tavlas, ‘The Greek Financial Crisis: Growing Imbalances and Sovereign Spreads’ (2012) 31 Journal of 
International Money and Finance 498. 
The Anti-holdout model  196 
further point of comparison, the yield on 10 Year treasury bonds that year oscillated between 
2.48% and 2.60% according to data gathered by US Department of Treasury1000.  
Bond yields, of course, are not only a proxy for the riskiness of the investment, but also for 
its desirability and can be impacted by other factors such as global inflation1001. 2009 bond 
yields might be distorted by broader market trends that year, notably the 2008 financial crisis 
which brought investors seeking safe havens from global volatility towards government 
securities, hence reducing their yield1002. However, used as a rough approximation of risk 
assessment by market actors, the yield on Greek bonds highlight that investors, despite 
Greece’s high debt to GDP ratio, did not consider the Greek government securities as a 
particularly reckless investment1003.  
Once the Greek restructuring was under way, and Greece’s default was deemed unavoidable 
by institutional stakeholders and credit rating agencies, the value of Greek bonds 
plummeted1004 . This meant that their holders already suffered consequential unrealised 
losses. At this point, were a retail investor to liquidate her position on Greek government 
securities, as suggested by the court, the losses would be realised. Logically, at this point, a 
prudent and circumspect institutional investor would liquidate. It would take in a loss and 
absorb it, either through gains in its portfolio, or through hedging. However, for a retail 
investor, selling at this point meant taking in a certain loss.  
One can therefore argue that the decision of such a retail investor to hold on to her bonds, 
especially when the Greek government had provided assurances that individuals would be 
spared during the restructuring1005, made economic sense. Contrary to the court’s reasoning, 
the fact that individual holders act differently than the majority of bondholders does not 
mean that, given their specific circumstances, they act unreasonably or in bad faith.  
Finally, given that for some retail investors, litigation is a mean to protect an investment, to 
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more difficult or more expensive might not be sufficient to prevent it. Specific provisions 
designed to make haircuts more palatable for retail investors are therefore required.  
4.4.2.3 The Sovereign Debtor in the Anti-holdout model 
the anti-holdout model mostly focuses on collective action issues between debtors and their 
creditor-base. While this approach is an appropriate response to the problems raised in the 
1990s and 2000s by holdout litigation, it does not address one of the central issues of debt 
restructurings: the lack of incentives, for debtor governments, to restructure their debt when 
necessary1006.  
The problem with debtors, under the current model, is that faced with domestic political 
pressures, governments may prefer to delay inevitable restructurings. This renders debt 
workouts more expensive, and thus more painful for creditors and the debtor’s population1007.  
For example, it is only following partial default on its bonds in November 2017 that 
Venezuela organised a rather unproductive meeting with its bondholders, despite having 
been plunged in a financial crisis for several years1008. Since this initial meeting, little efforts 
have been made by the Maduro government to resolve its debt crisis In the meantime, the 
living condition of Venezuela’s population deteriorated as inflation rose to historically high 
levels1009. 
The anti-holdout model addresses the issues arising after the sovereign has opted to open 
negotiations and restructure its debt. However, nothing within the current regulatory model 
is designed to entice the debtor’s government to restructure its debt when necessary. Such a 
situation is problematic, as later restructurings lead to higher costs not only for the 
sovereign’s debtor, but also for its population. 
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5. Conclusion 
5.1 Overview 
For most of its history, sovereign lending can be understood as a gamble by private entities 
that the sovereign to whom they have extended credit will choose to honour its contractual 
obligations. While mechanisms designed to increase the likelihood of repayments have 
nearly always been a feature of the sovereign/creditor relationship, actual judicial remedies 
guaranteeing repayment have been a historical exception rather than a rule. As such, 
economists sought to understand the sovereign debt puzzle by reference to either reputational 
games between States and their potential lenders1010, or by explaining that States could 
improve their borrowing conditions by providing their creditors with credible commitment 
devices1011.  
As such, rights of creditors had been guaranteed via supersanctions 1012 , gunboat 
diplomacy1013, the pledging of securities1014 and diplomatic protection1015. These means of 
protection were often inefficient as they subjected creditors to the political whims of their 
national State or failed to shield them from the debtor’s regulatory powers.  
A combination of factors from the 1970s onwards would see this situation change. First, as 
the ‘70s unfolded, bringing with them steep rates of inflation, the Bretton Woods institutional 
system started to show cracks and displayed an inability to face borrowing demands of 
LDCs1016. Bank syndicates entered this breach, re-opening private lending for developing 
sovereigns for the first time since the 1930s.  
The law potentially applicable to sovereign debt, however, differed from the one in force in 
the 19th and early 20th century. First, the law of immunities had evolved to enable private 
entities to litigate against sovereigns before domestic courts for acta de iure gestionnis1017. 
Second, at the international level, from the 90s onwards, two new avenues had been opened 
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to enable litigation by individuals and companies against sovereigns: human right courts1018 
and investment tribunals1019. 
During the following years, and up until the early 2000s, contractual design and court 
decisions showed a systematic bias towards favouring creditors. This bias, coupled with 
creditor heterogeneity, lead to collective action issues within the sovereign debt market, 
preventing sovereigns from efficiently restructuring their debts when necessary. These 
increased difficulties, led, in turn, to changes within the law on sovereign debt, at the 
contractual level, the domestic law level and the international level.  
These evolutions were accompanied by a spectacular fragmentation of the law on sovereign 
debt, both within the case law and the scholarship. At the judicial level, domestic and 
international courts rendered several highly contradictory and highly controversial decisions, 
whether on necessity1020, the interpretation of the pari passu clause1021, the applicability of 
ISDS to sovereign debt1022, or even the law on immunities1023. 
Approaches to sovereign debt were similarly fragmented within the legal scholarship on 
sovereign debt. Scholars have treated the social phenomenon that is sovereign debt in a 
divided way, falling on either side of the traditional domestic/international division of law. 
Methodologically, sovereign debt was examined through the lens of legal positivism, or law 
and economics, and focused on finding technical solutions to the problems plaguing the 
sovereign debt market. Alternatively, sovereign debt was approached in a highly political 
way, but few studies have provided a broad overview of how sovereign defaults and 
restructurings have been regulated. 
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Understanding the last forty years of legal development on sovereign debt, and 
understanding what type of incentives the current regime on default and restructuring 
provides, requires systematizing these fragmented approaches. This thesis has done so by 
providing a law and economics-based framework via which legal norms on sovereign debt 
can be understood. This framework examines the incentives produced by the domestic and 
international norms on sovereign debt, and sorts said norms according to the type of 
behaviour they seek to encourage. Such an understanding of sovereign debt, and the 
criticisms of the current regime it leads to, are necessary, when the prospect of a global 
financial crisis and defaulting sovereigns has risen again following the Covid pandemic. 
In order to understand sovereign debt, this thesis had to depart from traditional law and 
economics1024 and acknowledge that the behaviour of market actors is not fully rational but 
bounded by external factors1025. Notably, that high transaction costs may have prevented 
contractual developments1026. Similarly, the democratic appearance of CACs may increase 
compliance with restructuring offers and participation to the restructuring process. In the 
same vein, a fully institutionalist reading of State behaviour 1027 , would prevent 
understanding that governments, due to domestic political pressure, may not restructure 
when needed1028. 
The ‘new law and economics’ approach used here, treats the actors within the sovereign debt 
market as rationally bounded, but still influenceable by legal norms, either via their structural 
impact on the market, their effect as a pricing mechanism, or their legitimacy.  
The net result of this approach is that one can systematise the law on sovereign defaults and 
restructurings as a succession between two distinct regulatory models: the creditor protection 
model and the anti-holdout model.  
The creditor protection model relied on the idea that norms within the sovereign debt market 
should enable creditors to effectively enforce the obligations against the debtor. Such 
abilities should not be understood merely as favouring private interests over the interests of 
sovereigns and their populations, as the remedies act as judicial credible commitment 
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devices1029, incentivising creditors to lend. Thus, they enable sovereigns to borrow under 
better conditions. 
To function, the creditor protection model required a combination of three elements: first, 
access to competent and independent jurisdictions by creditors; second a recognition of the 
sovereigns’ obligations by said jurisdictions; finally, effective remedies to coerce the 
sovereign. 
Attempts to put in place all those components explain much of how the law on sovereign 
debt, both international and domestic has developed. Recognising that debt restructurings 
are acta de iure gestionnis 1030 , forum selection clauses in sovereign bonds, and the 
Abaclat 1031 , Ambiente 1032  and Alemanni 1033  decisions let creditors access independent 
domestic and international jurisdictions. Choice-of-law clauses1034, currency clauses1035 and 
a narrow reading of the necessity defence1036 ensured creditors that the obligations arising 
from the sovereign debt relationship were recognised by courts and tribunals and were 
protected from the sovereign’s regulatory reach. Finally, changes in the law of immunities 
and the rateable payment interpretation of the pari passu1037 clause provided creditors with 
variably efficient ways to coerce sovereigns into fulfilling their obligations.  
While these remedies did not guarantee that States would honour their obligations, they 
heavily favoured creditors and increased the chances of them being able to obtain payment. 
Thus, they provided a tax on defaulting, repudiating, or restructuring, and strategically 
enabled creditors to sue. In addition, these remedies ensured that sovereigns could not renege 
on their debts and should therefore respect the rule of law, thus legitimising the actions of 
litigating creditors. 
Such a situation was not problematic when the main contractual instruments for sovereign 
indebtedness were syndicated loans. Given the contractual structure of bank syndicates, and 
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given that large banks are in a long term client relationship with sovereign debtors, actors 
within the syndicated sovereign debt market had no interest in systematically suing 
restructuring sovereigns1038 . However, while the club-like nature of syndicated lending 
enabled lenders to coordinate during restructurings, and disincentivised reckless 
enforcement, it created a system where critically important financial institutions were 
heavily exposed to default risks of LDCs1039. When this system came to a halt during the 
Latin American crisis, sovereign indebtedness took the form of bonds, whose transferability 
enabled risk to be spread to broader classes of creditors.  
This heterogeneity of the bond market proved to be a double edge sword as it brought 
creditors which lacked the incentives to allow States to restructure their debts when needed: 
vulture funds and retail investors1040. 
These two groups of creditors would seize the remedies made available under the creditor 
protection model and heavily disrupt several restructuring processes, leading to increased 
uncertainty as to the success of much needed debt restructurings.  
This lead in the development of the second model, the anti-holdout model. The anti-holdout 
model seeks to improve upon the efficiency of sovereign debt law by providing the sovereign 
and its creditors with legal tools to facilitate debt restructurings. Thus, it seeks to 
disincentivise holding out and litigating reasonable restructuring offers.  
It relies on three key components: majoritarian decision-making during restructurings, 
incentives against holding out from restructuring offers, and the provision of funds to 
improve the debtor’s liquidity.  
Notably, the insertion of Collective Action Clauses in sovereign bonds1041, and reliance on 
good faith or good faith-like reasoning in adjudication1042 promote majority decision-making.  
The rank of payment reading of the pari passu clause1043, anti-vulture fund legislation1044, a 
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strengthening of immunities of execution1045, reliance on good faith and the abuse of rights 
doctrine and a more generous reading of the economic necessity defence1046 have reduced 
the efficiency of remedies available to creditors. This increases the likelihood that they will 
accept restructuring offers.  
Similarly, CACs prevent a minority of holdouts from suing the debtor for breach of contract 
if a majority of creditors has agreed to a restructuring offer.  
Finally, the systemic risk exception in IMF conditionality as wells as the creation of ESM1047 
have created new venues via which sovereigns can bolster their liquidity during crises thus 
limiting private exposure to default.  
Most of these developments, are essentially taxes on litigation, they lower the odds of 
success before courts without changing the pay-off.  Moreover, the insertion of CACs also 
restructures the creditor/debtor relationship by enabling the latter to restructure by majority 
decision making. Finally, the use of majority processes, and reliance on quasi-natural law 
principles, such as good faith and the abuse of rights, provides legitimacy to sovereigns 
refusing to repay holdouts. 
The main advantage of the anti-holdout model is that it facilitates debt restructurings, thus 
limiting the costs of reducing a sovereign’s over-indebtedness, both for the sovereign itself, 
but also for its population and most of its creditors. 
Despite these strengths, there remain some weaknesses in the current regulatory model for 
sovereign debt. First, the system as it is currently designed relies upon the idea that prompt 
restructurings are efficient. Research has shown that States restructuring too late is one of 
the main sources of costs during sovereign debt workouts1048. However, sovereign debt law, 
as it currently stands, does little to encourage sovereign to act as early as possible. 
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Similarly, while the current model is designed to disincentivise holding out, it does little to 
ensure that retail investors have an interest in accepting a reasonable restructuring offer by 
the sovereign. It therefore fails from a consumer protection perspective, and from an anti-
holdout perspective. 
Finally, the way via which legal innovation has been advanced in the sovereign debt market, 
via a disparate range of legal instruments and contradictory court decisions, raises the 
possibility of fragmentation. This added fragmentation leads to added uncertainty in times 
of restructuring. 
The paradigm-mapping exercise pursued in the pages of this thesis was necessary because  
understanding these blind-spots in the current regulatory model required moving away from 
a narrow technical lens when assessing the norms on sovereign debt. It also required a model 
of sovereign debt regulation which transcended the domestic/international legal boundary to 
fully map the sets of incentives applicable to sovereigns and their creditors. 
In highlighting issues created by the move away from the creditor protection model and 
towards an anti-holdout model, this thesis should not be regarded as discrediting recent legal 
developments. Rather, it understands these issues as unforeseen consequences of a model 
which improves on a previously dire situation.  
Finally, avenues to improve upon those blind spots can be developed and will briefly be 
examined the next, final section.  
5.2 Moving Forward: potential solutions to improve upon the 
contemporary regulatory model 
5.2.1 Reducing Fragmentation: Regional Agreements and Sovereign 
Debt 
The classic solution for fragmentation is the creation of multilateral conventional 
instruments. An international mechanism for sovereign debt restructuring has been, regularly 
suggested1049. Notably, in the early 70s, the Group of 77 suggested the instigation of an 
 
1049 Kenneth Rogoff and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, ‘Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 
1976–2001’ (2002) 19 IMF Staff Paper 
<https://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/staffp/2002/03/pdf/rogoff.pdf>. 
Conclusion  205 
International Debt Commission, tasked with assessing the debt of developing states and 
establishing recommendations to tackle over indebtedness1050. Similarly, scholars since, at 
least the 1980s have suggested the creation of a multilateral framework for sovereign debt 
restructuring, either centred on the IMF1051, or independent1052. 
At today’s date, the core of the discussion on an international mechanism for sovereign debt 
restructuring centres on Anne Krueger’s proposal for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism1053, operating in collaboration with the IMF1054. The establishment of such a 
multilateral system runs into two issues, one is political, the other legal. 
Politically, ‘creditor states’ have systematically opposed the creation of such mechanisms1055. 
As previously highlighted, the same creditor states voted against the recent UN general 
assembly resolution on sovereign debt, indicating that their opposition to a public 
international law-based framework for sovereign debt resolution remains strong1056. Given 
the opposition of creditor states, the establishment of such a treaty-based international 
mechanism to restructure sovereign debt seems unlikely. 
Moreover, legally, the creation of an additional instrument governing sovereign debt 
restructuring will not help reduce the fragmentation of the current regime. Fragmentation 
will remain unless said new multilateral instrument implicitly or explicitly repeals all other 
international norms applicable to sovereign debt restructurings. Rather, the creation of an 
additional instrument applicable to sovereign debt would only lead to the creation of 
additional conflict between norms. In addition, unless said multilateral instrument is made 
directly applicable, it does not seem that it would equally apply to creditors acting before 
domestic courts.  
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Series ; [Proceedings] 181. 
1052 See e.g. Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (n 1049). 
1053 Krueger (n 76). 
1054 ibid. 
1055 See in general Ocampo (n 32); Euliss (n 76); Mooney (n 76). 
1056 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Resolution 69/319: Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Processes’ (n 22). It should be noted that creditor States do not oppose all developments towards facilitating 
debt restructuring. Rather, their opposition seems to focus on the establishment of mechanisms to that effect in 
international law, contractual modifications being therefore preferred. See Mooney (n 76). On the role of 
creditor States within the development of the law on sovereign debt, and its links to sovereign equality see 
Klabbers (n 23) 247. 
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Against that background, it does not seem that the drafting of an international treaty on 
sovereign debt is the solution to the fragmentation issues that contemporary sovereigns face 
when restructuring their debt. 
A possible way to reduce the legal uncertainty created by the combination between the 
international nature of the bond market and drafting variation in BITs could be found in 
regional trade and investment agreements. Indeed, the multilateral nature of these 
instruments enables them to apply equally to bondholders of several nationalities, therefore 
overall reducing the number of possible drafting variations. 
For example, the already mentioned CETA treaty explicitly applies to sovereign bonds1057. 
CETA defines investments as:  
“Every kind of asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the 
characteristics of an investment, which includes a certain duration and other 
characteristics such as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of 
gain or profit, or the assumption of risk. Forms that an investment may take include:  
(…)  
shares, stocks and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise; bonds, debentures 
and other debt instruments of an enterprise; (…)  
claims to money or claims to performance under a contract;”1058 
This broad definition of investment, featuring the catch-all provision displayed in the 
Argentina-Italy BIT at stake in the Abaclat1059, Alemanni1060 and Ambiente1061 decisions is 
further developed regarding sovereign debt by Annex X.17, on CETA’s applicability to 
sovereign debt. Annex X explicitly excludes sovereign bonds from the ISDS dispositions of 
 
1057 ‘Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the One Part, and the European 
Union and Its Member States, of the Other Part, 14 September 2016 (Brussels)’ (n 862). 
1058 ibid. 
1059 Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic (n 17). 
1060 Giovanni Alemanni and Others v. The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (n 
17). 
1061 Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic (n 17). 
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CETA, except for cases related to MFN and National Treatment dispositions within the 
treaty1062. A similar exclusion of sovereign debt features in the NAFTA agreement1063.  
Mega-regionals reduce the uncertainty linked towards adjudicating sovereign debt through 
ISDS at two different levels.  
The multilateral nature of the instrument reduces the overall number of potential instruments 
applying to a single bond issue or restructuring. This facilitates the task of States and their 
creditors in ascertaining whether international litigation is possible on sovereign debt. Indeed, 
as they replace multiple pre-existing BITs, mega-regionals reduce the overall number of 
potentially applicable BITs to a single debtor.  
This advantage of regional trade and investment agreements is tempered by the fact that, for 
the near-foreseeable future, their use is unlikely to fully replace the already existing BIT 
system. Indeed, while the overall use of regional agreement is on the rise, and while the 
overall number of newly concluded BITs is falling, the current system for the adjudication 
of investment disputes remains BIT-centric.  
The second advantage of regional agreements is that compared to BITs, they usually feature 
more detailed dispositions on sovereign debt. This is easily explained by the fact that, if one 
wants to introduce reform regarding ISDS application to sovereign debt, doing so via 
multilateral regional agreements entails less transaction costs. Adding dispositions limiting 
the applicability of international investment agreements to sovereign debt involves a certain 
cost, linked to the fact that the sovereigns signing the treaty have to negotiate the exact 
content of said dispositions. Moreover, from a reputational or a credible commitment point 
of view, a State’s willingness to prevent litigation on its own debt may be perceived badly 
by its creditors. In a BIT, these costs are incurred by the two signatories alone, however, in 
a regional agreement, the same cost can be spread across all the parties to the treaty. 
 
1062 ‘Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the One Part, and the European 
Union and Its Member States, of the Other Part, 14 September 2016 (Brussels)’ (n 862). 
1063 ‘North-American Free Trade Agreement’, article 1139. 
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5.2.2 Incentivising Retail Investors against Litigating: GDP-
Linked Bonds and Representation 
The position of retail investors within the restructuring protection model creates a 
conundrum. On the one hand, litigation makes restructuring more complex and expensive, 
it hurts the interests of most stakeholders and therefore, when possible, should be avoided1064. 
On the other hand, preventing reasonable litigation by retail investors might lead them to 
exit the sovereign debt market, leading to higher borrowing costs for smaller economies or 
to higher concentration of risk in key players within the financial system.  
A potential solution to this conundrum would be to strengthen the path dependency between 
retail investors and the borrower. The problem with retail investors, from a game theoretical 
perspective, is that they play a single round of the prisoner’s dilemma game. If one could 
turn them into repeat players, it would incentivise them towards accepting restructuring 
proposals without potentially leading to their exit from the sovereign debt market.  
A potential solution could come from the use of GDP-linked bonds. GDP-linked bonds are 
floating rate bonds, with a rate tied to the GDP of the issuer1065. In other words, the pay-off 
on GDP-linked bonds rises when the debtor does well economically. Restructurings usually 
involve a menu of options for creditors, for example, bonds with extended maturity, a 
reduced interest rate or a reduced principal compared to the securities swapped during the 
restructuring1066.  
Systematically adding GDP-linked bonds to this menu, hence making them available for 
retail investors, would entice them into accepting a restructuring offer and would dissuade 
them from litigating once the swap has occurred. Regarding the first point, GDP-linked 
bonds could be used as a sweetener as the size of the haircut on the initial bonds would be 
reduced with the floating rate going up during periods of economic growth for the debtor. 
Basically, GDP-linked bonds allow for a haircut, ab initio. However, if this haircut is 
 
1064 See e.g. Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch and Henrik Enderlein, ‘Sovereign Defaults in Court: The 
Rise of Creditor Litigation 1976-2010’ [2012] SSRN Electronic Journal 
<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2189997> accessed 17 October 2016. 
1065 David Barr, Oliver Bush and Alex Pienkowski, ‘GDP-Linked Bonds and Sovereign Default’ in Joseph E 
Stiglitz and Daniel Heymann (eds), Life After Debt: The Origins and Resolutions of Debt Crisis (Palgrave 
Macmillan UK 2014) <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137411488_16> accessed 1 March 2019. 
1066 Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch (n 4) 7. 
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successful and creates economic growth for the debtor, then the rate of the bonds rises, 
paying for part of the debt write-off1067.  
Second, because the floating rate is linked to economic growth in the debtor’s economy1068, 
holders of GDP-linked bonds are incentivised towards creating said economic growth. As 
litigation creates uncertainty during a restructuring process, holders of GDP-linked bonds 
should be incentivised against litigating.  
Fundamentally, the use of GDP-linked bonds could allow debt issuers to create a long-term 
commitment between themselves and retail investors. Retail investors would thus be 
financially invested in the success of the restructuring process and incentivised towards 
voluntarily participating to it.  
In addition to GDP-linked bonds, ensuring the participation of representatives of retail 
investors to negotiations could strengthen the legitimacy of the restructuring agreement, and 
thus act as an incentive for retail investors to accept the result of negotiations.  
Direct participation of retail investors to the restructuring process is impossible given the 
number of small bondholders and the difficulties in inviting them all individually. However, 
ensuring the participation of legal representatives of small bondholders to the restructuring 
process could help achieve a similar effect.  
Several model of creditor representation have been envisaged for sovereign bonds1069 . 
Trustees for example are legal representatives of creditors, given power to trigger 
enforcement on the bonds in case of defaults1070. Trustees are a regular feature of modern 
bond issues with BNY Mellon acting as a trustee on some of Argentina’s restructure bonds 
and a trust a trust indenture being put in place for Ecuador’s bonds during its 2008 default1071. 
The advantage of trustees is that they can act both as representative of creditors, and therefore 
directly participate in the restructuring negotiations, while also wielding judicial powers.  
 
1067 Barr, Bush and Pienkowski (n 1033) 247. 
1068 While a State’s GDP is not a perfect measure of its economy, it is one of the few values that is easily usable 
as an easy economic indicator for economic growth. ibid. 
1069 For an overview of creditor representation during the Argentinean practice see Olivares-Caminal, Legal 
Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (n 5) 136–142. 
1070 Buchheit, ‘Trustees versus Fiscal Agents for Sovereign Bonds’ (n 319) 410. 
1071  See Mitu Gulati and Lee Buchheit, ‘The Coroner’s Inquest: Ecuador’s Default and Sovereign Bond 
Documentation’ [2009] International Financial Law Review 22. 
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Their issue, when focusing on retail investor participation in specifis, is that usually trust 
indentures or trust deeds are set for the whole of a bond issue1072. Trustees, as such, act as 
collective action clause in that they represent the majority of the bondholders, which is 
constituted by large players on the sovereign debt market.  
Creditor Committees could therefore provide a better framework through which retail 
investor protection could be achieved.  Creditor Committees are committees designed to 
represent the interest of bondholders following an event of default. As opposed to trustees 
they do not act as representatives of all the holders of a specific issue, but rather as ad hoc 
institutions designed for the representation of specific groups of holders1073. Dispositions for 
the creation of creditor committees can be included directly in the bond documentation, 
ensuring the existence of a legal framework for the creation of such committees prior to any 
default. 
In this case, the ICMA provides bond issuers with a standardised clause for the formation 
and management of such committees. The problem with the ICMA standardised clause, 
however, is that it requires the participation of 30% of bondholders for the creation of a 
committee. In practice, some issuers have favoured different required participation threshold, 
some as low as 25%, some as high as 50%1074. 
To encourage the participation of retail investors, a low required participation threshold 
might be more beneficial as it would broaden the potential issues in which such committees 
could be set up. In cases where several creditor committees are set up, a steering group has 
to be established, enabling them to coordinate their actions. A more systematic set up of 
creditor committees representing the interests of retail investors could strengthen the 
legitimacy of the decisions made during a restructuring process, and ensure that options for 
retail investors are at least considered during the restructuring negotiations. 
 
1072 Buchheit, ‘Trustees versus Fiscal Agents for Sovereign Bonds’ (n 377). 
1073 See Michael Waibel, ‘Engagement between Creditors and Sovereign Debtors: Guidance on Setting up 
Creditor Committees (EMTA Special Seminar: Further Improvements in the Market-Based Approach to 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring)’; Buchheit, ‘Use of Creditor Committees in Sovereign Debt Workouts’ (n 233). 
1074 See Michael Waibel, ‘To Formalize or Not to Formalize: Creditor–Debtor Engagement in Sovereign Debt 
Restructurings’ (2018) 13 Capital Markets Law Journal 452. 
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5.2.3 Incentivising States towards Restructuring Unsustainable 
Debts: A Contractually Enforceable Obligation to 
Restructure 
If the legal framework on sovereign debt is to be economically efficient, it has to provide 
incentives for the debtor to undertake politically difficult debt restructurings as soon as 
possible.  
Under the current system, the decision to kickstart debt restructurings lies firmly in the 
debtor’s hands, up until an event of default, as defined by the bonds’ documentation. 
Typically, events of defaults are defined as a breach of one of the bond’s clauses1075, usually 
events of default will be triggered by a missed payment on the bonds1076.  
The problem with this definition, or with the reliance on events of default to trigger creditor’s 
remedies1077, is that they ignore situations in which no contractual dispositions have been 
breached despite the fact that the debtor’s debt burden is unsustainable1078. 
Therefore, as long as the debtor has sufficient liquidity to meet short-term payment 
obligations, creditors are unable to force the State to restructure its debt. Given that events 
of defaults, as traditionally understood, do not allow creditors to rely on their contractual 
remedies prior to breach of contract, an expansion of the definition seems necessary.  
Ams et al.1079 have suggested redefining events of defaults via the use of three different legal 
categories:  
- Technical defaults, defined as events of defaults as contractually defined, but not 
constitutive of default under reputable third-party norms, e.g. credit rating agencies 
or CDSs1080. 
 
1075 Julianne Ams and others, ‘Chapter 7: Sovereign Default’, Sovereign Debt:   A Guide for Economists and 
Practitioners (IMF) <https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/News/Seminars/2018/091318SovDebt-
conference/chapter-7-sovereign-default.ashx>. 
1076 For an overview of the potential events of default arising from a standard bond issuance see Olivares-
Caminal, Legal Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring (n 5) 3. 
1077 In addition to litigation or payment acceleration, events of default also determine when creditor committees 
can be set up. Buchheit, ‘Use of Creditor Committees in Sovereign Debt Workouts’ (n 233); Waibel, 
‘Engagement between Creditors and Sovereign Debtors: Guidance on Setting up Creditor Committees (EMTA 
Special Seminar: Further Improvements in the Market-Based Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring)’ (n 
1073). 
1078 Ams and others (n 1075). 
1079 ibid 3. 
1080 ibid. 
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- Contractual defaults, defined as events of defaults that also constitute a default under 
reputable third-party norms1081.  
- Sustentive defaults, which count as defaults under reputable third-party norms but 
not as an event of default in contractu.1082 
The problem of this expanded definition of default is that it still relies on, either a financial 
default, the fact that the State has not repaid part of its original debt, or a breach of contract. 
Hence, it does not allow for pre-emptive remedies available to creditors when default has 
not yet occurred but seems inevitable.  
Designing such a remedy runs into two main potential issues. If the conditions for the use of 
the remedy are too narrow, the remedy is potentially useless. If they are too wide, they could 
potentially allow creditors to disturb a debt arrangement without proper cause. 
Against that background, this thesis suggests the use of an automatic negotiation obligation, 
tied to external appraisals of debt sustainability. Its purpose is to create, for the State, an 
obligation to convene a meeting of bondholders or their representatives once a substantial 
downgrade in the likelihood of its debt repayment has been pronounced. Failure to convene 
such a meeting should, in turn, be constitutive of a breach of contract, hence creating an 
event of default.  
The first step would be to implement into sovereign bonds themselves such an obligation to 
negotiate in case of doubts on the sustainability of the issuer’s debt. Two external sources 
could be provided for an appraisal of debt sustainability.  
First, the IMF’s Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA). The IMF’s DSA has several advantages 
for the purpose of using it as an indicator of debt repayment triggering an obligation to 
negotiate. First, it is conducted by an independent third party, the IMF. It is also standardised 
and conducted regularly1083. The IMF’s DSA takes into account several variables influencing 
debt sustainability such as the debtor’s GDP, inflation, interests and exchange rates. It 
correlates said variables with the debt-to-GDP ratio of the issuer, and issues a series of stress 




1083 On the DSA see Wyplosz (n 88) 2. 
1084 ibid 3-6. 
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of the economic and political institutions of the debtor1085. The results are then published by 
the IMF, with a label applied to each issuer, ranging from “low risk” to “high risk” or “debt 
distress”.  
One could imagine the obligation of the issuer to organise a meeting of bondholders to be 
linked with either a DSA going from medium to high risk or from high risk to debt distress.  
A second source for the appraisal of a State’s debt sustainability could come from credit 
rating agencies. There are several advantages on the use of credit rating agencies. First, as 
opposed to the IMF they are not perceived as political institutions. Their credit rating is also 
more nuanced than the 5 steps scale of the IMF. Moreover, according to Reinhart, credit 
rating agencies have a good track record in predicting default1086. In addition, rating is 
performed on separate bond issues and not the debt as a whole, allowing for added flexibility. 
There are however two main issues with the use of credit rating agencies1087. As private 
entities CRAs are funded by the issuer, raising potential questions of conflict of interests1088. 
Second, there are issues regarding the transparency of their methodologies1089.  
Using the automatic negotiation process, once a downgrade in debt sustainability outlook 
has occurred, the issuer has a legal obligation to convene a meeting of bondholder or their 
representative. Thus, under this system, a mere downgrade does not trigger an event of 
default, meaning that creditors could not use this opportunity to demand payment 
acceleration, or sue; similarly it could not lead to a contamination of the issuer’s other 
instruments via cross-default clauses. 
This meeting should be convened within a limited time window, and its purpose is to give 
representatives of the issuer an opportunity to propose solutions to prevent an eventual 
default. The downgrade in debt sustainability should also be linked to the ability to create 
creditor committees. At the end of these negotiations, a vote should take place, on the same 
majorities as CACs either demanding a debt restructuring, or refusing it. If a qualified 
 
1085 ibid 11. 
1086 They are however more problematic when it comes to predicting currency crises. Carmen M Reinhart, 
‘Default, Currency Crises, and Sovereign Credit Ratings’ (2002) 16 The World Bank Economic Review 151. 
1087 John Patrick Hunt, ‘Credit Rating Agencies and the Worldwide Credit Crisis: The Limits of Reputation, 
the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement’ (2009) 2009 Columbia Business Law Review 
109; Lynn Bai, ‘On Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Industry’ (2010) 13 New York 
University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 253. 
1088 On potential conflict of interests in CRAs see Bai (n 1087); Franklin Strier, ‘Rating the Raters: Conflicts 
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majority of creditors agrees that a restructuring is necessary, then a second round of 
negotiations should occur to determine the size of the haircut.  
Failure by the State to negotiate, at either of these stages would be characterised as a breach 
of contract, hence leading to an event of default and enabling creditors to accelerate payment 
or seek judicial enforcement.  
The advantage of such a solution is that it would allow for negotiations to occur 
automatically in cases where doubts are expressed on the likelihood that the debt will be 
repaid, without these doubts being considered events of default. Moreover, it also relies on 
pre-existing mechanisms and institutions, making it relatively easy to put in place and also 
synergises with the use of CACs and Creditor Committees, thus ensuring the representation 
of most creditors. 
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Annex 1: List of Treaties explicitly excluding 
sovereign debt 
The following list has been compiled by the author relying on the UNCTAD Bilateral 
Investment Treaty Database. It only encompasses the Bilateral Trade and Investment 
Agreements, in force in 2018. 
Acuerdo Entre El Gobierno De Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos Y El Gobierno De La 
Republica Argentina Para La Promocion Y Proteccion Reciproca De Las Inversiones, 1995. 
Agreement Between The Government Of Australia The Government Of The United 
Mexican States And On The Promotion And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, 1996. 
Agreement Between The Republic Of Austria And Bosnia And Herzegovina For The 
Promotion And Protection Of Investments, 1998. 
Agreement Between The Republic Of Austria And The Republic Of Cuba For The 
Promotion And Protection Of Investments , 1998. 
Agreement Between The Republic Of Austria And Georgia For The Promotion And 
Protection Of Investments, 1999. 
Agreement Between The Republic Of Austria And The Republic Of Guatemala For The 
Promotion And Protection Of Investments, 1999. 
Agreement Between The United Mexican States And The Republic Of Austria On The 
Promotion And Protection Of Investments, 1999. 
Agreement Between The Government Of The Republic Of Croatia And The Government Of 
The Republic Of Azerbaijan On The Promotion And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, 
2000. 
Agreement Between The Government Of The Kingdom Of Bahrain And The Government 
Of The United Mexican States On The Promotion And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, 
2000. 
Annex 1: List of Treaties explicitly excluding sovereign debt
  256 
Agreement Between The Government Of The United Mexican States And The Government 
Of The Republic Of Belarus On The Promotion And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, 
2000. 
Agreement Between The Government Of Canada And The Government Of The Republic 
Of Benin For The Promotion And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, 2000. 
Accord Entre L'union Economique Belgo-Luxembourgeoise, D'une Part, Et Le 
Gouvernement De La République Du Perou, D'autre Part, Concernant L'encouragement Et 
La Protection Reciproques Des Investissements, 2001. 
Acuerdo De Cooperación Y Facilitación De Inversiones Entre La República Federativa Del 
Brasil Y La República De Chile, 2002. 
Acordo De Cooperação E Facilitação De Investimentos Entre A República Federativa Do 
Brasil E A República Da Colômbia, 2005. 
Investment Cooperation And Facilitation Agreement Between The Federative Republic Of 
Brazil And The Republic Of Malawi, 2005. 
Acordo De Cooperação E Facilitação De Investimentos Entre A República Federativa Do 
Brasil E Os Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 2005. 
Canada - Honduras Fta (2013), 2005. 
Agreement Between The Government Of Canada And The Government Of The Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region Of The People's Republic Of China For The Promotion And 
Protection Of Investments, 2006. 
Agreement Between Canada And The Hashemite Kingdom Of Jordan For The Promotion 
And Protection Of Investments, 2006. 
Agreement Between Canada And The State Of Kuwait For The Promotion And Protection 
Of Investments, 2006. 
Agreement Between Canada And Mali For The Promotion And Protection Of Investments, 
2006. 
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Agreement Between Canada And Mongolia For The Promotion And Protection Of 
Investments, 2006. 
Agreement Between Canada And The Republic Of Peru For The Promotion And Protection 
Of Investments, 2007. 
Agreement Between Canada And The Federal Republic Of Senegal For The Promotion And 
Protection Of Investments, 2007. 
Agreement Between Canada And The Republic Of Serbia For The Promotion And 
Protection Of Investments, 2007. 
Agreement Between The Government Of Canada And The Government Of The United 
Republic Of Tanzania For The Promotion And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, 2008. 
Investment Agreement Between The Government Of The Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region Of The People’s Republic Of China And The Government Of The 
Republic Of Chile, 2008. 
Accuerdo De Inversion Entre La Republica De Chile Y La Republica Oriental Del Uruguay, 
2008. 
Bilateral Agreement For The Promotion And Protection Of Investments Between The 
Government Of The Republic Of Colombia And The Government Of The People's Republic 
Of China, 2009. 
Colombia - Costa Rica Fta, 2009. 
Agreement For The Promotion And Protection Of Investments Between The Republic Of 
Colombia And The Republic Of India, 2010. 
Colombia - Korea, Republic Of Fta, 2010. 
Acuerdo Entre El Reino De España Y La República De Colombia Para La Promoción Y 
Protección Recíproca De Inversions, 2011. 
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Bilateral Agreement For The Promotion And Protection Of Investments Between The 
Government Of The United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland And Republic 
Of Colombia, 2012. 
Convenio Entre El Gobierno De La Republica Del Peru Y El Gobierno De La Republica De 
Cuba Sobre La Promocion Y Proteccion Reciproca De Inversiones, 2013. 
Agreement Between The Czech Republic And The United Mexican States On The 
Promotion And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, 2013. 
Agreement Between The Republic Of Guatemala And The Republic Of Trinidad And 
Tobago On The Reciprocal Promotion And Protection Of Investments, 2013. 
Agreement Between The Government Of The United Mexican States And The Government 
Of The Republic Of Iceland On The Promotion And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, 
2013. 
Agreement Between The Government Of The United Mexican States And The Government 
Of The Republic Of India On The Promotion and Protection Of Investments, 2013. 
Agreement Between Japan And The Republic Of Peru For The Promotion, Protection And 
Liberalisation Of Investment, 2014. 
Agreement Between Japan And Ukraine For The Promotion And Protection Of Investment, 
2014. 
Agreement Between Japan And The Oriental Republic Of Uruguay For The Liberalization, 
Promotion And Protection Of Investment, 2014. 
Agreement Between The Government Of The United Mexican States And The Government 
Of The State Of Kuwait On The Promotion And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, 2014. 
Agreement On Promotion, Encouragement And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments 
Between The Kingdom Of The Netherlands And The United Mexican States, 2014. 
Pacific Alliance Additional Protocol, 2014. 
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Mexico - Panama Fta, 2015. 
Agreement Between The Portuguese Republic And The United Mexican States On The 
Reciprocal Promotion And Protection Of Investments, 2015. 
Agreement Between The United Mexican States And The Slovak Republic On The 
Promotion And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, 2015. 
Agreement On The Promotion And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments Between The 
United Mexican States And The Kingdom Of Spain, 2015. 
Agreement Between The Government Of The Kingdom Of Sweden And The Government 
Of The United Mexican States Concerning The Promotion And Reciprocal Protection Of 
Investments, 2015. 
Agreement Between The Swiss Confederation And The United Mexican States On The 
Promotion And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, 2015. 
Acuerdo Entre El Gobierno De Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos Y El Gobierno De La 
Republica De Trinidad Y Tobago Para La Promoción Y Protección Recíproca De Las 
Inversiones , 2016. 
Agreement Between The Government Of The United Kingdom Of Great Britain And 
Northern Ireland And The Government Of The United Mexican States For The Promotion 
And Reciprocal Protection Of Investments, 2016. 
 
